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premium on corporate assets is comparable to the standard equity premium. To reconcile this evidence, we
show that aggregate net issuances, which are acyclical and highly volatile, mask a strong exposure of total
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON BANKING AND ASSET-PRICING
Tetiana Davydiuk
Joao Gomes & Amir Yaron
This dissertation consists of two chapters. In the first chapter, I study both theoretical and
quantitative implications of the counter-cyclical capital buffers introduced with the Basel
Accord III. The proposed adjustment effectively translates into capital charges that vary
over time. To this end, I develop a tractable general equilibrium model and use it to solve
for optimal state-dependent capital requirements. An optimal policy trades off reduced
inefficient lending with reduced liquidity provision. Quantitatively, I find that the optimal
Ramsey policy requires pro-cyclical capital ratios that mostly vary between 4% and 6% and
depend on the output and bank credit growth, as well as the liquidity premium. Specifically,
a one standard deviation increase in GDP (bank credit) translates into 0.6% (0.1%) increase
in the capital charges, while a one standard deviation increase in liquidity premium leads
to a 0.2% drop. The welfare gain of implementing this Ramsey policy is relatively large.
In the second chapter, I, jointly with Scott Richard, Ivan Shaliastovich and Amir Yaron,
investigate the channels of asset price variation when a representative agent owns the entire
corporate sector. Utilizing novel market data on corporate bonds we measure the aggregate
market value of U.S. corporate assets and their payouts to investors. Total asset payouts are
very volatile, turn negative when corporations raise capital, and in contrast to procyclical
cash payouts are acyclical. This challenges the notion of risk and return since the risk
premium on corporate assets is comparable to the standard equity premium. To reconcile
this evidence, we show that aggregate net issuances, which are acyclical and highly volatile,
mask a strong exposure of total payouts cash components to low-frequency growth risks.
We develop an asset-pricing framework to quantitatively assess this economic channel.
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CHAPTER 1 : DYNAMIC BANK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
1.1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis imparted renewed attention on the stability of the banking sector
and on capital regulation. Both policymakers and academics have recognized that risk-
based capital requirements, such as those in the 2004 Basel II Accord, tend to exacerbate
business-cycle fluctuations, leading to an overly cyclical credit supply. To protect the bank-
ing sector from periods of excess credit growth and leverage buildup, the 2010 Basel III
Accord introduced the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) framework. The proposed
adjustment effectively translates into capital ratios that vary over time. Despite a few re-
cent trials to implement CCyB regimes within countries in the European Union, there is
no consensus at the practical or theoretical level about the implications of CCyBs on the
macroeconomy1.
The goal of this paper is to investigate both the theoretical and quantitative implications
of optimal state-dependent capital requirements. By comparison, most of the existing lit-
erature has limited itself to examining the costs and benefits of the overall level of capital
requirements.2 To this end, I develop a tractable general equilibrium model and use it to
characterize optimal bank capital requirements. The problem of choosing an optimal capital
policy follows from the work of Ramsey (1927) and builds on the primal approach used in
the optimal taxation literature3.
My model has three key features. First, high-quality production projects are scarce, espe-
cially during economic downturns. Second, banks benefit from government guarantees in
1The expectation is that the buffer will be at zero through most of the business cycle and increase to the
maximum 2.5% points only at the peak of the credit cycle. Even though under 2010 Basel Accord the CCyB
regime will be phased in globally between 2016 and 2019, individual EU members have already introduced
the CCyBs. For instance, the Bank of England maintained the buffer rate equal to 0% starting from 26 Jun
2014, and plans to increase it to 0.5% starting from 27 Jun 2018.
2Some examples include Diamond and Rajan (2000), Diamond and Rajan (2001), Hellmann et al. (2000),
Repullo (2004), Morrison and White (2005), Van den Heuvel (2008), Admati et al. (2010), DeAngelo and
Stulz (2013), Nguyen (2014), Begenau (2016),
3See, for example, Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari et al. (1991) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (2015).
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the form of bank bailouts, which lowers their borrowing cost, thereby creating incentives to
risk-shift. Third, households value money-like assets in the form of bank debt. This implies
that bank debt is priced at a premium and is a cheaper source of funding than equity. The
last two features create a trade-off: while tighter capital ratios can help to mitigate a bank’s
motives to risk-shift and rule out inefficient lending, at the same time they can reduce the
bank’s supply of credit and the creation of safe liquid assets4.
In the model, procyclical capital requirements (or, equivalently, countercyclical capital
buffers) emerge endogenously as an optimal policy scheme in a Ramsey equilibrium. Be-
cause of government guarantees, banks end up financing low-quality projects and more so
during periods of high economic growth, even though they are inefficient from the social
prospective. The reasons are twofold. Because of better lending opportunities during ex-
pansions, banks increase the supply of credit and deposits. As a result, the premium on
band debt becomes smaller, thereby increasing the value of default option and lowering the
banks borrowing costs. This translates into an even higher level of lending. In addition,
during expansions banks risk-shift on a larger scale, which implies that more inefficient
projects are financed in absolute terms. Consequently, heightened capital regulation can
be most beneficial through credit booms. At the same time, tight capital requirements can
have a contractionary effect on bank activity especially during recessions, when liquidity is
most valuable to households and, as a result, equity financing is more costly for banks. This
implies that optimal capital charges should be lower during economic slowdowns, thereby
reinforcing the cyclicality of optimal capital ratios.
In the model, procyclical capital requirements (or, equivalently, countercyclical capital
buffers) emerge endogenously as an optimal policy scheme. Presence of government in-
duces banks to finance low-quality production projects, even though they are inefficient
from the social prospective. My results show that investment in such projects builds-up
4This is consistent with the “countercyclical capital buffer” instituted with Basel III. The required buffer
is called countercyclical because the goal is to dampen the impact of capital regulation on the cyclicality of
bank lending. The buffer itself is procyclical.
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during periods of high economic growth. Because of better lending opportunities during
expansions, banks increase the supply of credit. As a result, expected bailout subsidies
become larger, thereby lowering banks borrowing costs and translating into an even higher
level of lending. Consequently, heightened capital regulation can be most beneficial through
credit booms. At the same time, tight capital requirements can have a contractionary effect
on bank activity especially during recessions, when liquidity is most valuable to households.
As banks reduce their deposit creation during downturns, the premium on bank debt in-
creases and, as a result, equity financing becomes more costly for banks.5 This implies that
optimal capital charges should be lower during economic slowdowns, thereby reinforcing the
cyclicality of optimal capital ratios.
In the model, procyclical capital requirements (or, equivalently, countercyclical capital
buffers) emerge endogenously as an optimal policy scheme. Because of government guaran-
tees, banks end up financing low-quality production projects, even though they are inefficient
from the social prospective. My results show that investment in such projects builds-up
during periods of high economic growth, when the bailout wedge – expected government
subsidy – is large. In the model, both the size of the government transfer and probability of
receiving it increase in bank level of lending. As banks issue more loans, they move further
into the distribution of projects’ quality and, thus, lower the quality of a marginal loan
on their balance sheet. Because of better lending opportunities during expansions, banks
increase the supply of credit. As a result, expected bailout subsidies become larger, thereby
lowering bank borrowing costs and translating into an even higher level of inefficient lending
during expansions. This implies that heightened capital regulation can be most beneficial
through credit booms. At the same time, tight capital requirements can have a contrac-
tionary effect on bank activity especially during recessions, when liquidity is most valuable
to households. As banks reduce their lending and deposit creation during downturns, the
5This paper focuses on the ongoing costs of holding equity on the balance sheet, as opposed to the
costs of raising new external equity finance. One of the theories why equity is more expensive on ongoing
basis has to do with the existence of the liquidity premium on safe “money-like” assets produced by banks
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)).
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premium on bank debt increases and, as a result, equity financing becomes more costly for
banks.6 Consequently, optimal capital charges should be lower during economic slowdowns,
thereby reinforcing the cyclicality of optimal capital ratios.
My results also show that the optimal Ramsey policy used as a single policy tool is not
sufficient to restore both the socially optimal level of lending and liquidity provision. To
provide some intuition behind the design of optimal capital regulations, I solve separately for
the “lending capital requirement” – restoring the first-best level of investment but admitting
a reduced level of deposits – and the “liquidity capital requirement” – ensuring the first-level
of liquidity provision but also allowing for excessive lending. Such policies focus only on one
dimension of the problem, either dampening incentives of banks to risk-shift or stimulating
creation of safe and liquid assets. By contrast, the Ramsey capital requirement balances
reduced inefficient lending with reduced liquidity provision.
The model highlights important trade-offs one needs to consider when regulating bank
capital. However, for effective policy making, it is also crucial to assess these trade-offs
quantitatively. I therefore calibrate the model to best match key macroeconomic quantities
and bank data variables. Using this choice of parameters, I solve numerically for the optimal
policy in the Ramsey equilibrium. Specifically, I characterize the optimal state-contingent
capital regulation and the set of allocations for bank lending and liquidity provision that
maximize consumers’ lifetime utility. Ramsey allocations have the property that they can
be implemented as a competitive equilibrium when banks encounter the prescribed capital
requirements. I find that the optimal Ramsey policy requires a cyclical capital ratio that
mostly varies between 4% and 6% and depends on key indicators of economic growth and
asset prices. This range of values is roughly comparable with a 2.5% upper bound of the
CCyB proposed by the Basel III Accord. Importantly, the optimal policy rule is not capped
at 6%, and can rise above it during periods of abnormal economic growth. In addition, the
6This paper focuses on the ongoing costs of holding equity on the balance sheet, as opposed to the
costs of raising new external equity finance. One of the theories why equity is more expensive on ongoing
basis has to do with the existence of the liquidity premium on safe “money-like” assets produced by banks
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)).
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mean Ramsey capital requirement is around 5%. This is one percentage point higher than
the level of the leverage ratio, and one percentage point lower than the Tier 1 capital ratio
as recommended by the Basel III Accord.
Implementing the optimal Ramsey policy delivers a permanent increase in the annual con-
sumption and deposit holdings of households relative to the average capital ratio observed
in the data. Although the exact magnitude of the welfare gain depends on the attitude
of households toward risk, more than 60% is attributed to having state-dependent capital
requirements. The remaining welfare improvement is achieved by setting an optimal fixed
capital requirement equal to the mean Ramsey capital ratio. The optimal policy leads to a
reduction in the cyclicality of bank credit – reducing inefficient lending during expansions,
but increasing the supply of credit during economic slowdowns – and, as a result, achieves
on average a higher level of consumption and deposit creation.
The main contribution of the paper is to characterize the optimal policy rule in terms of
measurable macroeconomic and bank aggregates. While the Basel Committee recommends
adjusting the capital requirements based on the “credit gap” – the deviation of the credit-to-
GDP ratio with respect to its long-term trend, – I show the credit gap alone fails to capture
the time variation in the optimal Ramsey policy. Instead, I find the optimal policy rule
takes into account the joint behavior of the credit gap, GDP, and the liquidity premium.
Specifically, the optimal policy is well approximated by the following rule:
capital ratio = 5% + 0.1%× credit gap+ 0.7%×GDP − 0.1%× liquidity premium,
where the liquidity premium is a discount on the price of safe liquid assets.7 A one standard
deviation increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio (GDP) translates into a 0.1% (0.7%) increase
in capital charges, while a one standard deviation increase in the liquidity premium leads
to a 0.1% drop. Growth in bank credit, along with the output growth, act as indicators of
7The three indicators are expressed in log-deviations from their steady states and normalized by their
standard deviations. The GDP variable has been orthogonolized with respect to the credit gap variable.
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banks’ incentives to risk-shift. By contrast, the liquidity premium serves as an indicator of
how expensive equity financing is for banks and how valuable liquid assets are for investors.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 1.2, I provide the details of bank regulation,
as well as review the related literature. I develop the baseline model in Section 1.3. I
characterize the first-best allocation in this economy in Section 1.4, as well as the competitive
equilibria with and without capital regulations in place. In Section 1.5, I examine the lending
and liquidity capital requirements within the baseline model. I provide the quantitative
assessment of the model in Section 1.6, as well as present the optimal policy rule. Concluding
remarks are give in Section 1.7.
1.2. Bank Regulation and Related Literature
1.2.1. The Basel Accords
The Basel Accords, developed by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS), con-
solidate capital requirements as the cornerstone of bank regulation. The 1988 Basel Accord,
known as Basel I (BCBS (1988)), was criticized for the risk-insensitivity of capital charges.
To address this critique, the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach was introduced with
the publication of Basel II in 2004. Under risk-based regulation, the amount of capital
that a bank is required to hold against a given exposure depends on the estimated credit
risk of that exposure, which in turn is determined by the probability of default (PD), loss
given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD), and maturity. The key implication of the
IRB approach is that riskier exposures carry a higher capital charge. The intention of this
approach is to reduce bank failures and the associated systemic costs by holding the bank
probability of default below some fixed target.
Both policymakers and academics have recognized that risk-sensitive capital regulations,
such as that in Basel II, tend to exacerbate the inherent cyclicality of bank lending and,
consequently, distort investment decisions. This is because in economics downturns losses
erode bank capital, and the remaining (non-defaulted) loans are downgraded by the relevant
6
credit risk model, delivering higher capital charges. To the extent that it is difficult or costly
for a bank to raise new capital during recessions, it will be forced to cut back on its lending
activity. Kashyap et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence that equity-raising was sluggish
during the recent financial crisis.
Kashyap and Stein (2004) argue that the IRB approach is largely microprudential in nature
and ignores the importance of the function of bank lending. In line with the literature on
capital crunches in banking, they claim that the shadow value of bank capital increases
during recessions and a capital requirement that is too high when bank capital is scarce
may result in reduced funding of positive net present value projects. So, if the government’s
objective is both to protect the financial system against the costs of bank defaults and
sustain bank-lending efficiency, the capital charges should be adjusted to the state of the
business cycle (for any degree of credit-risk exposure).
An important argument that is sometimes made is that during periods of economic growth
banks may hold capital in excess of the minimum regulatory requirements that could neu-
tralize potential cyclicality problems. Repullo and Suarez (2012) develop a dynamic model
of relationship lending, in which banks hold voluntary capital buffers as a precaution. They
find that the capital buffers set aside during expansions are typically not sufficient to pre-
vent credit supply shrinkage during recessions. They also document that the optimal capital
requirements are higher and less cyclically-varying than the requirements of Basel II when
the social cost of bank failure is high.
In an attempt to strengthen bank balance sheets against future financial upheavals, Basel
III introduced the countercyclical capital buffers, which range from zero to 2.5% of risk-
weighted assets. As mentioned before, the BCBS proposed to adjust the level of the buffer
based on the credit gap, meanwhile acknowledging that it may not be a good indicator of
stress in downturns. For example, Repullo and Saurina (2011) find that the credit gap for
many countries is negatively correlated with GDP growth. This can be traced to the fact
that the supply of credit typically lags the business cycle, especially in downturns.
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Kashyap and Stein (2004), Gordy and Howells (2006), Saurina and Trucharte (2007), and
Kashyap et al. (2008), among others, focus on the correction of risk-based capital require-
ments in a macroprudential direction. Using Spanish data, Repullo et al. (2010) analyze
different procedures aimed at mitigating the procyclical effects of capital regulation and
conclude that the most appealing one is to use a business cycle multiplier based on GDP
growth. The proposed adjustment maintains the risk sensitivity in the cross-section (i.e.,
banks with riskier portfolios would bear a higher capital charge), but a cyclically-varying
scaling factor would increase capital requirements in good times and reduce them in bad
times. In line with this study, I propose a cyclical policy rule that depends positively on
indicators of economic growth. In my setting, state-contingent capital requirements emerge
endogenously as an optimal policy scheme. Optimal regulations promote the stability of
the banking sector without contracting the supply of bank credit and deposit creation. Ar-
guments in favor of time-varying capital regulations are also found in Kashyap et al. (2008),
Hanson et al. (2011), and Malherbe (2015). Note that I abstract from the cross-sectional
dimension of capital regulation and focus on the time-series dimension.
1.2.2. Literature Review
The most closely related paper is Malherbe (2015), which studies the optimal capital re-
quirement over the business and financial cycles. In his setting, because of the general
equilibrium effect and decreasing returns to scale in production a higher level of aggregate
banking capital calls for a tighter capital requirement to preclude inefficient credit growth.
Even though his model also finds that capital regulation should be tightened during boom
episodes, the mechanism is different from mine. Liquidity channel
This research project is at the intersection of a large literature on optimal banking regu-
lation theory and dynamic macroeconomic models of financial intermediation. The recent
financial crisis has brought to the forefront the discussion of whether the capital require-
ments of banks should be increased (Admati et al. (2010)). On one side, Hellmann et al.
(2000), Repullo (2004), and Morrison and White (2005) argue that stringent capital regula-
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tion can induce prudent behavior by banks. On the other side, Diamond and Rajan (2000),
Diamond and Rajan (2001), and DeAngelo and Stulz (2013) provide theoretical evidence
that tightening capital requirements may distort banks’ provision of liquidity services, while
Dewatripont and Tirole (2012) show that stricter capital requirements may introduce gover-
nance problems. In line with the existing literature, I suggest that reduced moral hazard is
the key rationale for imposing restrictive capital regulation with reduced liquidity provision
being the main downside.
This paper is most closely related to other quantitative studies on the welfare impact of
capital requirements (Van den Heuvel (2008) , Nguyen (2014), Begenau (2016), Van den
Heuvel (2016)) and leverage constraints (Bigio (2010), Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2012),
Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014), and Christiano and Ikeda (2014) ). Among the most recent
studies estimating the optimal level of fixed capital requirements are Nguyen (2014) and
Begenau (2016). Nguyen (2014) finds that consumers’ lifetime utility is maximized at 8%
capital ratio, while the optimal number estimated by Begenau (2016) is 14%. A common
feature in these two papers is that government guarantees incentivize banks to engage in
excessive risk-taking, while capital regulation helps to address these distortions. Begenau
(2016) also extends the banks’ role to providing liquidity services, which are valued by
households. I complement this branch of literature by developing a tractable framework to
quantify the benefits and costs of capital regulation over the business cycle. This allows
me to provide not only qualitative, but also quantitative recommendations on the policy
design. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to solve for the stage-contingent
capital requirements within the Ramsey framework.
My paper is closely related to the papers estimating an optimal level of fixed capital re-
quirement in a dynamic general equilibrium setting. In this sense, the paper complements
existing quantitative studies on the welfare impact of leverage constraints. Van den Heuvel
(2008) was one of the first to study the welfare cost of capital requirements in a quantita-
tive general equilibrium model. Using U.S. data, he finds that the current level of capital
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regulation dampens the ability of banks to create liquidity, leading to a welfare loss, and,
therefore, concludes that it is too high. In his paper the bank capital structure is recovered
from binding capital requirements and it is difficult to infer the welfare costs of alternative
levels of bank regulation than the current one. Among the most recent studies estimating
the optimal capital requirements are Nguyen (2014) and Begenau (2016). Nguyen (2014)
finds that the welfare is maximized at 8% capital ratio, while the optimal number esti-
mated by Begenau (2016) is equal to 14%. A common feature in these two papers is that
government guarantees incentivize banks to engage in excessive risk-taking, while capital
regulation helps to address these distortions. Begenau (2016) also extends the banks’ role
to providing liquidity services, which are valued by households.
My paper is also related to prior contributions focused on welfare implications of capital
constraints. Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014), Christiano and Ikeda (2014), Bigio (2010) and
Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2012) reach the conclusion that a tighter leverage constraint
lowers the riskiness of the financial sector, but that it also shortens bank lending capacity,
thereby depressing the economic growth. Corbae and D’Erasmo (2014) study the quanti-
tative impact of capital regulation on bank risk-taking, bank failures and market structure
when there is competition among small and big banks. Bigio (2010) develops a model with
endogenous liquidity mechanism and analyzes how capital requirements change the risk
capacity of the economy. Christiano and Ikeda (2014) quantify the effects of leverage con-
straints in a framework where bankers have an unobservable effort choice. Martinez-Miera
and Suarez (2012) study the role of banks in generating systemic risk taking and find that
optimal capital requirements are quite high and don’t require counter-cyclical adjustments.
This is one of the first paper which looks at the welfare implications of time-varying capital
regulation.
There are few empirical contributions on the effects of higher capital requirements on bank
lending and bank cost of capital. Looking at the data on large financial institutions, Kashyap
et al. (2010) find that even if the minimum capital ratio is increased by 10%, the impact on
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loan rates is likely to be modest, in the range of 25 to 45 bps. In a similar vein, Baker and
Wurgler (2013) calibrate that a ten-percentage point increase in capital requirements would
translate into a higher weighted average cost of capital by 60-90 bps per year. Kisin and
Manela (2013) estimate the perceived costs of capital requirements by employing the data
on banks’ participation in a costly loophole that helped them to bypass capital regulations.
They document that a ten-percentage point increase in Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets
leads to, at most, a 3 bps increase in banks’ cost of capital. Even though these studies shed
light on the potential impact of capital regulations on the real economy, it is difficult to
assess the overall welfare implications of a time-varying capital requirement in their setting.
More broadly, this paper fits a strand of macroeconomic literature on the role of financial
intermediation in the development of economic crises. The transmission mechanism by
which the effects of small shocks persist, amplify, and spread to the macroeconomy is first
identified in the seminal works of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1995),
and Bernanke et al. (1999). The more recent studies of the balance sheet channel include
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), He and Krishnamurthy (2012),
Di Tella (2013), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).
1.3. Model Setup
To focus on the novel mechanisms associated with dynamic bank capital requirements, I
first layout the baseline model, which is kept as parsimonious as possible. I later augment
the model to quantify policy recommendations on what defines optimal time variation in
capital requirements of banks.
I develop a model studying the welfare implications of an endogenous capital requirement.
Government guarantees can introduce distortions in bank incentives and lead to excessive
risk-taking in equilibrium. Socially optimal allocation - both the first-best level of lending
and first-best level of liquidity provision - can not be restored with help of only one policy
tool. However, substantial welfare gains can be achieved when the government imposes a
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time-varying capital requirement.
In the model, time is discrete and runs for an infinite number of periods. Financial interme-
diaries own the production technology and the stock of capital in this economy. They are
financed either partially or entirely with deposits. The presence of deposit insurance dis-
torts banks’ optimal choices of investment. Households consume the final goods produced
in the banking sector and invest any savings in the banks’ deposits. To finance bailout
expenditures, the government levies taxes on households in lump-sum fashion.
1.3.1. Banking Sector
I start by characterizing a banking sector in detail. At any point in time the economy is
populated with a continuum of ex ante identical banks of measure one, indexed by j ∈ Ω =
[0, 1]. Each bank has access to decreasing returns to scale technology and produces a final
good yj,t, using capital as the only input,
yj,t = e
ωj,t+at lαj,t,
where at is an aggregate productivity shock, which follows:
at = (1− ρa) a¯+ ρaat−1 + σat, t ∼ iid N (0, 1) (1.1)
and ωj,t is an idiosyncratic disturbance, which is identically distributed across time and
across banks:
ωj,t = −1
2
σ2ω + σωεj,t, εj,t ∼ iid N (0, 1) . (1.2)
In the cross-section, the bank-specific shocks average to zero. This setup is isomorphic
to the one, where a consumption good is produced by penniless firms, who have been
credit rationed in the capital markets due to unmodeled information asymmetries, and
whose only source of funding is bank loans.8 The capital used in banks’ production process
8Suppose that each bank operates on an island j; one can think of an island as an industry or a state.
On each island, there is a continuum of cashless firms who require a unit investment at time t for production
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can be correspondingly interpreted as the amount of bank loans issued to these types of
borrowers. From this point on, I refer to lj,t+1 as bank lending. The decreasing returns
to scale assumption is crucial to capture the idea that borrowers are not homogeneous and
that there is a finite number of creditworthy borrowers, or equivalently a finite number
of positive net present value (NPV) production projects. This setup ensures that banks
internalize that each extra lending unit (borrower) is not as productive (creditworthy) as
the previous one.
A bank j enters a period t with capital, lj,t, bank debt, dj,t, and equity, nj,t. The balance
sheet equates risky assets, lj,t, to bank debt, dj,t, and equity, nj,t:
Bank j enters period t with lj,t lending units, financed with dj,t units of debt and nj,t units
of equity. The balance sheet equates risky assets to bank debt and equity:
lj,t – loans nj,t – net worth
dj,t – debt
The bank’s revenues realized at time t are equal to its earnings on the production net of
the interest payments on its liabilities:
pij,t = e
ωj,t+at lαj,t − lj,t − (Rd,t − 1) dj,t.
For the statement of problem, it is useful to define equity after profits as n˜j,t ≡ pij,t + nj,t.
Next, I assume that when a financial intermediary does not have sufficient funds to service
at time t + 1. Firms on each island are ranked according to their productivity. Specifically, a firm i on an
island j (where i denotes the firm’s ranking) produces αeωj,t+at iα−1 units of a consumption good. At time
t, the bank on island j issues loans to the first lj,t+1 firms with the total amount equal to:∫ lj,t+1
0
1di = lj,t+1.
The monopolist bank on the island can extract all surplus. In particular, at time t+ 1 the bank on island j
receives from the firms: ∫ lj,t+1
0
αeωj,t+1+at+1 iα−1di = eωj,t+1+at+1 lαj,t+1.
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its deposit liabilities, depositors are bailed out with probability one.9 In particular, banks
will default on their credit obligations whenever their idiosyncratic shock ωj,t is below a
cutoff level ω∗j,t, defined by the expression:
pij,t + nj,t = 0⇔ eω∗j,t+at lαj,t = Rd,tdj,t.
The net worth, nj,t+1, available to banks at the end of period t (going into period t + 1),
evolves according to:
nj,t+1 = {pij,t + nj,t}+ − zj,t (1.3)
=
{(
eωj,t+at lα−1j,t −Rd,t
)
lj,t +Rd,tnj,t
}+ − zj,t,
where {·}+ denotes the maximum operator max {·, 0} and captures that banks are subject
to limited liability and government guarantees. zj,t is the net payouts to the bank’s share-
holders. A positive net transfer, zj,t > 0, means that the equityholders receive dividends,
while a negative one, zj,t < 0, means that there is an equity issuance. Equation 1.3 demon-
strates that any growth in bank equity above the deposit return depends on the premium
that the financial intermediary earns on its assets, as well as the total amount of lending. To
finance the difference between the capital investment and available net worth, the financial
intermediary borrows an amount dj,t+1 from households, given by:
dj,t+1 = lj,t+1 − nj,t+1.
Finally, banks are subject to capital regulations, which require them to have a minimum
9The banking sector is subject to government guarantees for reasons that I do not explicitly model.
As has been acknowledged by the academics and practitioners, without government protection, economies
are prone to bank runs. Bank runs were a recurrent feature during the Great Depression in the U.S. and
continue today, including recent episodes of bank failures in the U.S. (Countrywide, IndyMac), Great Britain
(Northern Rock), and India (ICICI Bank). With many bank failures, there is a disruption of the monetary
system and a reduction in production (Bernanke (1983), Calomiris and Mason (2003), Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2008)). With the goal of protecting the economy against the potential welfare losses associated with bank
runs, deposit insurance was introduced along with a number of implicit government guarantees.
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amount of equity as a fraction of assets. Since loans are the only type of asset in my model,
the capital requirement I instate is that equity needs be at least a fraction ζt of loans for a
bank to be able to operate:
nj,t+1 ≥ ζtlj,t+1.
In each period, bank j decides how many loans to issue, lj,t+1, and makes a leverage choice
to maximize the discounted sum of the equity payouts:
max
zj,t,lj,t+1,dj,t+1,nj,t+1
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtzj,t
]
(1.4)
s.t. nj,t+1 =
{
eωj,t+at lαj,t −Rd,tdj,t
}+ − zj,t,
lj,t = nj,t + dj,t,
nj,t+1 ≥ ζtlj,t+1,
nj,0, dj,0 given.
makes an investment choice - how much loans to issue, lj,t+1, and a leverage choice - with how
much debt, dj,t+1, and how much equity, nj,t+1, to finance their investment - to maximize
the expected payouts to shareholders.
1.3.2. Household Sector
The economy is populated by a measure one of identical households. There are two types of
members in each household: savers and bankers (Gertler and Karadi (2011)). Savers hold
deposits at a diversified portfolio of financial institutions and return the interest earned to
their household. Bankers, on the other hand, manage financial intermediaries and similarly
return any earnings back to the household. The savers hold deposits at the banks that
its household does not own, otherwise in the absence of tax frictions, the Modigliani-Miller
theorem would hold and the irrelevance of banks’ capital structure would follow. Savers’ and
bankers’ earnings are perfectly shared across the entire household to secure a representative
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agent framework.
Let Ct denote family consumption and Dt+1 denote the holdings of bank deposits. House-
holds are risk-neutral and have a discount rate of β ∈ (0, 1) .10 I also assume that households
value the non-pecuniary services provided by bank deposits and, hence, enjoy the additional
flow of utility v (Dt+1), which is a concave non-decreasing function of the supply of deposits
Dt+1.
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Then households preferences are, therefore, given by
u (Ct, Dt+1) = Ct +
D1−ηt+1
1− η , η < 1.
In each period, the household chooses a consumption level and deposit holdings to maximize
their utility subject to the budget constraint:
max
Ct,Dt+1
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt (Ct + v (Dt+1))
]
(1.5)
with v (Dt+1) =
D1−ηt+1
1− η , η < 1
s.t. Ct = Rd,tDt −Dt+1 + Zt − Tt,
D0 given,
where Tt is a lump-sum tax levied by the government. Households are the owners of financial
intermediaries and at the end of each period receive the net proceeds of bank activity, Zt.
A unit of deposits issued in period t yields a gross return of Rd,t+1 at time t+ 1.
The presence of the government guarantees implies that Rd,t+1 is a return on a riskless
10A household’s consumption can be both positive and negative, as in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).
Negative consumption can be interpreted as disutility from labor.
11See, for example, Nataliya et al. (2016). This particular utility function allows me to derive the analytical
solutions for the baseline model, but it is generalized when I move to the quantitative assessment of the
optimal capital requirements.
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asset. The first-order conditions of 1.5 impart that the interest rate on deposits is equal to:
Rd,t+1 =
1
β
− 1
β
D−ηt+1.︸ ︷︷ ︸
liquidity premium
(1.6)
Since households exhibit a preference for bank debt, there is a discount on its interest rate,
which is the amount households are willing to relinquish in exchange for holding a risk-free
asset, which gives a flow of utility compared to a risk-free asset that does not give a flow
of utility.12 Figure 1 shows that liquidity premium is a decreasing function in the supply
of bank deposits. This implies that liquid deposits become more valuable to the household
when they are scarce.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) were among the first to analyze household demand for liq-
uidity. They find that bank deposits provide better risk-sharing possibilities to consumers,
justifying the existence of the liquidity premium. Stein (2011) and Gorton and Metrick
(2012) argue that collateralized short-term debt issued by banks yields a “money-like” con-
venience premium based on its relative safety and the transactions services that safe claims
provide. Further, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2015) document that investors value the money-like features of Trea-
suries the most, when the supply of Treasuries is low. The welfare implications of the
presence of liquidity premium via its effects on the lending costs of banks have also been
studied by Begenau (2016) and Van den Heuvel (2016).
1.3.3. Government
The role of the government is to provide deposit insurance. To finance its expenditures on
bank bailouts, the government levies a lump-sump tax on households in accordance with a
12In this setting, the rate of return on any other safe asset other than bank debt is equal to 1
β
. As long
as households derive utility from bank deposits and the economy is not fully saturated with liquidity, the
interest rate on bank debt is always lower than the interest rate on any other risk-free asset,
lim
Dt+1→∞
Rd,t+1 =
1
β
.
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balanced budget rule:
Tt =
∫ 1
0
max
{
Rd,tdj,t − eωj,t+at lαj,t, 0
}
dj. (1.7)
1.4. Equilibrium Characterization
Definition. A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices {Rd,t+1}∞t=0, government policies
{ζt, Tt}∞t=0, and allocations
{
Ct, Dt+1, {zj,t, lj,t+1, nj,t+1, dj,t+1}j∈Ω
}∞
t=0
, such that:
(i) Given prices {Rd,t+1}∞t=0, government policies {Tt}∞t=0 and initial amount of savings,
D0, households maximize their life-time utility given by 1.5;
(ii) Given prices {Rd,t+1}∞t=0, government policies {ζt, Tt}∞t=0 and initial capital structure
{nj,0, dj,0}j∈Ω, each bank j ∈ Ω maximizes the discounted sum of equity payouts given
by 1.4;
(iii) The government budget constraint 1.7 is satisfied;
(iv) Market clearing conditions hold:
– resource constraint
Ct +
∫ 1
0
lj,t+1dj =
∫ 1
0
yj,tdj,
– deposits market
Dt+1 =
∫ 1
0
dj,t+1dj.
The nature of the bank’s problem 1.4 implies that the equilibrium is symmetric and all banks
make identical decisions. The realization of the bank-specific shock ω induces a bailout
transfer from the government to a subgroup of banks, but does not affect the optimal
decisions of banks. To see this result, it is useful to define the value of the bank to its
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shareholders as follows:
J (lj,t, nj,t, ωj,t, St) = max {pij,t + nj,t, 0}+ V (St) ,
where the continuation value V (·) obeys the following Bellman equation:
V (St) = max
nj,t+1,lj,t+1
{
−nj,t+1 + Et
[
βMt,t+1
∫ +∞
0
J (lj,t+1, nj,t+1, ωj,t+1, St+1) dF (ωj,t+1)
]}
(1.8)
= max
nj,t+1,lj,t+1
{
−nj,t+1 + Et
[
βMt,t+1
(∫ +∞
ω∗j,t+1
(pij,t+1 + nj,t+1) dF (ωj,t+1) + V (St+1)
)]}
.
The conditional expectation Et is taken only over the distribution of aggregate productivity
shocks and St denotes the aggregate state of the economy. To the extent that bank-specific
shocks are not persistent and there is no equity issuance costs, all financial intermediaries are
ex ante the same and make identical decisions. In particular, lj,t+1 = Lt+1, nj,t+1 = Nt+1,
and dj,t+1 = Dt+1, ∀j ∈ Ω.
To uncover the inefficiencies introduced with the presence of government subsidies, I first
solve for the socially optimal allocation in this economy. Next, I characterize a competitive
equilibrium when banks face no capital regulations and then compare the optimal decisions
of banks in the two equilibria.
1.4.1. First-Best Allocation
A social planner chooses consumption and supply of liquid deposits to maximize households’
lifetime utility subject to the resource constraint:
max
Ct,Lt+1,Dt+1≤Lt+1
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Ct +
D1−ηt+1
1− η
)]
(1.9)
s.t. Ct + Lt+1 = e
atLαt ,
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where the regulator takes into account that the competitive equilibrium is symmetric and
that the deposit’s supply is bounded by the stock of capital in the banking sector. I
characterize the socially optimal allocation in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The first-best allocation is characterized by:
(i) Bank’s optimal finance policy:
DFBt+1 = L
FB
t+1, N
FB
t+1 = 0.
(ii) Optimal level of bank lending, LFBt+1, defined by:
Et
[
RFBl,t+1
]
= RFBd,t+1 (1.10)
with
RFBl,t+1 = αe
at+1
(
LFBt+1
)α−1
and RFBd,t+1 =
1
β
− 1
β
(
DFBt+1
)−η
.
Proposition 1 follows directly from the first order conditions to 1.9. The proofs of all
propositions are given in Appendix A. Because households value money-like securities, it
is optimal to finance all bank production with debt. The expression 1.10 pins down the
first-best level of lending by equating the marginal productivity of bank capital stock to the
marginal cost of lending (Figure 2). The social marginal cost of funding is equal to the rate
of return at which a household is willing to hold deposits at the financial intermediaries,
RFBd,t+1. It seems implausible that the social planner would find it optimal not to keep any
equity on the bank’s balance sheet. As an extension, I can introduce the social cost of bank
default. In such a setup, the optimal level of a bank net worth, NFBt+1 > 0, would trade off
reduced liquidity provision and reduced social cost of bank default.
I interpret the first-best level of lending, LFBt+1, as an upper limit on the amount of positive
NPV loans (creditworthy borrowers) in the economy. The model captures endogenously
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that there are fewer good lending opportunities during economic slowdowns than during
expansions, as I state in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The socially optimal level of lending, LFBt+1, is procyclical:
∂LFBt+1
∂at
> 0.
Proposition 2 is established using the equilibrium condition 1.10 and an implicit function
theorem (see Appendix A). Since the marginal productivity of lending is higher in good
times, when the marginal cost is acyclical (Figure 2), it is optimal to maintain a higher level
of production during expansions. This naturally advocates for a less stringent government
regulations during periods of economic growth, when there are more lending opportunities.
1.4.2. Competitive Equilibrium with No Capital Regulation
To highlight the economic mechanism at the heart of the model, I now provide a detailed
characterization of the bank’s lending and capital structure choice in a competitive equi-
librium. In this section, suppose that financial intermediaries face no capital regulation or,
equivalently, ζt = 0, ∀t.
The banks’ first order conditions with respect to lending and the amount of equity financing
are, respectively, given by:
Et [Rl,t+1] = Rd,t+1−Et
[∫ ω∗t+1
0
(Rd,t+1 − eωRl,t+1) dΦ (ω)
]
, (1.11)
−
(
1
β
−Rd,t+1
)
−Et
[∫ ω∗t+1
0
Rd,t+1dΦ (ω)
]
< 0, (1.12)
where the implicit (aggregate) rate of return on loans is equal to Rl,t+1 = αe
at+1Lα−1t+1 and
the bailout threshold is defined by eω
∗
t+1+at+1Lαt+1 = Rd,t+1 (Lt+1 −Nt+1). Φ (·) denotes the
normal distribution with mean −12σ2ω and standard deviation σω.
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The presence of government guarantees generates a bailout wedge in the bank’s cost of
lending, defined by:
ξ (Lt+1, Nt+1; at) ≡ Et
[∫ ω∗t+1
0
(Rd,t+1 − eωRl,t+1) dΦ (ω)
]
.
This bailout wedge captures the difference between the social and private marginal cost of
lending (see equations 1.10 and 1.11). The bank does not fully internalize the risk costs,
since those are partially borne by the taxpayers. In particular, whenever the bank’s profits
are hit by a sufficiently low idiosyncratic shock ω < ω∗t+1, their credit liabilities are covered
by the government. An important property of the bailout wedge is that for a given level
of lending it is decreasing in the aggregate productivity, ∂ξ/∂at < 0 (Panel A of Figure 3).
The economy is less likely to transition to a recession next period if it is currently in an
expansion, implying a lower bailout wedge during periods of economic growth.
Similarly, I can show that the bailout wedge is decreasing in Nt+1. The more net worth
financial intermediaries are holding on their balance sheet, the safer they are, the less likely
they will be bailed out and, hence, the smaller is the wedge in the lending cost.
The expression 1.12 demonstrates that equity is relatively a more expensive source of funding
for banks than debt. The reasons for this are twofold. By holding equity on their balance
sheets, banks forgo government subsidies and, at the same time, relinquish the liquidity
premium. As a result, the financial intermediaries will tilt their capital structure towards
debt and hold no equity on their balance sheets.
The funding wedge is strictly positive ξ (Lt+1, Nt+1; at) > 0, implying that the social
marginal cost of lending is strictly greater than the private one. Therefore, there exists an
excessive lending in a competitive equilibrium when the banks face no capital regulations,
LCEt+1 > L
FB
t+1.
13 It is a well documented in the banking literature, that government guaran-
tees incentivize banks to risk-shift. Contrary to the literature, in my model banks risk-shift
13ξ (Lt+1, Nt+1; at) > 0 as long as Lt+1 > 1, which ensures a positive rate of return on deposits.
22
in terms of quantity, rather than in terms of quality. By issuing more loans, banks move
further into the distribution of the projects’ quality (borrowers’ creditworthiness), meaning
that more loans result in a lower quality loan portfolio. I lay out a characterization of the
competitive equilibrium in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The competitive equilibrium with no capital regulation in place is charac-
terized by:
(i) Optimal level of lending, LCEt+1, defined by:
Et
[
RCEl,t+1
]
= RCEd,t+1 − ξ
(
LCEt+1, N
CE
t+1 ; at
)
, (1.13)
with
RCEl,t+1 = αe
at+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1
and RCEd,t+1 =
1
β
− 1
β
(
DCEt+1
)−η
.
(ii) Bank’s optimal finance policy:
DCEt+1 = L
CE
t+1 > L
FB
t+1, N
CE
t+1 = N
FB
t+1 = 0.
In the competitive equilibrium with the risk-shifting mechanism in place, the optimal level
of lending continues to be pro-cyclical (see Proposition 4). On the one side, lending is more
productive during expansions, calling for a higher level of investment. On the other side,
bank cost of lending goes up in good times because of a reduced bailout wedge, pushing the
optimal level of lending down (Panel B of Figure 3). Under log-normality of the aggregate
productivity shock, the former channel dominates the later and, hence, the procyclicality
of the optimal level of lending follows.
Proposition 4 In a competitive equilibrium with no capital regulations in place, the optimal
level of lending is procyclical:
∂LCEt+1
∂at
> 0.
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Using capital regulations, the government will aim to restrict inefficient lending that arises
in a competitive equilibrium. And whether tight capital requirements will be more benefi-
cial during expansions or recessions will depend on how the level of excessive investment,
LCEt+1/L
FB
t+1− 1, behaves over the business cycle. Proposition 5 provides the condition under
which the lending level in a competitive equilibrium is more procyclical than the first-best
allocation.
Proposition 5 The level of overinvestment is procyclical if and only if
−ξ¯a,t <
∂ξ
(
LCEt+1, N
CE
t+1 ; at
)
∂at
< 0. (1.14)
The threshold value ξ¯a is defined in Appendix A. There are a number of channels in force
that indicate how banks’ risk-shifting incentives change over the business cycle. First, a
decreasing returns to scale production technology generates a scale effect: in proportionate
terms banks risk-shift, by the same amount across the states of the economy, but since in
good times they risk-shift on a larger scale, the overinvestment is higher in absolute terms.
This mechanism can be demonstrated in the setup in which the bailout wedge is proportion-
ate to the deposit rate and the deposit rate is constant. The second channel arises due to
the fact that the value of default option (or, equivalently, bailout option) increases during
periods of economic growth as banks’ liabilities to debtholders become larger. Since during
good times the economy is more saturated with deposits, households are willing to relin-
quish a smaller premium on safe assets, delivering a higher deposit rate. This property of
the default option results from the concave preferences for liquid assets and can be demon-
strated in the setup in which banks have a constant returns to scale production technology.
Third, assuming everything else is equal, the probability of exercising the default option
is decreasing in the productivity shock at, meaning that the amount of inefficient lending
is reduced in good times. The restriction 1.14 ensures that in the equilibrium the banks’
risk-shifting motives are procyclical.
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The second channel arises due to the fact that the bailout wedge is increasing in lending,
∂ξ/∂Lt+1 > 0, as shown in Panel A of Figure 3. The more loans that banks issue, the
bigger is the size of the government transfer in case a bailout happens. This property
of the bailout wedge results from the concave preferences for liquid assets and decreasing
returns to scale in production. On the one side, a higher level of investment during periods
of economic growth implies a higher deposit rate, since the economy is saturated with
deposits and households are willing to relinquish a smaller premium on safe assets. On the
other side, decreasing returns to scale imply a lower income that is forgone in a bailout
when banks increase lending. A higher deposit rate and a lower rate of return on loans,
in turn, deliver a larger bailout wedge during expansions. Third, assuming everything else
is equal, the bailout wedge is decreasing in the productivity shock at, meaning that the
amount of inefficient lending is reduced in good times. The restriction 1.14 ensures that
in the equilibrium the bailout wedge or, equivalently, the banks’ risk-shifting motives are
procyclical.
1.4.3. Competitive Equilibrium with Capital Regulation
Next suppose that equity needs be at least a fraction ζt > 0 of loans for banks to be able to
operate. Given that in my model equity is a relatively more expensive form of finance for
banks than debt, the capital constraint is binding in each period of time (see Proposition
6).
Proposition 6 The capital constraint is binding:
NCEt+1 = ζtL
CE
t+1, D
CE
t+1 = (1− ζt)LCEt+1.
To demonstrate what are the implications of capital regulation on bank cost of lending, I
now provide the banks’ first-order conditions with respect to lending and the amount of
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equity financing, respectively, given by:
Et
[
RCEl,t+1
]
= RCEd,t+1 − ξ
(
LCEt+1, N
CE
t+1 ; at
)
+
1
β
λtζt,︸ ︷︷ ︸
equity wedge
(1.15)
1
β
λt = Et
[∫ ω∗
0
RCEd,t+1dF (ω)
]
+
(
1
β
−RCEd,t+1
)
, (1.16)
where λt is a Lagrange multiplier on the capital constraint. Imposing capital regulation
introduces an equity wedge into the bank’s cost of funding. The first term of equation 1.16
captures that a better capitalized bank forgoes the government subsidies and, as a result,
faces higher lending costs. A positive level of capital requirement also means that the bank’s
supply of deposits is reduced, implying a higher liquidity premium and, as a result, a higher
equity wedge, as captured by the second term of equation 1.16.
To better understand the costs and benefits of capital regulation, it is useful to decompose
the bank’s funding costs into (i) the liquidity channel and (ii) the risk-shifting channel,
which are, correspondingly, defined by:
θ (Lt+1, ζt) ≡ Rd,t+1 + ζt
(
1
β
−Rd,t+1
)
,
ξ˜ (Lt+1, ζt; at) ≡ Et
[∫ ω∗t+1
0
((1− ζt)Rd,t+1 − eωRl,t+1) dΦ (ω)
]
.
The obvious benefit of tightened capital requirements is reduced risk-shifting incentives
for banks. As shown in Panel A of Figure 4, the bailout wedge adjusted for the pres-
ence of capital regulations ξ˜ decreases as capital regulations are tightened, implying that
less inefficient firms are financed. There are two reinforcing mechanisms in place: the
bailout threshold ω∗t+1, as well as the size of a government transfer in case of a bank failure
((1− ζt)Rd,t+1 − eωRl,t+1), falls as capital requirements become more stringent.
The level of the liquidity costs of lending θ is mainly determined by the amount of deposits
supplied to households. A higher capital requirement means that the supply of liquid assets
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is reduced and, as a result, a liquidity premium is magnified. From the bank’s perspective,
this implies a lower required rate of return on debt, but a higher equity wedge (Panel B
of Figure 4). As long as η < 1, the liquidity cost of lending is strictly increasing in ζt.
Overall, capital regulations translate into a heightened lending costs for banks, suggesting
that excessive lending can be restrained by imposing a sufficiently high capital requirement.
1.4.4. Optimal Capital Requirements
The goal of a social planner when choosing an optimal level of capital requirements is to
dampen bank’s risk-shifting incentives, but without restricting the bank’ supply of high-
quality loans and deposits. As a matter of fact, it is not feasible to restore both first-best
level of lending and liquidity provision at the same time with only the help of capital
requirements. Suppose for now that the only goal of the regulator is to restore a socially
optimal lending level and to achieve this goal the capital requirement is set to ζLt > 0, which
is the “lending capital requirement”. This translates into a level of liquidity provision Dζ
L
t+1
that is below the socially optimal lending level:
Dζ
L
t+1 =
(
1− ζLt
)
LFBt+1 < L
FB
t+1 = D
FB
t+1.
Similarly, consider a social planner who aims to recover a socially optimal level of deposits
and imposes a capital requirement of ζDt , which is the “liquidity capital regulation”. This
capital requirement, however, allows inefficient lending from a social perspective:
Lζ
D
t+1 =
Dζ
D
t+1
1− ζDt
=
LFBt+1
1− ζDt
> LFBt+1.
To provide the intuition behind the design of the optimal capital regulations, I first solve
for the lending and liquidity capital requirements in the baseline model. This allows me to
demonstrate the cyclical properties of capital regulation in a fairly simple way.
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Lending Capital Requirement
Suppose now that the only goal of the social planner is to rule out excessive bank lending.
To do so, she institutes the lending capital requirement, defined in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 The first-best level of bank lending, Lζ
L
t+1 = L
FB
t+1, is restored when a capital
requirement is set to ζLt , defined by:
θ
(
LFBt+1, ζ
L
t
)−RFBd,t+1 = ξ˜ (LFBt+1, ζLt ; at) . (1.17)
The expression 1.17 equates the bank’s private cost of lending to the social one, ensuring
that the bank chooses the first-best level of lending when it encounters a capital requirement
of ζLt . The right-hand side of the equation 1.17 captures a key benefit of capital requirements
– reduced risk-shifting incentives – depicted in Panel A of Figure 5 by the dash-dotted lines.
The tighter the capital regulations the lower the expected government subsidies and, hence,
the lower the bank’s overinvestment. As discussed earlier, a capital regulation that is too
restrictive can amplify the liquidity costs of lending via an equity wedge, leading to reduced
liquidity provision and potentially restricting the funding of high-quality projects. Panel
A of Figure 5 shows that the spread between the private liquidity cost of lending and the
social one depicted by the solid lines is increasing in ζLt . The primary question I address in
this paper is how optimal bank capital requirements behave over the business cycle. This
essentially means answering whether the risk-shifting incentives for banks are stronger in
good or bad economic environments, and whether equity financing is more costly during
expansions or recessions.
The risk-shifting incentives for banks are defined by the bailout wedge ξ˜. Differentiating
this wedge with respect to the productivity shock,
dξ˜
(
LFBt+1, ζ
L
t ; at
)
dat
=
∂ξ˜
(
LFBt+1, ζ
L
t ; at
)
∂at
<0
+
∂ξ˜
(
LFBt+1, ζ
L
t ; at
)
∂LFBt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂LFBt+1
∂at︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≶ 0,
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demonstrates that there are two competing effects in place. On the one hand, the probability
of a bank bailout decreases with the productivity shock, implying a smaller wedge in the
bank’s lending costs. On the other hand, during periods of economic growth there are
more lending opportunities, indicating that more projects will be funded in the first best.
Because the bailout wedge expands when lending is higher, the risk-shifting motives become
stronger during expansions. Panel A of Figure 5 shows that under chosen parameter values,
the latter channel dominates the former and, as a result, the bailout wedge is procyclical,
suggesting that a higher capital requirement is necessary during periods of economic growth.
Households’ preference for safe assets implies that equity is costly, especially during reces-
sions. To the extent a bank’s balance sheet shrinks during a recession, less safe assets are
created by banks and the economy is less saturated with liquidity. This translates into a
higher liquidity premium and, as a result, a higher liquidity cost of lending. Panel A of
Figure 5 shows that for a given level of ζt, the cost of capital requirements is countercyclical,
suggesting that capital charges should be reduced during economic slowdowns.
The two effects - the countercyclical cost and procyclical benefit of capital regulation -
reinforce each other and deliver a capital requirement, ζLt , that is high in times during
periods of economic growth and low during downturns (Panel B of Figure 5).
Liquidity Capital Requirement
Consider now a type of capital regulation designed to restore the first-best level of liquidity
provision (i.e., the first-best level of deposit supply). Proposition 8 provides a characteri-
zation of the liquidity capital requirement.
Proposition 8 The first-best level of deposits, Dζ
D
t+1 = D
FB
t+1, is achieved, when the social
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planner sets the capital requirement equal to ζDt , defined by:
(
1− ζDt
)α−1
θ
(
LFBt+1
1− ζDt
, ζDt
)
−RFBd,t+1 =
(
1− ζDt
)α−1
ξ˜
(
LFBt+1
1− ζDt
, ζDt ; at
)
. (1.18)
As opposed to the lending capital requirement, the liquidity capital requirement allows
inefficient bank lending in the amount of
ζDt
1−ζDt
LFBt+1. This results in a larger bailout wedge
ξ˜, as well as a higher liquidity cost of lending θ, since the economy is more saturated with
safe assets. Importantly, when a bank’s balance sheet grows, the rate of return on loans
drops due to a decreasing returns to scale. This loss in a bank’s productivity can be viewed
as an additional cost that arises with the liquidity capital requirement, and it is captured
by the factor (1− ζt)α−1 ≥ 1.
When setting the level of liquidity capital requirement, the underlying trade-off remains the
same. On the one side, tight capital regulations restrict banks’ risk-shifting incentives as
captured by the right-hand side of the equation 1.18. But, on the other side, it increases
banks’ lending costs via the liquidity channel and, as a result, may lead to a reduction in
bank loans and deposits as captured by the left-hand side of the equation 1.18. Similar
to the case with the lending capital requirement, stringent capital ratios are of most use
during periods of economic growth, but are also less costly, delivering a liquidity capital
requirement that is procyclical.
Both lending and liquidity capital requirements focus only on one dimension of the problem
– either dampening banks’ incentives to risk-shift or stimulating banks’ creation of liquid
assets. In order to ensure highest lifetime utility of households in this economy, I solve for
an optimal Ramsey policy that balances reduced inefficient lending and reduced liquidity
provision. The Ramsey capital requirement is characterized in Section 5.
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1.5. Quantitative Assessment
In this section, I quantify policy recommendations on what defines optimal time variation
in bank capital requirements. First, I extend the baseline model and calibrate it to a fixed
capital requirement to match key macroeconomic quantities, as well as their counterparts
in the bank data. Next, I solve for the optimal policy rule using the chosen parameter
specification and characterize it in terms of the relevant macroeconomic aggregates.
1.5.1. Quantitative Model
To best match the data, I generalize the households’ preferences in the quantitative model,
as well as introduce a bank-independent production sector.
Household sector. In the model, households have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
preferences with the risk-aversion coefficient γ. The households’ utility is defined over
consumption and deposit holdings according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
aggregator:
v (Ct, Dt+1) =
(
C
η˜−1
η˜
t + χD
η˜−1
η˜
t+1
) η˜
η˜−1
,
where χ is a share parameter and η˜ is the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and liquidity services.
The households’ first-order conditions imply that the rate of return on bank debt satisfies:
Et [Mt,t+1Rd,t+1] = 1− χ
(
Dt+1
Ct
)− 1
η
, (1.19)
where Mt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor equal to:
Mt,t+1 =
(
v (Ct+1, Dt+2)
v (Ct, Dt+1)
) 1
η˜
−γ (Ct+1
Ct
)− 1
η˜
. (1.20)
Similar to the baseline case, there is a discount on the deposits rate compared to the rate of
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return on any other safe asset.14 In the quantitative model, the liquidity premium depends
on the ratio of deposit holdings and consumption, rather than just the level of deposit
holdings. This helps to capture the idea that higher consumption increases the marginal
utility of liquidity of households.
Production sector. By and large, the economy’s production sector is reliant either on
bank debt or access to capital markets to undertake production projects. To the extent that
some borrowers lack access to capital markets, typically due to informational asymmetries,
agents can be broadly classified into two groups. The first group is small businesses and
households, who have their financial needs fulfilled by bank loans and mortgages. The
second group is borrowers who have access to public markets and use multiple forms of
debt financing. To capture this heterogeneity in borrowers, the model now includes both a
banking sector and a bank-independent sector. The bank-independent sector includes firms
with access to capital markets.
For the most part, the banking sector remains the same in the quantitative as in the baseline
model. Each bank j ∈ Ω operates a sector-specific production technology:
eωj,t+a¯b+at lαbj,t ,
where the aggregate productivity shocks follows an AR(1) process:
at = ρaat−1 + σat, t ∼ iid N (0, 1) .
The constant a¯b is introduced to better match the fraction of output produced in the banking
sector. The bank-specific shock is iid across time and banks, with the law of motion given
by:
ωj,t = −1
2
σω (at)
2 + σω (at) εj,t, εj,t ∼ iid N (0, 1) .
14In the quantitative model, the rate of return on any other safe asset other than bank debt is equal to
1/Et [Mt,t+1].
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Consistent with Bloom et al. (2012), idiosyncratic productivity risk varies countercyclically
with the aggregate productivity; specifically, I choose σω (at) = σωe
−νat .
The capital in the banking sector depreciates at rate δ and accumulates according to:
lj,t+1 = (1− δ) lj,t + ib,j,t.
Further, the financial intermediaries incur an operating cost ob per unit of intermediated
assets. One could think of this cost as the resources spent to monitor bank borrowers.
As before, the banks finance production using a mixture of equity and debt financing.
Since there is neither equity issuance costs nor adjustments costs to capital, the equilibrium
continues to be symmetric and all banks make identical decisions lj,t+1 = Lt+1, nj,t+1 =
Nt+1, and dj,t+1 = Dt+1, ∀j ∈ Ω. Hence, the output produced in the banking sector equals
to Yb,t = e
a¯b+atLαbt .
The bank’s first-order conditions imply that the capital constraint is binding, while the
optimal level of lending satisfies:
Et [Mt,t+1 (Rl,t+1 + (1− δ − ob))] = θt − ξ˜t,
where the liquidity and risk-shifting costs of lending are, respectively, defined by:
θt = Et [Mt,t+1Rd,t+1] + ζt (1− Et [Mt,t+1Rd,t+1]) , (1.21)
ξ˜t = Et
[
Mt,t+1
(∫ ω∗
0
((1− ζt)Rd,t+1 − eωRl,t+1 − (1− δ − ob)) dΦ (ω)
)]
. (1.22)
with the loan rate being equal to
Rl,t = e
a¯b+atLαb−1t . (1.23)
The firms in the bank-independent sector similarly employ a decreasing returns to scale and
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produce consumption goods, using capital Kf,t as the only input, Yf,t = e
atK
αf
f,t . To form
output, the firms rent out capital from the household sector at the rate of return:
Rk,t = αfe
atK
αf−1
f,t . (1.24)
The households are the owners of the financial intermediaries, as well as of the firms in the
bank-independent sector. Therefore, at the end of each period, they receive proceeds from
the banks’ activity Zt, as well as the firms’ profits Πt. Because the households own the
capital used in production in the bank-independent sector, they are the ones who make the
capital investment choices. To invest in capital, households must pay a small operational
cost of . The capital in the non-banking sector depreciates at the same rate as in the banking
sector and accumulates according to:
Kf,t+1 = (1− δ)Kf,t + If,t.
1.5.2. Calibration
Data for the aggregate sector - the banking and non-banking sectors - comes from the Fi-
nancial Accounts of the United States Z.1 issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve15 and from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.16 In particular, the output produced in the total economy, Y , is mea-
sured using the income approach as the gross value added by all sectors, except Financial
Business.17 Similarly, I exclude the financial sector when measuring gross fixed capital
formation, I, and stock of fixed assets, K.18 Consumption is defined as the sum of expendi-
15https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
16http://www.bea.gov/itable/index.cfm.
17The sectors included are Households and Nonprofit Institutions Serving Households, Nonfinancial Non-
corporate Business, Nonfinancial Corporate Business and Government. The data is collected from the
Financial Accounts, S.2. Selected Aggregates for Total Economy and Sectors
18The data on investment are from the Financial Accounts, S.2. Selected Aggregates for Total Economy
and Sectors, while the data on capital stock are collected from the NIPA Fixed Assets tables, specifically, Ta-
ble 6.1. Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry Group and Legal Form of Organization
and Table 7.1A. Current-Cost Net Stock of Government Fixed Assets
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tures on non-durable goods and services. All the quantities are deflated with the Consumer
Price Index and normalized by the NIPA population. The data on CPI inflation are from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, with the price level being normalized to 1 as of December
of 2009.
The challenging part of mapping the model to the data is to differentiate the data on output
into the value added by the banking sector and the bank-independent sector. In the model,
the final goods produced by financial intermediaries, Yb, are viewed as the value added
by bank borrowers (predominantly, small businesses and households) and, consequently,
is measured as the the gross value added by Households and Nonprofit Institutions Serv-
ing Households and Nonfinancial Noncorporate Business sectors.19 The output produced
by borrowers with access to capital markets, Yf , is measured as the gross value added by
Nonfinancial Corporate Business and Government sectors.20 As documented in Rauh and
Sufi (2010), corporate businesses both use bonds and utilize bank debt as funding sources.
In this sense, I overestimate the value-added by the bank-independent sector and, as a
result, underestimate the costs associated with tight capital requirements, as reduced lend-
ing translates into a smaller loss in the aggregate output. According to this measure the
banking sector accounts for about 28% of the output produced in the economy. I pursue
the same split between borrowers when measuring gross fixed capital formation and stock
of capital in the two-sectors.
The model is calibrated at annual frequency for the 1980-2008 period. I exclude the post
Great Recession period to avoid zero-lower bound concerns. The parameters are calibrated
to satisfy the steady-state conditions of the model, along with the target first and second
moments in the data.
Long run behavior. The subjective discount factor is set to β = 0.975, which is a value
traditionally used in macroeconomics. The Cobb-Douglas function parameters αb and αf
19The data are from the Financial Accounts, S.2. Selected Aggregates for Total Economy and Sectors.
20The data are from the Financial Accounts, S.2. Selected Aggregates for Total Economy and Sectors.
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are chosen to match a capital-output ratio in the banking and non-banking sectors, respec-
tively. In the data, a capital-output ratio of the financial intermediaries (or, equivalently, of
firms in the banking sector) is equal to 4.9, which is roughly twice as high as a capital-output
ratio of the bank-independent firms (see Table 2). As a result, the αb = 0.78 decreasing
return to scale parameter for the banks is larger than the αf = 0.355 corresponding for
the firms. The scalar a¯b is set so that a ratio of loans to a total stock of capital in the
model is identical to the one in the data. By construction, I also match a market fraction
of the banking sector in terms of the produced output, as well as a capital-output ratio
of the aggregate sector. The capital depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.075 to produce a
plausible value for the model-implied ratio of investment-to-capital. The operating cost in
the banking sector ob is calibrated to match a bank’s profit-to-loan ratio. The bank data
stems from the aggregated regulatory filings, the so-called call reports, as reported by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).21 A bank’s loans are measured as the total
assets net of the securities, fixed assets,and cash and due to depository institutions, while a
bank’s profits are measured as the total interest and non-interest income net of the securi-
ties interest income and total interest expense. The operating cost in the bank-independent
sector is determined using the standard deviation of firms’ capital investment.
Productivity shocks. Estimates of Solow residuals typically imply a highly persistent
AR(1) process for the log productivity at. I use a standard value of 0.95 for the autoregres-
sive coefficient and choose a σa of 0.02
(√
4 · 0.01) to match the standard deviation of the
aggregate output in the data.
Idiosyncratic shocks. I use the parameter σω to determine both the risk choice of banks
(i.e., level of inefficient lending) and, for the most part, the fraction of banks being bailed
out each period. To the extent that there is no default in the model, I define the bailout
rate as a fraction of failed banks, both assisted and not assisted by the government. The
data on bank failures are from the fail bank list issued by the FDIC.22 On average, 0.76% of
21https://www5.fdic.gov/idasp/advSearch warp download all.asp?intTab=4.
22https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30&Header=1&tab=bankFailures.
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all insured institutions fail each year, delivering σω equal to 0.325. The parameter µω is set
to normalize the mean of idiosyncratic shock ω to 1. The level of ν is chosen to generate the
range of the idiosyncratic volatility dispersion σ2ω (at) consistent with the empirical evidence
in Bloom et al. (2012). Specifically, I target a 15% increase of the volatility dispersion in
recessions relative to expansions. This is on the conservative end of the values reported in
Bloom et al. (2012).
Capital adequacy ratios. Even though my aim is to characterize optimal capital regula-
tion that varies over the time, the model is calibrated with a fixed level of capital requirement
in place, ζ¯. In accordance with Basel III capital standards, FDIC-insured depository insti-
tutions are required to maintain the leverage ratio (Tier 1 capital divided by total assets) of
4% and the Tier 1 capital ratio (Tier 1 capital divided by total risk-weighted assets) of 6%.23
Obviously, these two ratios are different in the data, but are the same in the model. On
average, depository institutions hold 7.26% of total assets and 10.20% of total risk-weighted
assets in terms of core capital24. In the benchmark calibration, I set ζ¯ to 7.26%.
Liquidity premium. The financial intermediaries play a special role in creating liquidity;
they transform illiquid long-term assets into liquid short-term liabilities that offer non-
pecuniary services to investors. In accordance with this view, when mapping D to the
data, I aim to capture the short-term part of bank debt that is used to finance risky assets.
Following Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015), this measure of bank debt equals
the sum of all deposits and the other forms of short-term debt categories net of short-term
assets and holdings of Treasuries.25 Further, I assume that the short-term Treasuries and
23Core capital elements (Tier 1) consists of common stockholders’ equity capital, noncumulative perpetual
preferred stock, and minority interests in the equity capital accounts of consolidated subsidiaries.
24The data on capital adequacy ratios are collected from the “Ratios by Asset Size Group” table issued
by the FDIC. Due to the availability of the data, I calculate the average leverage ratio for the sample period
1984 - 2008 and the average Tier 1 capital ration for the sample period 1990 - 2008.
25An alternative approach is to map D to “core” deposits, which is the largest source of bank funding and
the major source of safe and liquid assets for households (see, for example, Drechsler et al. (2016)). Core
deposits include checking and money market accounts, as well as small time deposits. The cyclical properties
of this measure, however, change over the sample period of 1960-2015: while deposits exhibit strong positive
correlation with output growth in the earlier part of the sample, they become mildly countercyclical in the
later one. Yet, over the sample period I consider in this paper deposits co-move positively with output
overall. Nonetheless, I focus on a broader notion of the liquidity supply as it better captures the role of
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bank debt are perfect substitutes and, as a result, require the same rate of return. Under
this assumption, the liquidity premium is constructed as the spread between the rates of
return on the 3-month AA Commercial Paper and the 3-month Treasury bill, similar to
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).26,27
The preference of households for bank debt is governed by a share parameter, χ, and by
elasticity of substitution between consumption and liquidity services, η˜. The level of η˜ is
set to match the volatility of a ratio of the bank debt to consumption. Given the value of η˜,
the scalar χ is set so that the steady-state level of the liquidity premium is equal to 0.57%
(annually).
The model is quite parsimonious and requires only 10 structural parameters, besides the
stochastic process for the shocks.
In Table 1, I summarize the benchmark configuration of the model parameters. Tables 2 and
3 report the implications of the chosen parameters for the first and second unconditional
moments of the key variables. Overall, the model can successfully match a number of
moments for the main aggregates. The model has a hard time matching the volatility of
bank lending and, because of the binding capital constraint, also the volatility of bank
debt. In the model, bank lending is a stock variable and is quite persistent, therefore
having rather modest fluctuation over the business cycle. The low volatility of bank debt,
in turn, translates into low volatility of the liquidity premium. As a potential remedy, I
can introduce a stochastic process for one of the parameters governing a demand function
for safe assets (χ or η). For parsimony of the results, for now I consider the calibration
without liquidity shocks. As reported in Table 4, the model generates the correct signs
for the business cycle correlations, but overstates their magnitudes. This is a common
banks in creation of safe and liquid assets.
26For the period of 1997-2008, the rate of return on Commercial Paper is calculated as the average of the
rate of return on Financial and Non-Financial Commercial Paper.
27Other potential measures include (i) the spread between the rates of return on the Resolution Funding
Corporation (Refcorp) bonds and the Treasury bills (Longstaff (2002)), and (ii) the spread between the
interest rates on general collateral repurchase agreement (GC repo) and the Treasury bills (Nagel (2014)).
These measures produce quantitatively similar results.
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characteristic of the standard real business cycle model with one shock in the economy.
To understand the model dynamics, I now analyze the impulse response functions of key
quantities to a one standard deviation positive total factor productivity (TFP) shock. As
shown in Figure 6, following a positive shock, lending in the banking sector increases imme-
diately by 1% and continues to grow for a number of years. This is the case because lending
opportunities improve. An increase in lending, in turn, is accompanied by an increase in
deposits (0.03% increase in the deposits-to-consumption ratio) and, as a result, a reduction
in the liquidity premium. This result reaffirms the conjecture in the baseline model that
equity financing is relatively less expensive during expansions than recessions. Moreover,
this is line with the empirical evidence that the liquidity premium is countercyclical (see
Table 4). At the same time, a positive shock to productivity results in a reduced probability
of default in the current period. But in the subsequent periods, the probability of default
spikes up. This is in response to a heightened risk-shifting by banks, as captured by the
impulse response function of the bailout wedge. Note that the bailout wedge is the expected
(not realized) bailout subsidy at time t + 1, conditional on time t information and, most
importantly, on the time t choice of lending Lt+1.
1.5.3. Ramsey Equilibrium
The Ramsey problem characterizes a set of allocations that can be implemented as a compet-
itive equilibrium when banks face the prescribed capital requirements. A Ramsey planner
maximizes the lifetime utility of households subject to the resource constraint and imple-
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mentability conditions:
argmax
Ct,Lt+1,Nt+1,Dt+1,Kf,t+1
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (Ct, Dt+1)
]
with u (Ct, Dt+1) =
v (Ct, Dt+1)
1−γ
1− γ − 1
s.t. Ct = Rd,tDt −Dt+1 +Rk,tKαff,t − If,t − ofKf,t + Zt + Πt − Tt,
Et [Mt,t+1 (Rk,t+1 + (1− δ − of ))] = 1,
Nt+1 +Dt+1 = Lt+1,
Et [Mt,t+1 (Rl,t+1 + (1− δ − ob))] = θt − ξ˜t,
Ct + Ib,t + If,t = Yb,t + Yf,t − obLt − ofKf,t,
where the taxes and net proceeds from banks’ and firms’ activity are, respectively, equal to:
Tt =
∫ 1
0
max
{
Rd,tDt − eωj,t+atLαbt − (1− δ − ob)Lt, 0
}
dj,
Zt =
∫ 1
0
zj,tdj, with zj,t = max
{
eωj,t+atLαbt + (1− δ − ob)Lt −Rd,tDt, 0
}−Nt+1,
Πt = Yf,t −Rk,tKf,t.
The rate of return on deposits, the stochastic discount factor, the liquidity and risk-shifting
cost of lending, the rate of return on loans and capital are defined by 1.19, 1.20, 1.21,
1.22, 1.23 and 1.24, correspondingly. I provide further details in Appendix B. The op-
timal Ramsey policy – a capital requirement that implements the Ramsey allocations{
C∗t , L∗t+1, N∗t+1, D∗t+1,K∗f,t+1
}∞
t=0
– requires a capital ratio that equals ζ∗t = N∗t+1/L∗t+1.
The set of Ramsey allocations and policies constitute a Ramsey equilibrium.
Using the chosen configuration of parameters (Table 1), I solve for the Ramsey equilibrium.
Not surprisingly, the optimal policy rule for bank capital ratios ζ∗t = ζ (St, St−1) is a function
of all state variables St = {ζt−1, Lt,Kf,t, at} in the model, including the previous period
capital requirement, capital stock in the two sectors, and the productivity shock. I find that
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the Ramsey capital requirement, for the most part, fluctuates between 4% and 6%, with
the mean at 5%. This range of values is based on one standard deviation of the Ramsey
capital requirement above and below its mean, and is roughly consistent with an upper
bound of the CCyB proposed by the Basel III Accord. Importantly, the optimal policy rule
is not capped at 6%, and in periods of abnormal economic growth can go far above 6%.
The steady state value of ζ∗t is substantially lower than the Tier 1 leverage ratio observed in
the data, but at the same time 1% higher than the level prescribed by the Basel III Accord.
As shown in Figure 7, the effect of a positive TFP shock on the optimal policy rule is quite
persistent: a one standard deviation positive TFP shock increases the capital ratio by 0.2%
immediately and this effect lasts for a number of periods.
To uncover the implications of the capital regulation that varies over time, I now examine
the impulse response reactions to a one standard deviation positive TFP shock in a Ramsey
equilibrium. Figure 7 demonstrates that the Ramsey capital requirement indeed helps to
reduce the procyclicality of bank lending, by dampening overinvestment during expansions
and boosting bank credit during downturns. This reduced overinvestment, in turn, trans-
lates into a lower bailout wedge and, consequently, a lower probability of default. At the
same time, the optimal policy rule dampens the procyclicality of the deposits, as there are
two channels in place. The first channel is via bank lending directly: to the extent that a
bank’s balance sheet may shrinks during recessions, the supply of deposits contracts, but
less so in a Ramsey equilibrium. The second channel is via capital regulation itself: for a
given amount of bank lending, in a Ramsey equilibrium, a larger fraction of production is
financed with bank debt during recessions as compared to a competitive equilibrium with a
fixed capital requirement. In this instance, the optimal policy rule goes down in a response
to a negative productivity shock.
1.5.4. Optimal Policy Rule
For effective policy recommendations, it is useful to express the Ramsey capital requirement
ζ (St, St−1) as a function of key observable macro and bank quantities. To do so, I perform
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the following exercise: I simulate the model with the Ramsey optimal policies in place for
1, 000 times. Then, I estimate a regression of the Ramsey capital requirement on a number
of model aggregates for each simulated sample:
ζ∗t = ζss +
N∑
j=1
ζxjx
j
t + εt.
Admittedly, this policy rule is forward-looking: ζ∗t is a level of capital requirement set at
time t, but regulating a bank’s choice of capital structure at time t + 1. The results in
Panel A of Table 5 demonstrates that credit gap used as the only indicator to adjust the
capital charges over the business cycle does not capture the dynamics of the optimal policy
rule (R2 = 14%). I find that that using the credit gap along with GDP (in log deviations
from their steady states) delivers an R2 = 99.98%. In particular, ζ∗t is characterized by the
following policy rule:28
4.9% + 3×
(
log
Lt
Yt
− log Lss
Yss
)
+ 8× (log Yt − log Yss) .
In particular, a one percentage increase in the credit gap leads to a 0.03% increase in capital
charges, while a one percentage point increase in GDP translates into a 0.08% increase.
Equivalently, a one standard deviation increase in the credit gap leads to a 0.1% increase
in capital requirements, while a one standard deviation increase in GDP translates into a
0.7% increase (Panel B of Table 5). This finding aligns with my main model prediction: in
periods when banks are incentivized to risk-shift, that is in periods of high GDP and credit
growth, the optimal capital requirement is increased. Interestingly, the liquidity premium
plays little role if included as an additional explanatory variable in a regression (see Panel
A of Table 5). However, this result does not continue to hold if the model includes liquidity
shocks.
28The GDP growth variable is orthogonalized with respect to the credit gap variable, since the two
indicators are strongly positively correlated.
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1.5.5. Welfare Implications
Following the classic work of Lucas (1987), I calculate the potential welfare benefits (costs)
associated with different types of capital regulation. To do so, I denote the expected lifetime
utility of households in a world with capital regulation ζt by
Eζt
[
+∞∑
t=0
βt
C˜1−γt − 1
1− γ
]
,
where the aggregate consumption is defined by C˜t = v (Ct, Dt+1), accounting for the value
of liquid assets to the households. The question is how much the households would be
willing to pay or have to be compensated to move from the economy with a fixed level of
capital requirement ζt = ζ
0, ∀t to the world with a capital ratio of ζ1 or to the economy
where banks face the optimal Ramsey policy ζ∗t . This compensating variation $ is defined
as:
Eζ0
+∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(1 +$) C˜t
)1−γ − 1
1− γ
 = Eζ1
[
+∞∑
t=0
βt
C˜1−γt − 1
1− γ
]
,
or, equivalently:
$ =
Eζ1
[∑+∞
t=0 β
tC˜1−γt
]
Eζ0
[∑+∞
t=0 β
tC˜1−γt
]

1
1−γ
− 1.
Unlike the Lucas cost of business cycle, the above measure captures the changes in con-
sumption instability across different economies, as well as the changes in steady state levels
of consumption. I provide more detains on the calculation of welfare costs in Appendix C.
Figure 10 depicts the variation compensation, $, as a function of different levels of fixed
capital charges, ζ1 ∈ [0, 1], as well as the welfare result for the Ramsey economy. As the
benchmark, I choose a world with an optimal fixed level capital requirement, which happens
to be the stochastic steady state of the Ramsey policy. Moving from the current level of
capital ratio 7.26% to the Ramsey policy translates into a 0.06% permanent increase in
the annual consumption of households, although the exact magnitude of the gain depends
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on the attitude of consumers towards risk.29 Two-thirds of this welfare improvement is
attributed to a transition from the optimal fixed capital requirement to the time-varying
one. Admittedly, the welfare gain from implementing the policy rule that is solely based
on the credit gap is significantly smaller as compared to the welfare gain from having the
optimal capital ratios. Implementing the optimal Ramsey policy leads to 15.5% decrease
in the cyclicality of the bank credit (relative to a world with an optimal fixed level capital
requirement): the banks engage in less excessive lending during periods of economic growth,
but at the same time avoid contraction of lending activities during recessions. This in turn
translates on average into a higher level of lending (+0.93%) and consumption (+0.11%). In
addition, the increase in bank lending stimulates banks’ creation of liquid assets (+0.88%).
The time-varying capital ratios also lead to a reduction in the volatility of both lending
(−0.13%) and deposits (−0.17%), but to an increase in the consumption volatility (+0.08%).
1.5.6. Model with Liquidity Shocks
For robustness, I also consider a model with liquidity shocks. Namely, suppose that a share
parameter in the CES aggregator over consumption and deposits follows an AR(1) process:
log (χt) = (1− ρχ) χ¯+ ρχlog (χt−1) + σχut, ut ∼ iid N (0, 1) .
The χ¯ = 0.01 parameter is set to the value of a share parameter used in the benchmark
calibration of the model without demand chocks. The standard deviation of the demand
shock σχ = 0.1 is calibrated to better match the volatility of the liquidity premium. I
choose a persistence parameter of ρχ = 0.95. As shown in Appendix Figure 9, a one
standard deviation liquidity shock leads to a 0.1% decrease in the optimal capital ratio. A
positive liquidity shock means that the households enjoy holding liquid assets more and, as
a result, are willing to accept a lower rate of return on deposits, as captured by the impulse
response function of the liquidity premium. For a given capital requirement, an increased
29This is within the range of values documented by Lucas (1987), Alvarez and Jermann (2004), and
Van den Heuvel (2008).
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liquidity premium translates into lower liquidity costs of lending. At the same time, banks’
incentives to risk-shift become weaker, since the deposit rate is lower and so are the banks’
credit liabilities. The liquidity channel dominates the risk-shifting channel, therefore bank
lending increases mildly to satisfy the households’ demand for liquidity.
If I continue to use the GDP and bank credit as the only two indicators to guide the
dynamics of capital requirements, the R2 drops to 91% (see Panel A of Table 6). Including
the liquidity premium as an additional indicator increases the R2 to 98%. The Ramsey
policy rule can now be characterized with the following rule:30
4.9%+2×
(
log
Lt
Yt
− log Lss
Yss
)
+9×(log Yt − log Yss)−139×((rf,t − rd,t)− (rf,ss − rd,ss)) .
A one percentage point increase in the liquidity premium leads to a 1.4% decrease in cap-
ital charges or, equivalently, a one standard deviation increase in the liquidity premium
generates a 0.1% drop in capital ratios. The liquidity premium serves as an indicator of
how expensive for banks is equity financing, as well as how valuable for investors are liq-
uid assets. In line with the baseline model, when the liquidity premium increases, banks’
lending costs go up, potentially leading to a cut in deposits . This suggests that the capital
requirements should be reduced to satisfy the investors’ demand for safe assets.
1.6. Conclusions
Due to government guarantees, banks have incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking and
undertake inefficient investments from a social point of view. To prevent such risk-shifting,
financial regulators have instituted capital requirements. There is an ongoing debate, how-
ever, about whether they are effective, and if so, what level is most efficient. In this paper, I
provide a rationale for the use of a time-varying capital requirement, employing a dynamic
general equilibrium setting. A sufficiently high capital requirement can be used to rule
out excessive lending, but at the same time it may limit banks from financing high-quality
30The GDP growth variable has been orthogonolized with respect to the credit gap variable.
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investments and lead to reduced liquidity provision. In the model, an optimal capital re-
quirement trades off reduced risk-shifting incentives with reduced liquidity provision. Given
that banks are most incentivized to risk-shift during periods of economic growth and holding
equity is most costly during recessions, when the economy is the least liquid, a procyclical
capital regulation emerges endogenously as a solution to the Ramsey problem.
In this paper, I also quantify policy recommendations on which macroeconomic and bank
aggregates drive the optimal time variation in capital requirements. In line with the pre-
dictions of the baseline model, the optimal Ramsey policy would respond positively to the
credit gap and growth in GDP, where the two serve as indicators of a banks’ incentives to
risk-shift. At the same time, the Ramsey capital requirement would adjust negatively to
an increase in the liquidity premium, which indicates investor’s demand for safe and liq-
uid assets. Two-thirds of the welfare gain generated by implementing the optimal Ramsey
policy is achieved by having state-dependent capital ratios, while the remaining improve-
ment is attributed to an optimal fixed capital requirement. This leads me to conclude that
implementing the CCyBs, as recommended by the Basel III Accord, is a crucial step in
promoting the stability of the financial sector.
The optimal Ramsey policy requires a capital ratio between 4% and 6% and depends on
the economic growth, bank supply of credit and asset prices. Specifically, a one percentage
point increase in bank lending (GDP-to-lending) translates into 0.1% (0.2%) increase in
capital charges, while a one percentage point increase in liquidity premium leads to a 1.3%
decrease.
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Figure 1: Rate of Return on Deposits
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This figure depicts the rate of return on deposits Rd,t+1 as a function of the deposits supply Dt+1 and the
rate of return on other safe assets 1
β
. The scale of y-axis is omitted, as the numbers in this parameterized
example do not have economic meaning. The parameter values are set to β = 0.98, η = 0.8, α = 0.85, δ = 1,
ρa = 0.97, σa = 0.02, and σω = 0.2.
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Figure 2: Socially Optimal Allocation
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This figure depicts the social marginal cost of bank lending Rd,t+1 (black dash-dotted line) and the social
marginal benefit of lending during recessions EBt [Rl,t+1] (red solid line) and during expansions E
G
t [Rl,t+1]
(blue solid line) as a function of bank lending Lt+1. The optimal level of lending is at the intersection of
the social marginal costs and benefits. The scale of y-axis is omitted, as the numbers in this parameterized
example do not have economic meaning. The parameter values are set to β = 0.98, η = 0.8, α = 0.85, δ = 1,
ρa = 0.97, σa = 0.02, and σω = 0.2.
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Figure 3: Competitive Equilibrium Allocation
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Panel A of this figure depicts the social marginal cost of bank lending Rd,t+1 (black dash-dotted line) and the
private marginal cost of lending during recessions Rd,t+1 − ξB (Lt+1, Nt+1; at) (red dashed line) and during
expansions Rd,t+1 − ξG (Lt+1, Nt+1; at) (blue dashed line) as a function of bank lending Lt+1. Panel B
additionally depicts the marginal cost of lending Et [Rl,t+1] during recessions (red solid line) and expansions
(blue solid line). The optimal level of lending at social optimum is at the intersection of the social marginal
costs and benefits. The optimal level of lending in the competitive equilibrium is at the intersection of
the private marginal costs and benefits. The social and private marginal benefits are identical. The scale
of y-axis is omitted, as the numbers in this parameterized example do not have economic meaning. The
parameter values are set to β = 0.98, η = 0.8, α = 0.85, δ = 1, ρa = 0.97, σa = 0.02, and σω = 0.2.
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Figure 4: Effects of Capital Regulations on the Bank’s Lending Costs
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Panel A of this figure depicts the risk-shifting costs of bank lending as a function of capital requirements
ζt (holding lending and productivity fixed). Panel B depicts the liquidity costs of bank lending (black solid
line) and its two components: (i) the deposits rate (blue dashed line) and (ii) the equity wedge (red dash-
dotted line) as a function of capital requirements ζt. The scale of y-axis is omitted, as the numbers in this
parameterized example do not have economic meaning. The parameter values are set to β = 0.98, η = 0.8,
α = 0.85, δ = 1, ρa = 0.97, σa = 0.02, and σω = 0.2.
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Figure 5: Lending Capital Requirement
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Panel A in this figure depicts (i) the benefit of capital requirements during recessions (dash-dotted red line)
and during expansions (dash-dotted blue line) and (ii) the cost of capital requirements during recessions
(solid red line) and during expansions (solid blue line) as a function of ζt. Panel B depicts the liquidity
capital requirement as a function of the aggregate productivity. The scale of y-axis is omitted, as the numbers
in this parameterized example do not have economic meaning. The parameter values are set to β = 0.98,
η = 0.8, α = 0.85, δ = 1, ρa = 0.97, σa = 0.02, and σω = 0.2.
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Figure 6: Exogenous TFP Shock.
Benchmark Quantitative Model with Fixed Capital Requirement
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The figures show the effect of a one standard deviation shock to log productivity on the variables of the
benchmark quantitative model, as captured by the impulse response functions (blue solid lines). Banks are
subject to a fixed capital requirement of 7.26%. All model quantities are in logs.
52
Figure 7: Exogenous TFP Shock.
Benchmark Quantitative Model with Ramsey Capital Requirement
(a) TFP
10 20 30 40
-5
0
5
10
15
10-3
(b) Output
10 20 30 40
-5
0
5
10
15
20
10-3
(c) Consumption
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
15
10-3
(d) Lending
10 20 30 40
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
(e) Deposit-Consumption Ratio
10 20 30 40
-5
0
5
10
15
20
10-3
(f) Liquidity Premium
10 20 30 40
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10-3
(g) Probability of Bailout
10 20 30 40
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
(h) Bailout Wedge
10 20 30 40
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
(i) Ramsey Policy
10 20 30 40
0
10
20
10-4
The figures show the effect of a one standard deviation shock to log productivity on the variables of the
benchmark quantitative model, as captured by the impulse response functions. The figures provide a com-
parison of the effects when banks are subject to a fixed capital requirement of 7.26% (blue solid lines) and
when banks face the optimal Ramsey policy (red dash-dotted lines) . All model quantities are in logs.
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Figure 8: Exogenous Liquidity Shock.
Quantitative Model with Liquidity Shocks and Fixed Capital Requirement
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The figures show the effect of a one standard deviation shock to log productivity on the variables of the
quantitative model with liquidity shocks, as captured by the impulse response functions (blue solid lines).
Banks are subject to a fixed capital requirement of 7.26%. All model quantities are in logs.
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Figure 9: Exogenous Liquidity Shock.
Quantitative Model with Liquidity Shocks and Ramsey Capital Requirement
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The figures show the effect of a one standard deviation shock to log productivity on the variables of the
quantitative model with liquidity shocks, as captured by the impulse response functions. The figures provide
a comparison of the effects when banks are subject to a fixed capital requirement of 7.26% (blue solid lines)
and when banks face the optimal Ramsey policy (red dash-dotted lines) . All model quantities are in logs.
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Figure 10: Welfare Implications
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The Figure depicts the variation compensation, $, as a function of different levels of fixed capital charges
(green dots), as well as the welfare compensation corresponding to the Ramsey policy (blue square), the
policy solely based on the credit gap (red diamond) and the first-best allocation (black star). The variation
compensation is expressed in percentage points.
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Table 1: Configuration of Model Parameters
Description Symbol Value Source/Target
Subjective Discount Factor β 0.975 Standard
Risk Aversion Coefficient γ 1.000 Standard
Elasticity of Deposits and Consumption η 1.200 St.dev. of debt-consumption ratio
Deposits Weight χ 0.010 Average liquidity premium
Firm Capital Share αf 0.355 Capital-output ratio
Firm Operating Cost of 0.055 St.dev. of investment-capital ratio
Bank Capital Share αb 0.780 Capital-output ratio
Bank Operating Cost ob 0.065 Profit-to-loan ratio
Bank Output Weight a¯b -1.35 Capital ratio in two sectors
Capital Adequacy Ratio ζ¯ 0.073 Average leverage ratio
Depreciation Rate δ 0.075 Investment-capital ratio
Persistence of Productivity Schock ρa 0.95 Process for Solow residuals
Std of Productivity Schock σa 0.020
Std of Idiosyncratic Shock σω 0.335 Bailout rate
Dispersion of Idiosyncratic Volatility ν 0.500 Idiosyncratic volatility dispersion
This table reports the benchmark configuration of the model parameters calibrated at annual frequency.
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Table 2: First Aggregate Moments
Model
Data Mean 2.5% 97.5%
Aggregate Sector
Capital-Output, K/Y 3.03 3.00 2.96 3.04
Investment-Capital, I/K 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
Market Fraction
Capital Weight, Kb/K 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.47
Output Weight, Yb/Y 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.29
Banking Sector
Capital-Output, Kb/Yb 4.96 4.87 4.87 4.88
Investment-Capital, Ib/Kb 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08
Capital Adequacy Ratio, N/L,% 7.26 7.26 7.26 7.26
Profit-Lending, pi/L 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Liquidity Premium, Rf −Rd,% 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.59
Bailout Rate, % 0.76 0.77 0.70 0.84
Bank-Independent Sector
Capital-Output, Kf/Yf 2.29 2.28 2.28 2.29
Investment-Capital, If/Kf 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08
This table reports the first moments computed as averages of the data and model series. The summary
statistics in the data are computed in the annual sample for the 1980-2008 period. The mean, as well as
2.5% and 97.5% values, capture the model moment distributions across the samples whose size equals the
data.
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Table 3: Second Aggregate Moments
Model
Data Mean 2.5% 97.5%
Aggregate Sector
Consumption, σ (∆c) 1.28 0.88 0.81 0.95
Output, σ (∆y) 2.00 2.04 1.95 2.13
Investment, σ (∆i) 4.36 7.22 6.91 7.55
Banking Sector
Output, σ (∆yb) 2.54 2.30 2.16 2.46
Investment, σ (∆ib) 9.28 12.81 12.15 13.48
Lending, σ (∆l) 2.60 1.65 1.47 1.85
Debt-Consumpion Ratio, σ (∆d−∆c) 3.67 0.87 0.77 0.99
Profits, σ (∆pi) 13.59 10.64 10.11 11.22
Bank-Independent Sector
Output, σ (∆yf ) 2.07 2.02 1.93 2.11
Investment, σ (∆if ) 3.84 3.12 2.93 3.32
Liquidity Premium, σ (Rf −Rd) 0.35 0.06 0.04 0.08
This table reports the second moments computed as standard deviations of the data and model series. σ (∆x)
is the standard deviation of annual log growth rates of X. The summary statistics in the data are computed
in the annual sample for the 1980-2008 period. The mean, as well as 2.5% and 97.5% values, capture the
model moment distributions across the samples whose size equals the data. The statistics are expressed in
percentages.
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Table 4: Business Cycle Correlations
Model
Data Mean 2.5% 97.5%
Aggregate Sector
Consumption, ρ (∆c,∆y) 0.77 0.88 0.87 0.89
Investment, ρ (∆i,∆y) 0.84 0.96 0.95 0.97
Banking Sector
Output, ρ (∆yb,∆y) 0.82 0.94 0.93 0.95
Investment, ρ (∆ib,∆y) 0.70 0.93 0.92 0.94
Lending, ρ (∆l,∆y) 0.47 0.68 0.67 0.69
Deposits, ρ (∆d−∆c,∆y) 0.54 0.40 0.36 0.44
Profits, ρ (∆pi,∆y) 0.15 0.79 0.77 0.80
Liquidity Premium, ρ (Rf −Rd,∆y) -0.21 -0.04 -0.12 0.05
Bank-Independent Sector
Output, ρ (∆yf ,∆y) 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99
Investment, ρ (∆if ,∆y) 0.59 0.93 0.92 0.94
This table reports the correlations of aggregate variables with the output growth in the data and in the model.
ρ (∆x,∆y) is the correlation of annual growth rates of X with annual output growth rates; ρ (Rf −Rd,∆y)
is the correlation of annual liquidity premium (in levels) with annual output growth rates; ρ (p,∆y) is the
correlation of fraction of bailed out banks with the annual output growth rates. The summary statistics in
the data are computed in the annual sample for the 1980-2008 period. The mean, as well as 2.5% and 97.5%
values, capture the model moment distributions across the samples whose size equals the data.
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Table 5: Optimal Bank Capital Policy (Benchmark Quantitative Model)
Panel A: Level-Log Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 4.93 4.93 4.93 4.93 4.93
Credit gap 2.64 2.64 1.91
( 1.60, 3.48) ( 1.60, 3.48) ( 0.75, 2.93)
Bank credit 2.51
( 2.45, 2.57)
GDP 5.45 8.17 7.91
( 5.24, 5.72) ( 8.16, 8.18) ( 7.84, 7.99)
Liquidity premium -172.77
( -224.16, -117.29)
R2 0.1366 0.5033 0.8175 0.9998 0.9999
( 0.0431, 0.2465) ( 0.4062, 0.5927) ( 0.7877, 0.8469) ( 0.9997, 0.9998) ( 0.9998, 0.9999)
Panel B: Normalized Level-Log Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 4.93 4.93 4.93 4.93 4.93
Credit gap 0.09 0.09 0.06
( 0.05, 0.11) ( 0.05, 0.11) ( 0.02, 0.09)
Bank credit 0.08
( 0.07, 0.09)
GDP 0.16 0.69 0.67
( 0.15, 0.18) ( 0.63, 0.76) ( 0.61, 0.74)
Liquidity premium -0.01
( -0.02, -0.01)
R2 0.1366 0.5033 0.8175 0.9998 0.9999
( 0.0431, 0.2465) ( 0.4062, 0.5927) ( 0.7877, 0.8469) ( 0.9997, 0.9998) ( 0.9998, 0.9999)
Panel A of this table presents results from level-log regressions of the form ζ∗t = ζss +
∑N
j=1 ζxjx
j
t + εt,
while Panel B presents results from normalized level-log regressions, where independent variables are scaled
by their standard deviations. The dependent variable is the Ramsey policy rule in year t expressed in
percentages (1 to 100). The independent variables include (i) credit gap log Lt
Yt
− log Lss
Yss
; (ii) bank credit
log Lt − log Lss; (iii) GDP log Yt − log Yss; (iv) liquidity premium (rf,t − rd,t) − (rf,ss − rd,ss). Reported
coefficients are the mean values across the samples, while the numbers reported in parentheses are the 2.5%
and 97.5% values. Reported R2s are the mean values across the samples, while the numbers reported in
parentheses are the 2.5% and 97.5% values.
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Table 6: Optimal Bank Capital Policy (Quantitative Model with Liquidity Shocks)
Panel A: Level-Log Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 4.93 4.93 4.93 4.93 4.92
Credit gap 1.71 1.71 1.67
( 0.41, 2.96) ( 0.41, 2.96) ( 0.61, 2.58)
Bank credit 2.20
( 1.74, 2.64)
GDP 5.26 8.57 7.87
( 4.62, 5.93) ( 8.18, 8.97) ( 7.77, 7.97)
Liquidity premium -139.24
( -145.78, -132.49)
R2 0.0584 0.3435 0.6577 0.9107 0.9766
( 0.0024, 0.1551) ( 0.2161, 0.4717) ( 0.5562, 0.7417) ( 0.8820, 0.9330) ( 0.9702, 0.9820)
Panel B: Normalized Level-Log Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 4.93 4.93 4.93 4.93 4.92
Credit gap 0.06 0.06 0.06
( 0.01, 0.10) ( 0.01, 0.10) ( 0.02, 0.09)
Bank credit 0.07
( 0.06, 0.09)
GDP 0.16 0.74 0.68
( 0.13, 0.18) ( 0.66, 0.83) ( 0.62, 0.74)
Liquidity premium -0.09
( -0.09, -0.08)
R2 0.0584 0.3435 0.6577 0.9107 0.9766
( 0.0024, 0.1551) ( 0.2161, 0.4717) ( 0.5562, 0.7417) ( 0.8820, 0.9330) ( 0.9702, 0.9820)
Panel A of this table presents results from level-log regressions of the form ζ∗t = ζss +
∑N
j=1 ζxjx
j
t + εt,
while Panel B presents results from normalized level-log regressions, where independent variables are scaled
by their standard deviations. The dependent variable is the Ramsey policy rule in year t expressed in
percentages (1 to 100). The independent variables include (i) credit gap log Lt
Yt
− log Lss
Yss
; (ii) bank credit
log Lt − log Lss; (iii) GDP log Yt − log Yss; (iv) liquidity premium (rf,t − rd,t) − (rf,ss − rd,ss). Reported
coefficients are the mean values across the samples, while the numbers reported in parentheses are the 2.5%
and 97.5% values. Reported R2s are the mean values across the samples, while the numbers reported in
parentheses are the 2.5% and 97.5% values.
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CHAPTER 2 : HOW RISKY IS THE U.S. CORPORATE SECTOR?
2.1. Introduction
How risky is the capital in the U.S. corporate sector? To answer this question, the finance
literature typically considers the returns and the payouts per one equity share of the ag-
gregate stock market.1 As such, these measures ignore the proceeds from changes in the
total number of asset shares (i.e., issuances and repurchases), as well as the contributions
from the debt of corporations. In contrast, in our paper we focus on the aggregate invest-
ment strategy which is the claim to the entire supply of corporate capital. The aggregate
strategy is appropriate for the macroeconomic and macro-finance research which features
aggregate transfers of resources to and from the corporate sector at the economy-wide level.
The aggregate, rather than per share, payouts and valuations are the relevant measures to
assess the nature and magnitude of risks in the corporate sector, and to evaluate the risk
and return implications of such models.
To measure aggregate payouts and valuations, we use the market data on prices, shares, and
distributions associated with equity, debt, and total asset side of the corporations. While
equity measurements are standard, we bring a novel source of corporate debt data from
Barclay indices to uncover the market value of U.S. corporate bonds and their corresponding
payouts to investors. The aggregate payouts include both cash (dividend and interest
payments) and non-cash (share issuances and repurchases) distributions associated with
debt and equity of the U.S. corporate sector. The aggregate valuations represent the total
market capitalizations of equity and debt of the corporate sector.2
We show novel empirical evidence that risk properties of aggregate payouts are quite dif-
ferent from those of typical per share equity dividends. First, accounting for net issuances,
1This is a standard approach in the macro-finance literature, from the business cycle risk models of Mehra
and Prescott (1985) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) to the long-run risks of Bansal and Yaron (2004)
or rare disaster of Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006).
2The aggregate value of a corporation is commonly called the ”Enterprise Value”. Hence, we are exam-
ining the enterprise value of the entire US corporate sector.
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total payouts are often negative, meaning that there are periods when the corporate sec-
tor receives funds from investors rather than paying them out. Indeed, in our 1975-2014
sample total payouts go below zero about 40% of the time for bonds, and 30% of the time
for equity and total assets. Second, net issuances are highly volatile, and are a dominant
component of the total payouts. They significantly raise the volatility of the total payouts
relative to smooth cash distributions. Third, while cash payouts are strongly pro-cyclical,
total payouts are generally acyclical, both at short and long horizons. For example, the
correlations of consumption growth with changes in asset cash payouts increase from 20%
at a 1 quarter horizon to 40% at a 5-year horizon. On the other hand, the correlations of
consumption growth with changes in total asset payouts are nearly zero at all the consid-
ered horizons. Intuitively, both aggregate issuances and repurchases tend to increase during
expansion periods, leading to acyclical net issuances and thus total payouts. Our market
value of debt reveals that much of these adjustments take place along the debt side of the
corporation.
The evidence for the acyclicality of total payouts is especially puzzling given that asset
returns are predominantly equity-like. The asset return averages 6.4%, comparable to 7.8%
for the equity, and the correlation between the two is in excess of 99%. The asset returns are
also considerably exposed to movements in economic growth, especially at long horizons.
Taken together, the payout and return evidence challenges standard notions of risk and
return in the finance literature. We develop a model that helps to explain the above features
of the asset market data while accounting for the dynamics of total payouts.
The evidence of acyclical total payouts raises an important question about the economic
nature and sources of risk in financial markets, i.e., what risks are being compensated?
In addition, negative payouts provide a methodologically challenging aspect for standard
models as well as data characterization.3 We develop a long-run risk type model that helps
explain the above features of the asset market data while accounting for the dynamics of
3Indeed, it is no longer feasible to work with log growth rates because total payouts are often zero or
negative.
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total payouts and specifically, for the possibility of negative payouts. In the model payouts
are indeed not procyclical, yet their exposure to long run growth risk generates a sizeable
premium over the risk free rate. This mechanism, which underlies many long run risk model
calibrations, emphasizes that it is not the business cycle risk that drives the unconditional
risk premium, but a risk of a longer duration. In this regard the model highlights the
tension between matching the acyclical dynamics, higher volatility, and lower persistence of
total payouts relative to standard dividend cashflows and the large asset premium.
Related Literature. Our focus on broader notions of cashflows which account for repur-
chases and issuances is related to several strands of the literature. Fama and French (2001)
and Grullon and Michaely (2002) are among the early papers that highlight the changing
nature of firms’ payouts. Dittmar and Dittmar (2004), Guay and Harford (2000), and Ja-
gannathan et al. (2000) discuss the role of repurchases as the preferred form of distributing
the transitory component of earnings, as dividend policy requires financial commitment.
Bansal et al. (2005) incorporate repurchases to their alternative measure of dividends to
measure cash flow risk. Boudoukh et al. (2007) find that total equity payouts, which include
repurchases and issuances, provide stronger evidence of return predictability than cash div-
idends alone. Closest to our work are Larrain and Yogo (2008) and Bansal and Yaron
(2007). Larrain and Yogo (2008) analyze, using standard VAR return decomposition, the
connection between total payouts and asset price fluctuations. Importantly, their measures
of payouts are based on book, rather than market values of debt, as in our work. In addi-
tion, our main focus is on understanding the cyclicality and the exposure of the payouts to
economic risks. Bansal and Yaron (2007) focus on total payouts in the equity market, and
provide strong evidence for equity return and equity payout growth predictability.
Our findings are consistent with the evidence in Julliard and Parker (2005), Bansal et al.
(2005), Hansen et al. (2008) and the basic premise of the long-run risks model of Bansal
and Yaron (2004), which identifies low-frequency movements in economic growth as a key
source of risk in financial markets. While these studies focus on equity markets, we show
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the relevance of these growth risk channels in bond and total asset markets. In terms of
related work on corporate bond returns, Chen (2010) and Bhamra et al. (2010) show the
importance of low-frequency economic growth risks for the choice of the capital structure,
dynamics of the leverage, and the riskiness of corporate bonds. Ferson et al. (2013) show
the role of growth risks in the cross-section of equity and corporate bond returns.
Our empirical findings are also important for interpreting the expanding literature of pro-
duction based asset pricing; see Jermann (1998), Lochstoer and Kaltenbrunner (2010),
Croce (2014), Kung and Schmid (2014), among many others. In that literature dividend
dynamics are often counter-cyclical as large TFP improvements are associated with the
desire to invest and not pay dividends. In these models the notion of dividends is an en-
compassing one and thus more closely related to our measure of total payouts. Our analysis
suggests that the mapping from model-based dividend to ones in the data should perhaps
be based on total payouts. In that case, the production based models implications for divi-
dends would accord better with the data, and the asset pricing would still be relevant with
regard to the level of the observed risk premia.
The remainder of the paper continues as follows: Section 2.2 provides the data analysis. In
Section 2.3 we consider an economic model, show how to address negative payouts, calibrate
the model and provide quantitative results. Section 2.4 provides concluding remarks.
2.2. Empirical Analysis
2.2.1. Payouts and Valuations
In this section we lay out key relationships between valuations and payouts which underlie
our empirical analysis. Unlike the majority of the literature which considers a per share
investment strategy in equity, our main focus is on the aggregate strategy which is the
claim to the entire supply of corporate capital. The payoff on this aggregate strategy
includes standard cash distributions in the form of dividends and interest payments, and,
importantly, non-cash distributions, such as share issuances and repurchases associated with
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the equity and debt sides of the corporate balance sheet.4
define the key return and payout variables which pertain to cash, issuances, repurchases,
and total distributions. As in Bansal and Yaron (2007), we first analyze the return to two
trading strategies: the hold-one-share strategy, where an investor holds one share forever,
and the aggregate holding strategy, where a representative agent holds the entire supply
of capital. These trading strategies have identical returns, but have different measured
payouts to investors.
Consider a standard gross return on holding one share of an asset between period t and
t+ 1, Rt+1 :
Rt+1 =
Pt+1 + CFt+1
Pt
, (2.1)
where Pt is the price per share, and CFt is the cash payout per share of an asset. Cash
payout refers to cash dividends or coupon/interest payments for equity or bond, respectively.
Multiplying the numerator and denominator by the number of outstanding shares Nt, we
can rewrite the gross return equation in the following way:
Rt+1 =
Vt+1 +Nt · CFt+1 − (Nt+1 −Nt) · Pt+1
Vt
, (2.2)
where Vt = Nt × Pt is the total market capitalization. The right-hand side of the above
equation can be interpreted as the return to the aggregate investment strategy. Its value is
given by the total market capitalization Vt, and its payoff corresponds to the total resource
distribution Da,t+1 in the form of aggregate cash distributions and share issuances and
repurchases:
Da,t+1 ≡ Dt+1 −NIt+1, (2.3)
where Dt+1 ≡ Nt · CFt+1 is the aggregate cash payout, and NIt+1 ≡ ISSt+1 − REPt+1
is the aggregate net issuance. The issuances ISSt+1 and repurchases REPt+1 capture the
4Larrain and Yogo (2008), Boudoukh et al. (2007) and Bansal and Yaron (2007) also consider broader
notions of payouts which incorporate share issuances and repurchases.
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transfer of resources in and out of the firm, respectively. The outflow at date t+ 1 is given
by,
REPt+1 ≡ −{Nt+1 −Nt}− Pt+1 ≥ 0. (2.4)
It is positive when there is a repurchase of the existing shares, i.e. when Nt+1 − Nt ≤ 0.
Similarly, define issuances as:
ISSt+1 ≡ {Nt+1 −Nt}+ Pt+1 ≥ 0. (2.5)
This represents the inflow of resources into the corporation following a new issuance of
shares when Nt+1 is greater than Nt. As can be seen from the above equations, total
payout to the aggregate strategy is directly affected by net issuances, above and beyond
standard cash distributions. Share repurchases increase total aggregate payout, while share
issuances reduce it.
Notably, equations 2.1 and 2.2 define very different investment strategies: the former is
a per share strategy typical for an individual investor, while the latter is an investment
into the aggregate supply of firm’s capital. These strategies have very different valuations
and payouts, even though by construction they have identical returns (see also Bansal
and Yaron (2007) and Larrain and Yogo (2008)). 5 They also differ in applicability: the
aggregate strategy is particularly relevant in the context of macroeconomic and macro-
finance literature which features transfers of resources between the representative firm and
the representative agent at the economy-wide level. The aggregate, rather than per share,
payouts and valuations should then be used to assess the nature and magnitude of risks in
the corporate sector, and to evaluate the risk and return implications of such models. In
subsequent sections we describe our approach to measure aggregate payouts and valuations
associated with debt, equity, and asset side of the U.S. corporate sector, and highlight their
economic implications relative to the standard measurements.
5See also ? and ? for a related discussion of these strategies.
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The total payout, Da,t includes both outflows from firms to investors in the form of cash
payouts and repurchases, and inflows into the corporate sector in the form of issuances. A
present value representation of returns implies that
Vt =
∞∑
j=1
exp
{
−
j∑
k=1
logRt+k
}
Da,t+j , (2.6)
with
Rt+1 =
Vt+1 +Da,t+1
Vt
. (2.7)
That is, the current market capitalization reflects the discounted sum of a net transfer of
aggregate resources from all the firms.
In this paper, we measure total payouts to equity, debt, and total assets of the firm. Total
assets refers to the sum of the two components of the corporate sector - equity and debt.
Debt, in its turn, is the sum of the long-term and short-term debt.
2.2.2. Data and Empirical Measurements
We use market data on prices, shares, and distributions to measure market valuations and
payouts. The latter includes both cash (dividend and interest payments) and non-cash
(share issuances and repurchases) distributions associated with debt, equity, and asset side
of the U.S. corporate balance sheet. For accurate and relevant measurements, we empha-
size the importance of using the market price data, whenever possible. This is especially
pertinent to debt-related variables. The market data for bond valuations and distributions
are not as widely available as for equities, so the majority of studies in the literature have
resorted to book rather than market valuations, which can affect empirical measurements.6
To measure equity-related variables, we use the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Monthly Stock File. The dataset provides equity price per share (prc) and share
6It has been common either to use book values to capture debt valuations or approximate market values
by imputing the maturity distribution of long-term debt as pioneered by Brainard and Shoven (1980). See
also Bernanke and Campbell (1988), Hall et al. (1988), Richardson and Sloan (2003), and Larrain and Yogo
(2008).
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data (shrout) at an individual security level, as well as holding period returns including and
excluding dividends, ret and retx, respectively. We include only common stock listed on
NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE Arca stock exchanges.7 Similar to Boudoukh et al.
(2007) and Larrain and Yogo (2008), we measure individual stock i net issuance in month
t as a change in shares outstanding valued at the month-end share price:8,9
niit = prcit × shroutit − prcit−1 × shroutit−1 × (1 + retxit) . (2.8)
Different from Boudoukh et al. (2007) but similar to Larrain and Yogo (2008), we also
account for changes in the entity structure due to initial public offerings, mergers, acquisi-
tions, and exchanges, which is necessary to fully capture total transfers of resources in and
out of the corporations. Specifically, we use firm’s market capitalization on the first trading
month, shrout × prc, to measure net issuances during the IPO. We use CRSP delisting
data to identify securities with delisting codes of 2xx and 3xx, and use their delisting price
(dlprc) and the delisting return (dlretx) to account for the repurchases during mergers and
acquisitions. We aggregate the firm-level data and compute market valuations, dividends,
returns, and net issuances at the total market level.10
We face several challenges associated with measuring the payouts and valuations of the
debt side of the corporate balance sheet. U.S. corporations issue a wide variety of debt
instruments, and most of the trade takes place at the over-the-counter (OTC) dealer’s
7We have checked that including preferred stocks and/or excluding government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) does not have a material effect on our results.
8This is equivalent to measuring net issuances as the value of the change in the number of shares over
the period, appropriately adjusted by the cumulative adjustment share and price factors cfacshr and cfacpr
that account for splits and other corporate events:
niit = (shroutit × cfacshrit − shroutit−1 × cfacshrit−1)× prcit/cfacprit.
9Valuing net issuances at the average of beginning-of-month and end-of-month prices, as in Boudoukh
et al. (2007), instead of the month-end prices as in Larrain and Yogo (2008) does not impact our results
10Bansal and Yaron (2007) and Welch and Goyal (2008) measure aggregate net issuances directly in the
market index data as MCAPt −MCAPt−1 × (1 + VWRETXt) , where MCAP is the market capitalization
and VWRETX is the value-weighted return excluding distributions. The index and firm-based approaches
treat differently firm exits for reasons other than mergers, acquisitions and exchanges; e.g., defaults and
bankruptcies would show up as negative net issuances using the index data, but not in our approach using
the firm level data. Empirically, however, the two measures are quite similar.
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market. As such, there is no convenient centralized platform to obtain market valuations for
firm’s debt. Further, there is a double-counting concern: corporate loans made by financial
institutions (banks), which are financed by the debt and equity of the banks themselves,
should be excluded from the analysis.
To tackle these issues, we bring novel bond market value data from Barclays Indices. The
Barclays Indices are widely used throughout the financial industry because of their accuracy
and wide range of market coverage. Reported market capitalizations and month-to-date
index returns are updated on daily basis, and our data is taken on the last trading day
of the month when bond prices are hand marked by traders. Reported total returns are
decomposed into coupon returns and price returns which facilitates calculation of monthly
coupon cash flows and net issuances.11
Barclays Indices represent many types of debt instruments, varying from debentures and
asset-backed bonds to commercial paper issues, and our goal is to measure all of the out-
standing corporate debt. To capture long duration debt, we include the following sub-
indices of the Barclays U.S. Universal Index: Corporate Investment Grade (IG), Corporate
High Yield (HY), 144A Ex Aggregate, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS)
and Fixed Rate Asset-Backed Securities (ABS). All of the bonds represented in the above
sub-indices have fixed-rate coupon, are fully taxable, include both senior and subordinate
debt, and must have at least one year-to-final maturity.12 Additional details for the char-
acteristics of the bonds are given in the Appendix D, Table D.1. We further augment our
debt measure with corporate issues of taxable municipal bonds, in particular Industrial
Development Revenue Bonds (IDR), Pollution Control Revenue Bonds (PCR), and U.S.
Convertibles Composite Index, since those are outside of the Universal Index.
To measure debt of short duration, we include the following Barclays sub-indices: Asset-
11Unlike for equities, we do not have access to individual bond data, so the payout and valuation compu-
tations are done at the index level.
12The Universal Index excludes bonds that has less than 1 year to maturity as they become money market
eligible. ABS and CMBS must have a remaining average life of at least one year, while bonds that convert
from fixed to floating rate will exit the sub-indices one year prior to conversion.
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Backed Securities Floating Rate (ABS FRN), Floating Rate Notes (FRN), Floating Rate
Notes High Yield (FRN HY) and Short-Term Corporate Index (STI). The floating-rate
securities in the above sub-indices may have longer maturity, but their interest rate dura-
tions are typically less than 1 year. More details are given in the Appendix D (Table D.1).
We further augment our measure with short-term debt instruments, such as commercial
paper and certificates of deposits, using Compustat/CRSP Merged Database. Specifically,
”Debt in Current Liabilities” (item 34, dlc) serves as a good proxy for the market value of
outstanding short-term debt. Short duration notes payable tend to be quite insensitive to
changes in interest rates, hence, book values provide reasonable assessments of their val-
uations. As in Richardson and Sloan (2003), we employ income statements and measure
net issuance directly as ”Current Debt Changes” (item 301, dlcch).13 To construct coupon
cash flows, we use one month repo rate, which is obtained from Bloomberg.
We face two issues of double counting: banks and insurance companies. Banks make direct
non-marketable loans to corporations. Buying all of the banking sectors equity and debt
includes the rights to the cash flow from the direct loans. To avoid double counting we
exclude the value of bank borrowing from the market liabilities of the non-financial corporate
sector. The issue of insurance companies is more difficult because they invest heavily in
marketable corporate debt. We have not been able to find time-series data on the market
value of insurance company corporate debt holdings. Instead, we assume that corporate
bond holdings of insurance companies can be partially offset by their bond issuance. As
such, we exclude bonds issued by insurance companies within the major Barclays indices,
in particular, IG, HY, Convertibles and FRN. The remaining Barclays indices are not
disaggregated by the corporate sector and, hence, bonds issued by insurance companies
can not be excluded. However, as of December 2014 IG, HY, Convertibles and FRN indices
constituted around 70% of the market value of all Barclays indices included in our measure
13An alternative approach is to employ the balance sheet data and measure net issuance as the change
in ”Debt in Current Liabilities” (item 34, dlc). As discussed in Richardson and Sloan (2003), this method
suffers a number of limitations. Specifically, debt can be added to the balance sheet through mergers and
acquisitions rather than through the issuance of new debt. Also, open market repurchases of bonds can
involve cash payments that differ from the carrying value of the debt.
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of debt market and as such the measurement error should be minimal.14
In addition to the asset prices, we also use aggregate macroeconomic data. We collect the
data on GDP and consumption, defined as the sum of expenditures on non-durable goods
and services, from the BEA tables. The data on CPI inflation come from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The price level is normalized to 1 in December of 2009. All the nominal
quantities are deflated by the CPI to obtain real measures.
Our benchmark sample covers the period from 1975 until 2014, due to the availability of
the bond data from Barclays. For some of our supplemental analysis we also use equity
only data that go back to the 1930s.
2.2.3. Empirical Evidence
Market Prices and Returns
We start our empirical analysis by describing the key properties of market capitalizations
and returns to equity, debt, and assets of the U.S. corporate sector.
Figure 11 shows the evolution of the components of corporate debt. As can be seen on the
top panel, investment grade bonds made up the entirety of our measure of long-term debt
in the beginning of the sample. The role of other debt instruments, especially high-yield
bonds and 144A issues, has significantly increased over time and helped fuel growth in the
corporate debt market. By the end of the sample, the real market value of the long-term
corporate debt has reached 7.09 trillion (in December 2009 dollars), and more than half of
it is comprised of non-IG bonds. By the end of the sample, we estimate that the real market
value of the long-term corporate debt has reached 6.5 trillion (in December 2009 dollars),
and more than half of it is comprised of non-IG bonds.
The bottom panel of Figure 11 shows that short-term non-bank corporate debt is nearly
14Other liabilities of insurance companies, such as policy liabilities, do not represent ownership claims, and
thus do not need to be included in our asset and payouts measures. We also tried excluding the insurance
companies all together by removing their equity, which did not have any impact on our key results.
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entirely made up of short-term loans (STL), with Floating rate notes (FRN) and asset-
backed securities (ABS) entering in early 2000s into the dataset. Unlike the long-term
corporate debt whose value has been generally growing over time, the market value of
short-term debt increased from 0.29 trillion in 1975 to its maximum of 8.72 trillion in 2007,
then precipitously fell during the Financial Crisis. It remains at its mid-1990s value of
about 3.87 trillion at the end of 2014.15
Figure 12 shows the dynamics of the market capitalization of aggregate debt, equity, and
assets, where the latter corresponds to the sum of the first two. Aggregate equity is on
average twice as large as debt, which leads to a typical estimate of debt-to-equity ratio of
1/2. Asset and equity values tend to be more volatile and more procyclical than debt, and
also experience a larger growth over time. Our estimates suggest that the real market value
of U.S. corporate assets grew from 3.79 trillion in mid-1975 to nearly 37.60 trillion at the
end of 2014, which is comprised of 2.89 to 26.63 trillion increase for equity and 0.79 to 10.97
for bonds.
To assess the riskiness of aggregate equity, debt, and assets, we provide basic summary
statistics for the returns on these claims. Table 7 shows that in our sample, the average
real equity return is 7.8%, with a standard deviation of 16.3%. The debt return is smaller
on average, and is much less volatile: its mean is 2.9%, and its standard deviation is 5.4%.
The asset return is the weighted average of the two, with the weight tilted more to equities
which represent a larger fraction of the asset value. As shown in Table 7, the average asset
return is 6.4%, and its volatility is 12%. Further, the asset and equity returns are nearly
perfectly correlated. Hence, the aggregate assets of the U.S. corporate sector are quite risky,
and the magnitude and nature of risk is comparable to that of equities.
15This is consistent with the evidence in Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010) who document a significant
decline in the commercial paper during the Financial Crisis. They suggest substitution to other sources
of financing, adverse selection and the inability of issuers to issue the commercial paper, and institutional
constraints as potential reasons for the collapse.
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Payouts
We next consider the empirical evidence for the payouts to debt, equity, and assets of U.S.
corporations. Following the discussion in Section 2.2.1, for each of these components the
aggregate payouts can be broken down into cash (total dividends or interest payments) and
non-cash (net share issuance) distributions.
Figure 13 shows the time series of the total payouts and their cash and net issuance com-
ponents. Naturally, cash payouts are positive. On the other hand, net issuances are not
restricted to be of any sign. At times when firms opt for a net distribution of resources
through repurchases, net issuances are negative, and they become positive when firms at-
tract capital through new share issuances. In our sample, net issuances of equity, debt, and
corporate assets are mostly positive: the firms generally draw resources from the investors.
Figure 13 also shows that net issuances are much more volatile than cash distributions, and
thus are a dominant component of total payouts. Compared to cash distributions, total
corporate payouts are very volatile, and can actually be negative: in our sample, they go
below zero about 40% of the time for bonds, and 30% of the time for equity and total assets.
To analyze formally statistical properties of the aggregate payouts, we need to convert them
into stationary variables: in levels, payouts are a random walk. However, the standard
method of using logarithms to define growth rates does not work in our setting because
payouts can be less than or equal to zero. Instead, we rely on alternative measures of
growth in which we normalize the level change by the consumption level Ct , e.g.
∆Da,t
Ct
=
Da,t−Da,t−1
Ct
, or by the aggregate output Yt, e.g.
∆Da,t
Yt
=
Da,t−Da,t−1
Yt
. 16 At the same time, we
continue to use the standard log growth rate to measure consumption and output growth,
16We have also examined alternative normalizations by a previous period consumption level,
∆Da,t
Ct−1 , by
the average consumption level in the current and previous period,
∆Da,t
1
2 (Ct−1+Ct)
, by the constant non-linear
trend of consumption, ∆D˜a,t ≡ ∆Da,texp{gt} with g = 1T
∑T
t=1 ∆ct, and by excluding the scaling all together.
The results are very similar to our benchmark. Further, in Section 2.2.4 we show that using normalized
changes versus log growth rates does not make any difference for our key correlation results for positive cash
distributions.
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∆ct ≡ log
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
and ∆yt ≡ log
(
Yt
Yt−1
)
, respectively. One of the advantages of our growth
measure is that it is additive. For example, because the level of asset payouts is the sum of
equity and debt, our measure of growth rate in asset payouts is also equal to a simple sum
of growth rates in equity and debt payouts.
Figure 14 shows the time-series of growth in cash payouts ∆DC , net issuance
∆NI
C , and the
total payouts DaC for equity, debt and total assets. Table 8 documents the key summary
statistics for these variables. The presented evidence highlights the significance of our novel
payout components related to firms’ debt and net issuances, which are missed by the typical
measures of per-share cash payouts on equity.
First, one can see that debt payouts contribute a significant fraction to the fluctuations
in asset payouts. For the cash component, the growth in debt payouts is twice as volatile
as the growth in equity cash payouts, so that the asset cash payout growth mostly reflect
variations in debt payments: the correlation between the growth rates in debt and total
asset cash payouts is 93%. The volatilities of growth rates in equity and debt net issuances
are more comparable (3.0 and 3.8, respectively), so the fluctuations in asset net issuances
are more evenly split between equity and debt. The growth rates in total payout on assets
have a 60% correlation with growth in total payouts on debt, and 35% with total payouts
on equity.
Second, it is evident from Figure 14 and Table 8 that growth rates in net issuances are
much more volatile than growth rates in the corresponding cash payouts. For example, the
volatility of net equity issuance growth is 10 times larger than the volatility of the equity
cash dividends, and for debt, the volatility of changes in net issuances is 6 times larger
than that of bond cash payouts. This implies that total payouts, which are equal to the
difference between cash and net issuances, are very volatile, and are driven predominantly
by shocks to net issuances. Indeed, the volatilities of the changes in total payouts are very
similar to those of net issuances, and are several times larger than the volatilities of the
corresponding cash flows.
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Overall, the evidence suggests that our total asset payouts have very different properties
relative to typical measures of corporate distributions, such as equity dividends. It is also
quite distinct from other, earnings-based measures popular in the literature. Earnings cap-
ture profits generated by the firm during the period, and aggregate earnings are often used
to measure total performance of the corporate sector. Aggregate earnings, however, are con-
ceptually distinct from the asset payouts. They are an accounting, rather than an economic
measure based on actual distributions. They contain retained earnings, which represent the
capital not paid out to the investors. Most importantly, earnings do not incorporate asset
repurchases and issuances, which we showed are the dominant part of the asset payouts.
Because of that, aggregate earnings are more aligned with asset cash distributions, rather
than asset total payouts. Indeed, in our sample, growth rate in aggregate earnings (EBIT)
has a 70% correlation with changes in asset cash payouts, while its correlation with changes
in total asset payouts is actually negative, -20%.
Economic Growth Risk Exposure
Our earlier analysis shows that total asset payouts are very volatile relative to equity pay-
outs, and asset returns are about as risky as equity returns. We next assess the economic
nature of risk in asset returns and payouts through their exposure to high and low frequency
variations in macroeconomic growth. The exposure to fluctuations in economic growth is
one of the main tenets of the macro-finance research, from the business cycle risk models
of Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) to the long-run risks
approach of Bansal and Yaron (2004). early power utility models of Mehra-Prescott to
modern theories based on habit formation (CC) and long-run risks (BY). It is a natural
starting point for the analysis of the economic nature of risk in the financial markets.
First, we consider the business-cycle behavior of the payouts. Table 9 shows contempora-
neous correlations of the growth rates in payouts with consumption or output growth. We
show the results for the benchmark annual sample from 1975 to 2014, for the 1975 to 2006
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sample which excludes the Financial Crisis, and at a quarterly frequency. Notably, cash,
net issuances, and asset payouts have very different business cycle properties. Cash payouts
tend to be procyclical: in the benchmark sample, the correlations of consumption growth
with changes in cash payouts range from 0.21 for debt to 0.34 for assets; these correlations
increase to 0.34 and 0.44, respectively, using output growth to measure cyclicality. The cor-
relations remain positive excluding the Financial Crisis and at a quarterly frequency, and
are typically above 10%. These results are consistent with the evidence in the literature
that per share equity dividend growth rates are positively correlated with aggregate growth,
and extend it to cash payments on debt and total assets.
Table 9 further shows that changes in net issuances are acyclical and even counter-cyclical.
The correlation estimates for net issuances are virtually always smaller, in absolute value,
than those for the cash payouts, and are negative in almost half of the cases. For example,
in our benchmark sample the correlation of consumption growth with equity net issuances
is -0.17, and it is 0.14 and 0.00 for debt and total assets, respectively. The fact that net
issuances drive a large part of the variations in total payouts implies that the aggregate
payouts are much less procyclical than the cash payouts. In fact, our estimates suggest
that the total payouts on the assets of the corporate sector are essentially acyclical. In
the benchmark sample, the correlation of consumption growth with total asset payouts is
0.07, and it drops to zero excluding the Crisis and in quarterly data. The reduction in
the cyclicality of total payouts is due to both accounting for debt and net issuance data.
Indeed, in the benchmark sample the equity payout correlations with consumption growth
drop from 0.34 to 0.20 when we account for the net issuances of equity, and it drops further
to 0.07 when we also incorporate debt.
The correlation results suggest that total asset payouts are essentially unrelated to the
short-run (i.e., quarterly or annual) fluctuations in economic growth. On the other hand, our
earlier evidence suggests a considerable exposure of the returns to long-run economic growth
fluctuations (see Figure 17). To expand the evidence beyond the short run, we consider
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the term structure of the payout cyclicality, and compute the multi-horizon correlations of
consumption growth with changes in the payouts, e.g.
ρh ≡ Corr
(
∆Da,t
Ct
+
∆Da,t+1
Ct+1
+ ...+
∆Da,t+h
Ct+h
,∆ct + ∆ct+1 + ...∆ct+h
)
,
for h equal to 0, 1, ..., 20 quarters. We focus on quarterly growth rates to address the short
sample concerns, and compute the GMM standard errors. We plot these correlations as a
function of the horizon h for cash payouts, net issuances, and total payouts on equity, debt
and assets in Figures E.1 and 16.
Our results for h = 0 confirm our short-run evidence in Table 9. The cash payouts are
procylical. The correlations are statistically significant for all cases except for the correla-
tion of debt payout with consumption, which is marginally significant (the debt correlation
is significant for the output growth measure). The correlations of aggregate growth with
changes in the net issuances or total payouts are economically and statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. Interestingly, our cyclicality evidence remains similar in the medium
and long run. The correlations for cash payouts remain stable, positive, and statistically
significant up to the considered 5 year horizon. Growth in net issuances is acylical, and
the correlations for the total payouts are smaller, in absolute value, than those for the cash
components. While the equity and asset payout growth correlations with economic growth
tend to be positive at all the frequencies, they are indistinguishable from zero. Thus, the
evidence suggests that cash payouts are exposed to economic risks at short and long fre-
quencies, but changes in net issuances do not seem to respond to high or low frequency
movements in the fundamentals. Because they are so volatile, net issuances drive most of
the fluctuations in aggregate payouts, and significantly reduce the cyclicality of the total
payouts on equity, debt, and assets.
We use a similar approach to assess the exposure of asset valuations to low and high fre-
quency movements in aggregate economic growth. We consider the term structure of return
cyclicality, and compute multi-step correlations of equity, debt, and asset returns with con-
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sumption or output growth, e.g.
ρh ≡ Corr (rt + rt+1 + ...+ rt+h,∆ct + ∆ct+1 + ...∆ct+h) ,
for h equal to 0, 1, ..., 20 quarters. We plot these correlations as a function of the horizon
h for equity, debt, and assets returns in Figure 17. Nearly all of the correlations are
positive, which suggests that the returns are risky with respect to growth fluctuations. The
estimates tend to be smaller and insignificant in the short run. The correlations increase
in the medium and long run, and most of them become significant, especially when we
use output growth to measure cyclicality. For example, the asset return correlations with
consumption growth are below 20% at a quarterly horizon, and increase to 30% at annual
or lower frequencies. The asset return correlations with output growth are statistically and
economically indistinguishable from 0 on a quarterly frequency, and reach 45% at a 3-year
horizon. These findings indicate that equity, bond, and total asset valuations are strongly
exposed to economic growth concerns, especially at lower frequencies.
2.2.4. Robustness and Extensions
In this section we expand and verify our main empirical results. We document the impor-
tance of using market relative to book values to measure debt, extend and economically
interpret the findings for acyclicality of net issuances, present further evidence for the long-
term behavior of payouts using spectral analysis, consider a global perspective, and provide
additional robustness checks with respect to measurements and samples.
Book versus market values. One of the key novel features of our analysis is the reliance
on the market rather than book values to measure prices and payouts. The availability of
reliable bond market data from Barclays Indices imposes limitations in terms of the sample
size and the coverage; however, we find that using it has important implications for the
measured payouts. Indeed, we follow Larrain and Yogo (2008) and construct book values of
debt from the Flow of Funds. We plot the time series of cash, net issuance, and total payouts
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from debt on Figure 18. The corresponding market and book payout growth rates are
positively correlated and share common patterns, however there are several key differences.
The book value quantities are much smoother, and are two to three times less volatile than
the market value ones. For example, the unconditional volatility of the total payouts on
debt goes up from 1.14 to 3.55 once we switch from book to market measurements. They
also have different cyclical properties. Figure 19 contrasts the term structures of payout
cyclicality when we use book versus market values of debt. We continue to use market values
to measure equity payouts to focus on an incremental impact of debt measurements. The
Figure shows that the book value cash payouts from debt and therefore, total assets, are
much less procyclical than the market-based ones, and are essentially acyclical in the short
and the long run. Hence, using book values to measure debt would suggest that that asset
payouts are not exposed to economic growth risk, while market-based estimates strongly
point to a large sensitivity of (the cash components of) the payouts to low-frequency growth
fluctuations.17
Acyclicality of Net Issuances. Our evidence suggests that acyclicality of net issuances
is responsible for the a-cylicality of total payouts, in spite of a strong procyclicality of
cash payments. To help interpret the acyclicalilty of net issuances themselves, it is helpful
to consider the issuances and repurchases components separately. This, however, requires
individual firm data, which we can only obtain for equities from the CRSP Monthly Stock
File. With this caveat in mind, we focus on the term structure of cyclicality for the equity
payouts, and split the equity net issuances into issuances and repurchases.18 Figure 20 shows
the results for the benchmark sample from 1975 to 2014, while in Figure 21 we consider a
longer sample which starts in 1949. The results from both samples are consistent with our
17The Flow of Funds data include both the public and private sector. This raises a concern whether the
difference in results reflects an inclusion of private firms, or the market versus book measurements. We
instead use Compustat database to measure book value of debt, and obtain very similar results that the
book-value-based correlations of debt cash payouts are much lower, by about 0.2 correlation units, than the
market-based quantities.
18Following the literature, we attribute firm’s net issuances to issuances (repurchases) if the number of
shares outstanding increases (decreases) over the month, and aggregate the firm-level measures to aggregate
index issuances and repurchases.
81
main findings: cash payout growth rates are procyclical, especially in the long run; changes
in net issuances are acyclical, and total payout growth appears acyclical as well.
Interestingly, while changes in net issuances are acyclical, both of its components are quite
procyclical in the data: the correlations of changes in issuances and repurchases with con-
sumption growth are positive, and in many cases statistically significant. A potential expla-
nation for these findings is that our measures aggregate across firms which may have different
needs for capital. In good times, some firms in the cross-section face good investment op-
portunities and thus acquire more capital through issuances. Other firms may opt for the
distribution of profits to the investors, which can be done either through cash dividends or
through the repurchases. The repurchases may be the preferred form of distributing the
transitory component of earnings, as dividend policy requires financial commitment (e.g.,
Lintner (1956)), consistent with the evidence in Dittmar and Dittmar (2004), Guay and
Harford (2000), and Jagannathan et al. (2000). In both cases, issuances and repurchases
increase. This makes them procyclical separately, while on net basis the two effects offset
each other, which leads to acyclical net issuances at the aggregate level.
In Table ?? we show the portion of the cospectrum due to cycles above and below 4 years.
For cash payouts on equity, debt, and assets, a significant portion of their covariance with
consumption is due to low frequency variation: for example, for assets, out of the total
correlation of 0.33, 0.26 comes from cycles above 4 years. The cospectrum for net issuances
is close to zero at both short and long frequencies. Finally, for equity and asset total payouts,
the cospectrum is negative for cycles below 4 years, but it is positive for low-frequency cycles
above 4 years. While the magnitudes are small, the evidence suggests that total payouts
inherit some of the long-run growth exposure of the cash payouts. The lower panel of the
Table shows that the results are similar when we calculate the co-spectrum of the payout
growth with the output growth.
Wavelet Analysis. The high volatility of acyclical net issuances makes it challenging to
identify the risks associated with total payouts. To help uncover the long-run properties
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of the series, we perform a decomposition of the correlation between the payout changes
and the economic growth using a discrete wavelet transform. Specifically, we estimate a
sample wavelet correlation between the two on a scale by scale basis, where each scale is
associated with specific frequency interval (e.g. the wavelet correlation for the wavelet scale
16 corresponds to periods of 32-64 quarters). In this part of the analysis we use quarterly
growth rates adjusted by x12 ARIMA model which helps reduce the seasonality patterns in
the data. All other computational details are provided in Appendix F.
In Table 10 we show the estimates of wavelet correlations at different frequencies and the
associated 5% confidence interval. For cash payouts on equity, debt, and assets, a significant
portion of their correlation with consumption is due to low frequency variation: for example,
for assets, the wavelet correlation equals to 55% associated with period of 32-64 quarter, and
21% at 2-4 quarter frequency. The wavelet correlation for net issuances is statistically close
to zero at both short and long frequencies. Finally, consistent with the benchmark evidence,
the correlations for the total payouts are much lower than for the cash components, and
are measured with a substantial noise. For asset payouts, the estimated correlations are
positive at lower frequencies beyond 16 quarters.
Global Perspective. Our main results are conducted from the U.S. perspective and ana-
lyze the exposures to the economic risks in the U.S. consumption and output data. To the
extent that investors are diversified in international markets, they may instead care about
the exposures to global macroeconomic shocks. To confirm the robustness of our results, we
construct several alternative measures of aggregate economic risks using the international
macroeconomic data. We collect quarterly GDP data from major industrialized countries,
and measure global output as a value-weighted GDP across countries. Alternatively, to re-
duce the impact of the U.S., we remove the U.S. from the GDP sample or use equal weights.
Figure E.1 in the Appendix E shows the term structures of asset payout when we use global
GDP to measure aggregate output. The results are very similar to the benchmark findings:
growth rates in cash payouts are strongly procyclical, while growth rates in net issuances
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and total payouts are acyclical. For brevity, the Figure only reports the results for the total
assets; our findings for equity and debt are very similar to the benchmark as well.
Alternative Samples and Measurements. We perform several other robustness checks
to assess the validity of our results. Specifically, we consider: i) equity payouts in longer
samples going back to 1949 or 1930; ii) using different sampling frequencies, such as annual
growth rates at quarterly frequency, and seasonally adjusted quarterly growth rates either by
band-pass, x12 ARIMA model, or by looking at year-to-year changes. The results reported
in Table E.1-E.3 are consistent with our benchmark findings.
Finally, for our empirical analysis we use normalized changes in payouts to measure their
growth rates, e.g.
∆Da,t
Ct
=
Da,t−Da,t−1
Ct
. This is necessitated by the fact that payouts are
often negative, and thus typical log growth computations can not be performed. To assess
whether the use of non-traditional growth measures can have an impact on our findings, we
consider cash dividends, which are always positive, and contrast the term structures of the
correlations based on our growth measure,
ρh ≡ Corr
(
∆Dt
Ct
+
∆Dt+1
Ct+1
+ ...+
∆Dt+h
Ct+h
,∆ct + ∆ct+1 + ...∆ct+h
)
,
with the one based a more standard log growth measure,
ρh ≡ Corr (∆dt + ∆dt+1 + ...∆dt+h,∆ct + ∆ct+1 + ...∆ct+h) .
Figure E.2 shows that the two term structures are virtually identical. Thus, using nor-
malized changes to measure growth rates does not seem to cause statistical issues for our
results.
2.3. Model
Our novel empirical evidence suggests that total asset payout growth is acyclical at short
and low frequencies. However, corporate assets demand a risk premium and are signifi-
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cantly exposed to economic growth risk, especially in the long run. To explain this puzzling
empirical evidence, we argue that total assets payouts are dominated by acyclical net is-
suances which mask economic growth risk of the cash payouts. We develop a long-run risks
valuation framework to quantitatively assess the plausibility of our economic explanation.
Independently, we make a methodological contribution to the literature by providing an
alternative log-linearization framework of Campbell and Shiller (1988) to the cases with
negative payouts.
2.3.1. Economic Setup
Preferences. We consider a discrete-time endowment economy, in a spirit of Bansal and
Yaron (2004) and a subsequent long-run risks literature. The preferences of the representa-
tive agent over the future consumption stream are characterized by the Kreps and Porteus
(1978) recursive utility of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989):
Ut =
[
(1− β)C
1−γ
θ
t + β(EtU
1−γ
t+1 )
1
θ
] θ
1−γ
, (2.9)
where Ct is consumption, β is the subjective discount factor, γ is the risk-aversion coeffi-
cient, and ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (IES). For ease of notation, the
parameter θ is defined as θ ≡ 1−γ
1− 1
ψ
. Note that when θ = 1, that is, γ = 1/ψ, the recursive
preferences collapse to the standard case of expected power utility, in which case the agent
is indifferent to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty of the consumption path. When
risk aversion exceeds the reciprocal of IES (γ > 1/ψ), the agent prefers early resolution of
uncertainty of consumption path, otherwise, the agent has a preference for late resolution
of uncertainty.
Epstein and Zin (1989) show that the asset pricing restriction for any asset return rj,t+1
satisfies a standard Euler condition
Et [exp {mt+1 + rj,t+1}] = 1, (2.10)
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where mt+1 is the log of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS), defined as
mt+1 = θlogδ − θ
ψ
4ct+1 + (θ − 1) rc,t+1. (2.11)
∆ct+1 = log(Ct+1/Ct) is the log growth rate of aggregate consumption, and rc,t is a log
return on the asset which delivers aggregate consumption as dividends (the wealth portfolio).
Consumption dynamics. As in Bansal and Yaron (2004), the consumption growth rate
contains a small predictable component xt which determines the conditional expectation
of consumption growth, and the volatility of fundamental shocks is time-varying and is
captured by the state variable σ2t :
4ct+1 = µc + xt + σtηt+1, (2.12)
xt+1 = ρxxt + ϕxσtet+1, (2.13)
σ2t+1 = σ
2
0 + ν
(
σ2t − σ20
)
+ σωωt+1. (2.14)
The parameters ρx and ν capture the persistence of the expected growth and volatility
news, and σ0, ϕx, and σw govern the unconditional scales of shocks to realized and expected
consumption and consumption volatility, respectively.
Corporate sector payouts. To model the corporate sector, we focus on the total asset
side of the balance sheet and provide a parsimonious exogenous specification for the cash
and net issuances components of the aggregate asset payouts. For simplicity, we do not
consider the issues of optimal capital structure and issuance and repurchase decisions, and
leave these model extensions for future research.
Following Hansen et al. (2008), Bansal and Yaron (2007) and Bansal et al. (2005), cash
payouts are co-integrated in logs with the consumption level:
log
(
Dt
Ct
)
≡ st. (2.15)
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The co-integrating residual st is stationary, persistent, and is exposed to the low-frequency
growth risk:
st+1 = µs + ρs (st − µs) + φsxt + ϕsσtut+1. (2.16)
Parameters µs, ρs, and ϕs determine the unconditional level, persistence, and the volatility
of the cash payout dynamics, and φx govern the sensitivity to the expected growth risks.
To accommodate net issuances, we first define the adjusted net issuance Ht as
Ht ≡ Ct +NIt = Ct + ISSt −REPt. (2.17)
Economically, we expect the adjusted net issuances to be always positive: the repurchase
component of net issuances is a capital distribution from firms to investors, supplemental
to cash dividends and coupons, all of which are used to finance consumption expenditures.
Hence, even ignoring issuances, we expect Ct > REPt, and therefore Ht > 0.
19 Then, we
assume that the log of the adjusted net issuances to consumption is driven by i.i.d. shocks:
log
Ht
Ct
= µh + ϕhσtεt, (2.18)
where µh and ϕh capture the unconditional level and volatility of the net issuances. Unlike
cash flows, net issuances are not directly exposed to low-frequency fluctuations in economic
growth. Further, different from the cash flow dynamics, the process for net issuances is
specified in levels and not in logs, because they can be negative.20
The four shocks ηt+1, et+1, ωt+1 and εt+1 are i.i.d standard Normal. We allow for the
19This is also strongly supported by the data. In our sample, equity repurchases are on average below
10% and never exceed 40% of the level of consumption. Adding issuances, the issuances net of repurchases
never fall below 15% of the total consumption at equity, debt, or asset levels.
20Our approach is different from Boudoukh et al. (2007) who add a constant to net yield to make it
positive. Adjusting net issuances by the level of consumption allows us to impose co-integration between
the key aggregate quantities while guaranteeing positivity of adjusted net issuances.
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correlation between the transitory shocks to consumption growth and cash payout growth:
Cov (ηt+1, ut+1) = α. (2.19)
2.3.2. Model Solution
For tractability, we consider an approximate solution to the model based on the log-
linearization of the consumption and asset return.
Valuation of consumption claim and the IMRS. The log-linearization of the con-
sumption return is standard and follows from Campbell and Shiller (1988). Specifically,
rc,t+1 = log
(
Vc,t+1 + Ct+1
Vc,t
)
≈ κ0,c + κ1,cvcc,t+1 + ∆ct+1 − vcc,t, (2.20)
where vcc,t = log
(
Vc,t
Ct
)
is the valuation of the consumption claim, and κ0,c and κ1,c are the
linearization coefficients which are determined in equilibrium by the unconditional level of
the consumption asset valuation. Under the log-linearized consumption return, the value of
the consumption claim, the consumption return, and hence, the stochastic discount factor
are linear in the underlying states of the economy, and can be solved in a closed form. As
shown in Appendix G and elsewhere in the literature, the value of the consumption claim
is given by:
vcc,t = A0,c +A1,cxt +A2,cσ
2
t , (2.21)
and the equilibrium log stochastic discount factor satisfies,
mt+1 = m0 +mxxt +mσσ
2
t − λησtηt+1 − λeϕeσtet+1 − λwσwωt+1, (2.22)
The exposures of the consumption asset and the market prices of risks are pinned down
by the model and preference parameters, and are provided in Appendix G. The economic
content of the long-run risks model is that when agents have a preference for timing of
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uncertainty resolution, the short-run, long-run, and volatility risks (η, e, and ω, respectively)
are priced, and determine the risk compensation in asset markets. Specifically, for γ > 1 and
ψ > 1, the consumption claim requires a positive risk premium because the consumption
asset return is low in bad times of low realized or expected consumption growth (λη, λe > 0
and A1,c > 0), or high consumption volatility (λw < 0 and A2,c < 0). Quantitatively,
the risk premium is dominated by the compensations for the expected consumption and
volatility risks, which are magnified due to a large persistence of these shocks.
Valuation of corporate assets. The payouts from the corporate sector are determined
by the cash and net issuance components in (2.15) and (2.18), respectively. Notably, unlike
for typical consumption and dividend claims, these payouts can be negative when firms
need capital and issue a large amount of equity or debt. Hence, we can not use a standard
Campbell and Shiller (1988) approximation, and derive an alternative approach to log-
linearize the return. We rewrite the return on the corporate assets in (2.2) as follows:
1 +Rd,t+1 =
Vd,t+1 +Dt+1 −NIt
Vd,t
=
Vd,t+1 +Dt+1 + Ct+1 −Ht+1
Vd,t
=
Ct+1
Ct
·
1 +
Vd,t+1
Ct+1
+ Dt+1Ct+1 −
Ht+1
Ct+1
Vd,t
Ct
,
where Vd,t is the value of the asset. Notably, all the ratios in the last equation are positive:
consumption, prices, cash payouts, and adjusted net issuances are all above zero. We can
then log-linearize the expression above around the unconditional log values of vcd, dc and
hc to derive the log-linear approximation for the asset return:
rd,t+1 ≈ κ0,d + κ1,dvcd,t+1 + ∆ct+1 + κ2,ddct+1 + κ3,dhct+1 − vcd,t, (2.23)
where vcd,t = log
(
Vd,t
Ct
)
is the log asset value to consumption ratio, dct = log
(
Dt
Ct
)
is the
log ratio of the asset cash payouts to consumption, and hct = log
(
Ht
Ct
)
is the ratio of the
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net issuance to consumption. The expressions for the log-linearization coefficients κ are
provided in the Appendix G.
Our log-linear approximation in (2.23) nests a standard one for the consumption asset in
(2.20). Indeed, when there are no net issuances and cash payouts are equal to consumption,
then hct = dct = 0. When net issuances are part of the payouts, the total payout can
now be negative and can no longer be used to scale valuations and define growth rates.
This is why we have to switch to consumption to scale all the quantities, and rewrite the
payouts in terms of positive cash and the adjusted net issuance components. Finally, our
approach is also different from the linearizations in Larrain and Yogo (2008) and Bansal
and Yaron (2007). These papers effectively log-linearize the returns around the positive
issuance and repurchase components of the net issuances. The disadvantage of this method
is that it requires modeling issuances and repurchases separately. Recall that due to the
data limitations, we can not separate the issuances and repurchases at the asset level, and
thus prefer modeling the issuances net of repurchases directly.
κ1,d =
exp {vcd}
1 + exp {vcd}+ exp
{
dc
}− exp{hc} . (2.24)
Using our log-linearization solution to asset returns in (2.23), we can now use the corporate
payout dynamics in (2.15)-(2.18) and the equilibrium stochastic discount factor in (2.22)
to solve for the equilibrium asset valuations. The corporate valuations are linear in the
economic states:
vcd,t = A0,d +A1,dxt +A2,dσ
2
t +A3,dst. (2.25)
Similar to the consumption asset, for typical model parameters corporate assets are risky:
they fall in bad times of low economic growth (A1,d > 0) or high consumption volatility
(A2,d < 0 ). The asset prices also increase at times of a positive gap between cash payouts
and consumption (A3,d > 0): because the gap st is persistent, it signifies higher cash
payments to investors in the future.
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2.3.3. Implications for Payouts and Valuations
We calibrate the model, and assess whether it can quantitatively account for our empirical
evidence. As is common in this literature, we calibrate the model at a monthly frequency,
and use simulations to target the data at an annual horizon. Specifically, we time-aggregate
the simulated monthly output from the model and construct annual growth rates and payout
changes, asset returns, and valuation ratios. We report the median and percentiles for the
model statistics based on 10, 000 Monte-Carlo simulations with 40×12 monthly observations
each that match the length of the historical data. We also show the population values that
correspond to a long-sample of 10,000 annualized observations.
Consumption and corporate payouts. Table 11 reports the parameter values for
the model. In a spirit of the long-run risks literature, the consumption calibration features
persistent low-frequency movements in the expected growth and consumption volatility.
The persistence of the expected growth component is set at 0.985, and that of the volatility
shocks at 0.999. The scales of the expected growth and volatility shocks are rather small
to account for the empirical properties of the macroeconomic fundamentals in the data.
Table 12 shows that our model can match salient properties of the consumption data. The
Table reports the mean, standard deviation, and the persistence of the consumption growth
at 1,2 and 5 lags in the data and in the model. The data moments are computed for the
benchmark 1975-2014 sample, as well as for a long sample going back to 1929. The median
model values are close to the data, and in all the cases the data values are within the
confidence interval of the model.
We next calibrate the dynamics of the cash payouts and net issuances. The cash payouts
are moderately persistent (ρs = 0.96) and are exposed to the expected growth fluctuations
(φs = 6). Recall that in the model the ratio of net issuances to consumption is unpredictable
and driven by its own i.i.d. shock, so we only need to set its overall level and scale. As
shown in Table 13, the model can successfully capture the key moments of cash payout, net
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issuance, and total payout dynamics in the data. Changes in net issuances are several times
more volatile that changes in cash payouts. This leads to a highly volatile total asset payout
growth dominated by shocks to net issuance. Its volatility of 3.15 is comparable to 4.36 in
the model. The Table also shows that, unlike cash dividends which are always positive, net
issuances and total payouts can go negative. In the model, net issuances become negative
about 5% of the time, while total payouts turn negative 25% of the time. These estimates
are consistent with the data.
Changes in annual cash payouts are mildly persistent both in the model and the data.
Changes in net issuances actually have a negative persistence in the data. This is also
captured by the model structure because i.i.d. shocks to the levels of net issuances lead
to negative autocorrelation for the changes. Changes in total payouts behave like net
issuances, and have a negative persistence both in the data and in the model. The Table
also shows that the model can capture well the short-run cyclicality evidence in the data.
Cash payouts are positively correlated with annual consumption growth: the correlation
is 0.30 in the data and 0.34 in the model. Net issuances are acyclical, and total payouts
are essentially acyclical as well: their correlation with consumption growth 0.00 in the data
relative to 0.02 in the model. The confidence intervals on the asset payout correlations are
quite large, which is consistent with the idea that the net issuances introduce a substantial
noise in measuring the exposures of aggregate payouts to economic risks.
Perhaps surprisingly, the model does not match the means of net issuances and aggregate
payouts, even though these are effectively governed by the exogenous parameters in the
model (the data value is within the 5% confidence interval of the model). The unconditional
mean net issuance changes in the data is actually larger than the mean of changes in
cash payouts, which implies that the mean of total payout changes is negative (see Table
13). Taking these estimates at the face value, this suggests that future payouts from the
corporate sector are negative on average, which would lead to negative asset valuations.
This is counterfactual in the data, and is ruled out in our model solution approach which
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forces prices to be positive. Because there is a substantial statistical uncertainty about the
estimates of the mean, we instead target a lower value for the average net issuances which
is below the average of the cash payouts. Under these values, the average total payouts are
positive, and their present value is positive as well.21
Asset prices and economic risk. To study the implications for the asset prices, we
calibrate the preference parameters to standard values in the literature. The risk aversion
is set at 10, and the IES parameter is 1.5. This configuration implies a preference for early
resolution of uncertainty and a strong substitution effect. These margins play an important
role to generate sizeable risk compensations and realistic dynamics of the asset prices (see
Bansal and Yaron (2004)).
Table 14 shows the model implications for the key asset-pricing moments, such as the mean
and standard deviation of the risk-free rate and the asset return. The model replicates
quite well a relatively low level and volatility of the risk-free rate in the data. The level is
0.86% in the data relative to 1.64% in the model, and its volatility is 1.78% in the data and
0.82% in the model. The asset returns are risky: the asset risk premium is 6.42% in the
data relative to 6.25% in the model, and the asset return volatility is about 12% both in
the model and in the data.
What is the nature and sources of risk in corporate assets? The key source of risk in our
economy is the news to the expected consumption growth, which accounts for about a half
of the compensation for the total asset risk premium, with volatility and short-run consump-
tion risks explaining the rest. This expected growth risk compensation reflects the exposure
of the cash component of the aggregate payouts to low-frequency fluctuations in expected
consumption through the parameter ϕs. Indeed, zeroing out net issuance components from
the total payouts by setting ϕh = 0 does not materially affect the model implied asset risk
21Asset payouts which are positive on average is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the conver-
gence and positivity of asset valuations. Due to aggregate risk compensation, states with negative payouts
in general contribute more to total asset valuations than states with positive payouts. This places further
discipline on the payout parameters to ensure that the solution to asset prices exists.
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premium.22
The term structures of cyclicality help further assess and validate the expected growth
risk channel for the payouts and valuations. As shown in Figure 22, asset returns co-
move positively with consumption growth at short and long horizons in the data, and the
model can quantitatively capture these correlations. The model also replicates very well the
correlation patterns across different components of the payouts and at different frequencies.
Both in the data and in the model, the cash payouts are procyclical at all horizons, while the
net issuances and total payouts are effectively acyclical. The correlations are very similar
in the model and in the data.
Hence, even though corporate payouts are dominated by shocks to net issuances which
are uncorrelated with the aggregate economy, the large exposure of cash payouts to low-
frequency growth fluctuations makes total payouts risky, and generates a large risk premium
for asset returns.
2.4. Conclusions
We measure the market value of U.S. corporate assets and their payouts to investors. Our
measure of total payout includes not only the cash dividends and interest payments (cash
payouts), but also net transfers in the form of repurchases and new issuances of equity and
debt.
We document several novel empirical findings. First, total asset payouts often turn negative,
meaning that there are periods when investors finance the corporate sector. Second, net
issuances are highly volatile, and are a dominant component of the total payouts. Third,
while cash payouts are procyclical, total payouts appear acyclical. This holds for equity,
debt and especially for asset payouts. This evidence challenges standard notions of risk and
return, because asset returns are risky and comparable to equities.
22The volatility of net issuances is exposed to consumption volatility, so that net issuances affect the
asset exposure to the volatility risks. Net issuances also impact the values of the steady states for the
log-linearization of returns. These effects are quite small.
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We develop a long-run risk model to account for the empirical evidence. In the model, net
issuances are acyclical and highly volatile, which masks the exposure of cash components
of total payouts to low frequency economic risks. The model matches acyclical dynamics of
the total payout, while generating a sizeable asset risk premium.
There are several extensions of our paper that would be fruitful to pursue in future work.
On the empirical side, it would be interesting to consider properties of the valuations and
payouts across firms, and not just at the aggregate level. Theoretically, it would be useful
to develop an economic model which endogenizes the payout decisions. As a next step, one
can calibrate or estimate the economic environment and quantify the role of economic risks
for payout policy and asset valuations. We leave these extensions for future research.
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Figure 11: Debt Market Capitalization
(a) Long-Term Debt
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 20100
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 
 
IG
HY
144A Ex
CMBS
Convertibles
ABS
Municipals
(b) Short-Term Debt
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 20100
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 
 
STL
FRN
FRN HY
STI
ABS FRN
The Figure shows the market value of the components of the long-term and short-term corporate debt. The
data are real annual observations from 1975 to 2014, and are expressed in trillions of December 2009 dollars.
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Figure 12: Asset Market Capitalization
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The Figure shows the market values of equity, debt, and assets. Grey bars indicate the NBER recessions.
The data are real annual observations from 1975 to 2014, and are expressed in trillions of December 2009
dollars.
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Figure 13: Equity, Debt, and Asset Payouts
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The Figure shows equity, debt, and asset payouts. The payouts include cash, net issuances, and total
payouts. Grey bars indicate the NBER recessions. The data are real annual observations from 1975 to 2014,
and are expressed in trillions of December 2009 dollars.
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Figure 14: Changes in Equity, Debt, and Asset Payouts
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The Figure shows changes in equity, debt, and asset payouts, scaled by the consumption level. The payouts
include cash, net issuances, and total payouts. Grey bars indicate the NBER recessions. The data are real
annual observations from 1975 to 2014.
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Figure 15: Term Structure of Payout Cyclicality (Consumption)
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The Figure shows multi-horizon correlations between equity, debt, and asset payouts and consumption
growth. The payouts include cash, net issuances, and total payouts. The data are real quarterly observations
from Q1.1975 to Q4.2014. The standard errors are Newey-West adjusted.
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Figure 16: Term Structure of Payout Cyclicality (Output)
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The Figure shows multi-horizon correlations between equity, debt, and asset payouts and output growth.
The payouts include cash, net issuances, and total payouts. The data are real quarterly observations from
Q1.1975 to Q4.2014. The standard errors are Newey-West adjusted.
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Figure 17: Term Structure of Return Cyclicality
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The Figure shows multi-horizon correlations between equity, debt, and asset excess returns and measures of
economic growth, such as consumption (left panels) and output (right panels). The data are real quarterly
observations from Q1.1975 to Q4.2014. The standard errors are Newey-West adjusted.
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Figure 18: Change in Debt Payouts: Book and Market Values
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The Figure shows changes in debt payouts, scaled by the consumption level, and computed using the market
(solid line) or book (dashed line) values. The payouts include cash, net issuances, and total payouts. Grey
bars indicate the NBER recessions. The data are real annual observations from 1975 to 2014.
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Figure 19: Term Structure of Payout Cyclicality: Book Values of Debt
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The Figure shows multi-horizon correlations between equity, debt, and asset payouts and consumption
growth. Debt payouts are computed using the market (solid line) or book (dashed line) values. The payouts
include cash, net issuances, and total payouts. The data are real quarterly observations from Q1.1975 to
Q4.2014. The standard errors are Newey-West adjusted.
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Figure 20: Term Structure of Equity Payout Cyclicality: 1975-2014
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(a) Quarterly Data (Q1,1975-Q4,2014)
The Figure shows multi-horizon correlations between equity payouts and consumption growth. The pay-
outs include cash, net issuances, issuances, repurchases, and total payouts. The data are real quarterly
observations from Q1.1975 to Q4.2014. The standard errors are Newey-West adjusted.
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Figure 21: Term structure of Equity Payout Cyclicality: 1949-2014
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(b) Quarterly Data (Q1,1949-Q4,2014)
The Figure shows the multi-horizon correlations between components of equity payout and consumption
growth. The Figure shows multi-horizon correlations between equity payouts and consumption growth. The
payouts include cash, net issuances, issuances, repurchases, and total payouts. The data are real quarterly
observations from Q1.1949 to Q4.2014. The standard errors are Newey-West adjusted.
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Figure 22: Model Implications for Payout and Return Cyclicality
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The Figure shows multi-horizon correlations between asset payouts and consumption growth, and excess asset
returns and consumption growth in the data and in the model. The payouts include cash, net issuances,
and total payouts. The data (solid line) are real quarterly observations from Q1.1975 to Q4.2014. Model
median (circles) and 5-95% confidence interval (dashed line) are based on a long simulation of the model.
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Table 7: Asset Returns in the Data
Equity Debt Asset
Mean 7.80 2.94 6.42
Std 16.33 5.36 12.00
AC(1) -0.08 0.20 -0.06
Cross-Correlations:
Debt 0.46
Asset 0.99 0.54
The Table reports summary statistics for equity, debt, and total asset returns. The mean and standard
deviation are in percentage terms. The data are real annual observations from 1975 to 2014.
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Table 8: Asset Payouts in the Data
(a) Cash Payout
Equity Debt Asset
Mean 0.14 0.13 0.27
Std 0.30 0.63 0.78
AC(1) 0.11 0.34 0.37
Cross-Correlations:
Debt 0.35
Asset 0.66 0.93
(b) Net Issuance
Equity Debt Asset
Mean 0.17 0.19 0.36
Std 3.02 3.78 3.32
AC(1) -0.13 -0.29 -0.36
Cross-Correlations:
Debt -0.54
Asset 0.29 0.64
(c) Total Payout
Equity Debt Asset
Mean -0.03 -0.06 -0.10
Std 3.08 3.55 3.15
AC(1) -0.09 -0.36 -0.35
Cross-Correlations:
Debt -0.56
Asset 0.35 0.58
The Table reports summary statistics for the changes in equity, debt, and asset payouts, scaled by the
consumption level. The payouts include cash payouts, net issuances, and total payouts. The mean and
standard deviation are in percentage terms. The data are real annual observations from 1975 to 2014.
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Table 9: Asset Payout Cyclicality
(a) Annual Data (1975-2014)
corr (·,∆c) ∆D
C
∆NI
C
∆Da
C
Equity 0.34 -0.17 0.20
Debt 0.21 0.14 -0.11
Asset 0.30 -0.00 0.07
corr (·,∆y) ∆D
Y
∆NI
Y
∆Da
Y
Equity 0.44 -0.23 0.27
Debt 0.34 0.21 -0.16
Asset 0.44 0.03 0.08
(b) Annual Data (1975-2006)
corr (·,∆c) ∆D
C
∆NI
C
∆Da
C
Equity 0.24 -0.07 0.09
Debt 0.06 0.09 -0.08
Asset 0.14 0.01 0.02
corr (·,∆y) ∆D
Y
∆NI
Y
∆Da
Y
Equity 0.35 -0.17 0.19
Debt 0.20 0.03 0.00
Asset 0.30 -0.18 0.23
(c) Quarterly Data (1975-2014)
corr (·,∆c) ∆D
C
∆NI
C
∆Da
C
Equity 0.16 0.02 0.00
Debt 0.20 0.01 0.00
Asset 0.22 0.01 0.00
corr (·,∆y) ∆D
Y
∆NI
Y
∆Da
Y
Equity 0.15 -0.11 0.13
Debt 0.32 -0.06 0.08
Asset 0.27 -0.11 0.13
(d) Quarterly Data (1975-2006)
corr (·,∆c) ∆D
C
∆NI
C
∆Da
C
Equity 0.17 0.06 -0.05
Debt 0.08 -0.06 0.06
Asset 0.17 -0.00 0.01
corr (·,∆y) ∆D
Y
∆NI
Y
∆Da
Y
Equity 0.10 -0.06 0.07
Debt 0.22 -0.10 0.11
Asset 0.19 -0.11 0.11
The Table reports correlations between changes in payouts, scaled by the aggregate level of the economy,
and measures of economic growth. The payouts include cash payouts, net issuances, and total payouts, and
are computed for equity, debt, and assets. The left and right panels use consumption or output, respectively,
to measure the aggregate level of the economy. The data are real, and correspond to (a) annual observations
from 1975 to 2014; (b) annual observations from 1975 to 2006; (c) quarterly observations from Q1.1975 to
Q4.2014; (d) quarterly observations from Q1.1975 to Q4.2006.
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Table 10: Wavelet Correlation between Asset Payout and Consumption Growth
Equity
Scale Cash Payout Net Issuance Total Payout
2 - 4 Quarters 0.05 ( -0.18, 0.26) -0.02 ( -0.24, 0.20) 0.02 ( -0.20, 0.24)
4 - 8 Quarters 0.15 ( -0.17, 0.44) 0.00 ( -0.31, 0.31) 0.01 ( -0.31, 0.32)
8 - 16 Quarters 0.35 ( -0.11, 0.69) 0.04 ( -0.41, 0.47) -0.03 ( -0.47, 0.42)
16 - 32 Quarters 0.63 ( 0.01, 0.90) -0.14 ( -0.71, 0.53) 0.19 ( -0.50, 0.73)
32 - 64 Quarters 0.15 ( -0.53, 0.71) 0.21 ( -0.49, 0.74) -0.14 ( -0.71, 0.54)
Debt
Scale Cash Payout Net Issuance Total Payout
2 - 4 Quarters 0.03 ( -0.19, 0.25) -0.00 ( -0.22, 0.22) -0.01 ( -0.23, 0.21)
4 - 8 Quarters 0.03 ( -0.28, 0.34) 0.06 ( -0.25, 0.37) -0.07 ( -0.38, 0.24)
8 - 16 Quarters 0.23 ( -0.24, 0.61) 0.23 ( -0.24, 0.61) -0.22 ( -0.61, 0.24)
16 - 32 Quarters 0.52 ( -0.16, 0.87) 0.24 ( -0.46, 0.76) -0.13 ( -0.70, 0.54)
32 - 64 Quarters 0.71 ( 0.15, 0.93) 0.35 ( -0.36, 0.80) -0.24 ( -0.76, 0.46)
Asset
Scale Cash Payout Net Issuance Total Payout
2 - 4 Quarters 0.21 ( -0.01, 0.41) -0.04 ( -0.25, 0.18) 0.04 ( -0.18, 0.26)
4 - 8 Quarters 0.25 ( -0.06, 0.52) 0.01 ( -0.30, 0.32) 0.02 ( -0.29, 0.33)
8 - 16 Quarters 0.34 ( -0.12, 0.68) 0.27 ( -0.19, 0.64) -0.21 ( -0.60, 0.25)
16 - 32 Quarters 0.58 ( -0.08, 0.89) -0.13 ( -0.70, 0.55) 0.32 ( -0.38, 0.79)
32 - 64 Quarters 0.55 ( -0.12, 0.88) 0.06 ( -0.59, 0.67) 0.11 ( -0.56, 0.69)
The Table reports wavelet correlations between changes in payouts and consumption growth. The payouts
include cash payouts, net issuances, and total payouts, and are computed for equity, debt, and assets. The
panels report the estimates of wavelet correlation for different scales, with 5% confidence intervals reported
in the brackets. The data are real quarterly observations from Q1.1975 to Q4.2014, seasonally adjusted by
x12 ARIMA model.
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Table 11: Configuration of Model Parameters
Preferences δ γ ψ
0.9992 10 1.5
Consumption µc ρx ϕx σ0 ν σω
0.0024 0.985 0.038 0.005 0.999 0.000001
Cash Payout µs ρs φs ϕs α
-2.65 0.96 6 5 -0.15
Net Issuance µh ϕh
0.045 18
The Table reports the configuration of model parameters. The model is calibrated at a monthly frequency.
Table 12: Model Implications: Consumption
Data Model
1929-2014 1975-2014 Med 2.5% 5% 95% 97.5% Pop
E (·) 2.97 2.69 2.89 1.21 1.53 4.20 4.41 2.91
σ (·) 2.20 1.67 1.99 1.22 1.29 3.03 3.25 2.19
AC (1) 0.52 0.27 0.43 0.11 0.15 0.67 0.71 0.54
AC (2) 0.23 0.20 0.19 -0.19 -0.14 0.50 0.55 0.35
AC (5) 0.04 -0.17 0.04 -0.31 -0.24 0.32 0.38 0.21
The Table reports the data and model properties of real consumption growth. The summary statistics in
the data are computed in the annual samples from 1929 to 2014 and from 1975 to 2014. The median and
2.5%, 5%, 95%, and 97.5% values capture the model moment distributions across the small samples whose
size equals the data. Population values correspond to a long simulation of the model. Means and volatilities
are expressed in percentage terms.
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Table 13: Model Implications: Asset Payouts
(a) Cash Payout
Model
Data Median 2.5% 5% 95% 97.5% Pop
E (·) 0.27 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.39 0.43 0.22
σ (·) 0.78 0.61 0.37 0.39 1.00 1.08 0.65
AC (1) 0.37 0.27 -0.03 0.02 0.50 0.54 0.29
AC (2) -0.21 0.00 -0.29 -0.26 0.27 0.31 0.03
AC (5) -0.20 -0.06 -0.34 -0.30 0.19 0.24 -0.04
corr (·,∆c) 0.30 0.34 -0.04 0.02 0.56 0.62 0.36
% of Neg Payouts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(b) Net Issuance
Model
Data Median 2.5% 5% 95% 97.5% Pop
E (·) 0.36 0.15 -0.09 -0.05 0.36 0.40 0.15
σ (·) 3.32 4.29 2.51 2.82 6.39 6.85 4.36
AC (1) -0.36 -0.48 -0.68 -0.66 -0.26 -0.22 -0.50
AC (2) 0.08 -0.01 -0.37 -0.33 0.29 0.36 -0.01
AC (5) -0.03 -0.00 -0.33 -0.29 0.28 0.33 0.01
corr (·,∆c) -0.00 0.02 -0.23 -0.19 0.23 0.26 0.02
% of Neg Payouts 5.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 15.00 4.27
(c) Total Payout
Model
Data Median 2.5% 5% 95% 97.5% Pop
E (·) -0.10 0.07 -0.19 -0.14 0.29 0.33 0.07
σ (·) 3.15 4.36 2.57 2.82 6.51 6.91 4.40
AC (1) -0.35 -0.47 -0.67 -0.65 -0.25 -0.19 -0.48
AC (2) 0.14 -0.01 -0.37 -0.32 0.29 0.35 -0.01
AC (5) -0.02 -0.00 -0.34 -0.28 0.27 0.33 0.01
corr (·,∆c) 0.07 0.03 -0.22 -0.19 0.23 0.29 0.03
% of Neg Payouts 30.00 25.00 5.00 10.00 47.50 51.25 24.87
The Table reports the data and model properties of changes in asset payouts, scaled by the consumption
level. The payouts include cash payouts, net issuances, and total payouts. The summary statistics in the data
are computed in the annual sample from 1975 to 2014. The median and 2.5%, 5%, 95%, and 97.5% values
capture the model moment distributions across the small samples whose size equals the data. Population
values correspond to a long simulation of the model. Means and volatilities are expressed in percentage
terms.
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Table 14: Model Implications for Asset Prices
Model
Moment Data Median 2.5% 5% 95% 97.5% Pop
Risk-Free Return:
E (rf ) 0.86 1.64 0.31 0.53 2.43 2.61 1.65
σ (rf ) 1.78 0.82 0.42 0.46 1.36 1.49 1.04
Asset Return:
E (rd) 6.42 6.25 0.24 1.78 10.52 11.81 6.13
σ (rd) 12.00 12.08 7.72 8.24 19.68 22.23 12.95
The Table reports the data and model properties of the real risk-free rate and the asset return. The summary
statistics in the data are computed in the annual sample from 1975 to 2014. The median and 2.5%, 5%, 95%,
and 97.5% values capture the model moment distributions across the small samples whose size equals the
data. Population values correspond to a long simulation of the model. Means and volatilities are expressed
in percentage terms.
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APPENDIX A: Proofs
Proposition 1
The social planner’s problem 1.9 can be equivalently stated as:
L = max
Lt+1,Dt+1
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
eatLαt − Lt+1 +
D1−ηt+1
1− η + ϕt (Dt+1 − Lt+1)
)]
,
where ϕt is the Lagrange multiplier on the deposits supply constraint.
The first-order conditions are given by:(
∂L
∂Dt+1
)
:
(
DFBt+1
)−η
+ ϕt < 0, (A.1)
= 0 if DFBt+1 > 0,
(
∂L
∂Lt+1
)
: −1− ϕt + βEt
[
αeat+1
(
LFBt+1
)α−1] ≤ 0, (A.2)
= 0 if LFBt+1 > 0,
(
∂L
∂ϕt
)
: DFBt+1 − LFBt+1 ≤ 0, (A.3)
= 0 if ϕt > 0.
The first-order condition A.1 along with A.3 delivers a corner solution for the socially optimal level
of bank debt, DFBt+1 = L
FB
t+1. This in turn implies that N
FB
t+1 = 0. Provided that the following
condition holds:
lim
LFBt+1→0
{
−1 + (LFBt+1)−η + βEt [αeat+1 (LFBt+1)α−1]} = +∞,
I have an interior solution for the socially optimal level of lending, LFBt+1 > 0.
The second-order condition with respect to lending,(
∂2L
∂L2t+1
)
: βEt
[
α (α− 1) eat+1 (LFBt+1)α−2] < 0,
ensures that LFBt+1 is a global maximum of the social planner’s problem. Rearranging equation A.2
and using that ϕt =
(
LFBt+1
)−η
completes the proof .
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Proposition 2
Define:
F
(
LFBt+1, at
) ≡ Et [αeat+1 (LFBt+1)α−1]−RFBd,t+1 = 0. (A.4)
Using an implicit function theorem and condition A.4, the procyclicality of LFBt+1 follows from:
dLFBt+1
dat
= −
∂F(LFBt+1,at)
∂at
∂F(LFBt+1,at)
∂LFBt+1
= −
Et
[
αρeat+1
(
LFBt+1
)α−1]
Et
[
α (α− 1) eat+1 (LFBt+1)α−2]− ∂RFBd,t+1∂LFBt+1 ,
where I use that:
∂RFBd,t+1
∂L¯t+1
= η
1
β
(
LFBt+1
)−η−1
> 0 and
∂Et [e
at+1 ]
∂at
= ρEt [e
at+1 ] > 0. 
Proposition 3
Under symmetric equilibrium, each bank solves:
L = max
Lt+1,Nt+1≤Lt+1
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
({
eωt+atLαt −Rd,tLt +Rd,tNt
}− {eωt+atLαt −Rd,tLt +Rd,tNt}− −Nt+1)
]
.
The first-order conditions are given by:(
∂L
∂Nt+1
)
: −1 + βRCEd,t+1 − βEt
[∫ ω∗t+1
0
RCEd,t+1dΦ (ω)
]
< 0.
(
∂L
∂Lt+1
)
: Et
[
αeat+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1]−RCEd,t+1
+Et
[∫ ω∗t+1
0
(
RCEd,t+1 − αeω+at+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1)
dΦ (ω)
]
≤ 0
= 0 if LCEt+1 > 0
where ω∗t+1 is defined by e
ω∗t+1+at+1
(
LCEt+1
)α
= RCEd,t+1
(
LCEt+1 −DCEt+1
)
.
Without loss of generality, I restrict attention to the case when the deposit rate is strictly positive.
In the equilibrium, the deposit rate is equal to RCEd,t+1 =
1
β − 1β
(
LCEt+1 −NCEt+1
)−η
, implying that
bank’s objective function is strictly decreasing in the amount of equity financing, delivering a corner
solution NCEt+1 = 0. Provided that the following condition holds:
lim
LCEt+1→0
(
Et
[
αeat+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1]
−RCEd,t+1 + Et
[∫ ω∗t+1
0
(
RCEd,t+1 − αeω+at+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1)
dΦ (ω)
])
= +∞,
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I have an interior solution for the optimal level of lending, LCEt+1 > 0.
For ease of exposition, define the random variable υt+1 = e
ω+at+1 , which is, conditionally on time
t information, log-normally distributed with mean υ¯t ≡ − 12σω + (1− ρa) a¯ + ρaat and standard
deviation συ ≡
√
σ2ω + σ
2
a. The change of variables allows me to re-write the first-order conditions
with respect to lending as follows:
FOC (Lt+1) ≡
∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
(
αυt+1L
α−1
t+1 −Rd,t+1
)
dFt (υt+1) ,
where the bailout threshold equals to
υ∗t+1 =
Rd,t+1 (Lt+1 −Nt+1)
Lαt+1
.
The second-order condition with respect to lending implies that the objective function is neither
concave, nor convex in Lt+1:(
∂2L
∂L2t+1
)
:
∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
α (α− 1) υt+1Lα−2t+1 dFt (υt+1) +
∂υ∗t+1
∂Lt+1
(
Rd,t+1 − αυ∗t+1Lα−1t+1
)
ft
(
υ∗t+1
)
≶ 0,
where
∂υ∗t+1
∂Lt+1
=
Rd,t+1
(
Lαt+1 + αL
α−1
t+1 (Lt+1 −Nt+1)
)
(Lt+1)
2α > 0.
Given that NCEt+1 = 0, ∀Lt+1 ∈ [0,+∞), I can re-write the SOC as follows:
SOC (Lt+1) ≡
∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
α (α− 1) υt+1Lα−2t+1 dFt (υt+1) +R2d,t+1 (1− α)2 L−αt+1ft
(
υ∗t+1
)
.
The definition of the bailout threshold delivers that Rd,t+1 = υ
∗
t+1L
α−1
t+1 , which allows me to further
iterate the SOC:
SOC (Lt+1) = (1− α)Lα−2t+1
(
−α
∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1) + υ
∗2
t+1 (1− α) ft
(
υ∗t+1
))
.
Note that:
SOC (Lt+1) < 0⇔ α > α
(
υ∗t+1
) ≡ υ∗2t+1ft (υ∗t+1)∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1) + υ∗2t+1ft
(
υ∗t+1
) . (A.5)
I have that:
1.
lim
υ∗t+1→0
α
(
υ∗t+1
)
=
{0}
Et [υt+1] + {0} = 0;
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2.
lim
υ∗t+1→+∞
α
(
υ∗t+1
)
= lim
υ∗t+1→+∞
1
1 +
∫+∞
υ∗
t+1
υt+1dFt(υt+1)
υ∗2t+1ft(υ∗t+1)
= 1,
since
lim
υ∗t+1→+∞
∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1)
υ∗2t+1ft
(
υ∗t+1
) = lim
υ∗t+1→+∞
−υ∗t+1ft
(
υ∗t+1
)
υ∗t+1ft
(
υ∗t+1
) (
1− logυ∗t+1−υ¯tσ2υ
) =
= lim
υ∗t+1→+∞
1
logυ∗t+1−υ¯t
σ2υ
− 1
= 0;
3.
∂α
(
υ∗t+1
)
∂υ∗t+1
> 0,
since
sign
{
∂α (υ∗t+1)
∂υ∗t+1
}
= sign
{
υ∗t+1ft (υ
∗
t+1)
(
1− logυ
∗
t+1 − υ¯t
σ2υ
)∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1) + υ
∗3
t+1ft (υ
∗
t+1)
2
}
= sign
{(
1− logυ
∗
t+1 − υ¯t
σ2υ
)∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1) + υ
∗2
t+1ft (υ
∗
t+1)
}
,
and provided that:
(a) (
1− logυ
∗
t+1 − υ¯t
σ2υ
)∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1)+υ
∗2
t+1ft
(
υ∗t+1
)
> 0, υ∗t+1 < exp
{
υ¯ + σ2υ
}
,
(b)
∂
∂υ∗t+1
((
1− logυ
∗
t+1 − υ¯t
σ2υ
)∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1) + υ
∗2
t+1ft
(
υ∗t+1
))
=
= − 1
σ2υυ
∗
t+1
∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1) < 0,
(c)
lim
υ∗t+1→+∞
((
1− logυ
∗
t+1 − υ¯t
σ2υ
)∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1) + υ
∗2
t+1ft (υ
∗
t+1)
)
=
= lim
υ∗2t+1→+∞
(∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1)
)
· lim
υ∗2t+1→+∞
(1− logυ∗2t+1 − υ¯t
σ2υ
)
+
υ∗2t+1ft (υ
∗
t+1)∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
υt+1dFt (υt+1)
 = 0.
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Condition A.5, along with the properties of α
(
υ∗t+1
)
, implies that there exists υ∗∗t+1, such that:
SOC (Lt+1)

< 0, υ∗t+1 ∈
[
0, υ∗∗t+1
)
= 0, υ∗t+1 = υ
∗∗
t+1
> 0, υ∗t+1 ∈
(
υ∗∗t+1,+∞
) ,
where υ∗∗t+1 is defined by:
α = α
(
υ∗∗t+1
)
.
Provided that υ∗t+1 is monotonically increasing in Lt+1, there exists a corresponding L
∗∗
t+1, such that:
SOC (Lt+1)

< 0, Lt+1 ∈
[
0, L∗∗t+1
)
= 0, Lt+1 = L
∗∗
t+1
> 0, Lt+1 ∈
(
L∗∗t+1,+∞
) . (A.6)
Consequently, I have that for Lt+1 ∈
(
L∗∗t+1,+∞
)
∂
∂Lt+1
FOC (Lt+1) > 0,
which together with
lim
Lt+1→+∞
FOC (Lt+1) = 0,
delivers that:
FOC (Lt+1) < 0, ∀Lt+1 ∈
(
L∗∗t+1,+∞
)
.
This implies that the objective function is strictly decreasing in the convex region, i.e., when Lt+1 ∈(
L∗∗t+1,+∞
)
. Finally, provided that the following conditions hold:
lim
Lt+1→0
FOC (Lt+1) = +∞,
∂
∂Lt+1
FOC (Lt+1) < 0, Lt+1 ∈
[
0, L∗∗t+1
)
,
and
FOC
(
L∗∗t+1
)
< 0,
there exists a unique LCEt+1 ∈
(
0, L∗∗t+1
)
, such that:
FOC
(
LCEt+1
)
= 0.
To sum up, the bank’s objective function is concave in lending in the region Lt+1 ∈
(
0, L∗∗t+1
)
and
strictly decreasing when Lt+1 ∈
(
L∗∗t+1,+∞
)
. Hence, LCEt+1 is a unique global maximum. 
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Proposition 4
Define
F
(
LCEt+1, at
)
= Et
[
αeat+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1]−RCEd,t+1 + ξ (LCEt+1, NCEt+1 ; at) (A.7)
=
∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
(
αυt+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1 −RCEd,t+1) dFt (υt+1) = 0
Taking derivative of A.7 with respect to lending delivers
∂F
(
LCEt+1, at
)
∂LCEt+1
=
∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
(
α (α− 1) υt+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−2 − ∂RCEd,t+1
∂LCEt+1
)
dFt (υt+1)
+
∂υ∗t+1
∂LCEt+1
(
RCEd,t+1 − αυ∗t+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1)
ft
(
υ∗t+1
)
= SOC
(
LCEt+1
)− ∂RCEd,t+1
∂LCEt+1
(
1− Ft
(
υ∗t+1
))
< 0,
since the rate of return on deposits is increasing in bank lending
∂RCEd,t+1
∂LCEt+1
= η
1
β
(
LCEt+1
)−η−1
.
Before differentiating A.7 with respect to productivity shock, it is useful to re-write F
(
LCEt+1, at
)
as
follows:
F
(
LCEt+1, at
)
=
(
αEt
[
υt+1| υt+1 ≥ υ∗t+1
] (
LCEt+1
)α−1 −RCEd,t+1) (1− Ft (υ∗t+1)) ,
where
Et
[
υt+1| υt+1 ≥ υ∗t+1
]
= eυ¯t+
1
2σ
2
υ
1− Φ
(
logυ∗t+1−υ¯t
συ
− συ
)
1− Φ
(
logυ∗t+1−υ¯t
συ
) = eυ¯t+ 12σ2υ 1− Φ (υ˜t − συ)
1− Φ (υ˜t) ,
where, for ease of notation, I define υ˜t ≡ logυ
∗
t+1−υ¯t
συ
. Now,
∂Et
[
υt+1| υt+1 ≥ υ∗t+1
]
∂υ¯t
= eυ¯t+
1
2
σ2υ
(
1− Φ (υ˜t − συ)
1− Φ (υ˜t)
+
1
συ
φ (υ˜t − συ) (1− Φ (υ˜t))− 1συ (1− Φ (υ˜t − συ)φ (υ˜t))
(1− Φ (υ˜t))2
)
=
1
συ
eυ¯t+
1
2
σ2υ
1− Φ (υ˜t − συ)
1− Φ (υ˜t)
(
συ − φ (υ˜t)
1− Φ (υ˜t)
+
φ (υ˜t − συ)
1− Φ (υ˜t − συ)
)
.
Provided that the following conditions hold:
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(i)
lim
υ˜t→+∞
(
συ − φ (υ˜t)
1− Φ (υ˜t) +
φ (υ˜t − συ)
1− Φ (υ˜t − συ)
)
=
{
συ − {0}{0} +
{0}
{0}
}
=
lim
υ˜t→−∞
(
συ − −υ˜tφ (υ˜t)−φ (υ˜t) +
− (υ˜t − συ)φ (υ˜t − συ)
−φ (υ˜t − συ)
)
= 0,
(ii)
lim
υ˜t→−∞
(
συ − φ (υ˜t)
1− Φ (υ˜t) +
φ (υ˜t − συ)
1− Φ (υ˜t − συ)
)
=
{
συ − {0}{1} +
{0}
{1}
}
= συ,
(iii)
∂
∂υ˜t
(
συ − φ (υ˜t)
1− Φ (υ˜t) +
φ (υ˜t − συ)
1− Φ (υ˜t − συ)
)
=
∂
∂υ˜t
(σ − λ (−υ˜t) + λ (−υ˜t + σ)) = λ′ (−υ˜t)− λ′ (−υ˜t + σ) < 0,
where λ (υ˜t) ≡ φ(υ˜t)Φ(υ˜t) is an inverse of Mill’s ratio, with λ′ (·) < 0 and λ′′ (·) > 0,
I have that:
sign
{
∂Et
[
υt+1| υt+1 ≥ υ∗t+1
]
∂υ¯t
}
= sign
{(
συ − φ (υ˜t)
1− Φ (υ˜t) +
φ (υ˜t − συ)
1− Φ (υ˜t − συ)
)}
= ⊕.
This implies that:
∂F
(
LCEt+1, at
)
∂at
= α
∂Et
[
υt+1| υt+1 ≥ υ∗t+1
]
∂υ¯t
∂υ¯
∂at
(
LCEt+1
)α−1 (
1− Ft
(
υ∗t+1
))
> 0.
Using implicit function theorem and equation A.7, the pro-cyclicality of LCEt+1
dLCEt+1
dat
= −
∂F(LCEt+1,at)
∂at
∂F(LCEt+1,at)
∂LCEt+1
> 0. 
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Proposition 5
Employing the results from the derivation of Propositions 2 and 4, I have that:
sign
{
d
dat
LCEt+1
LFBt+1
}
= sign
{
dLCEt+1
dat
LFBt+1 −
dLFBt+1
dat
LCEt+1
}
= sign

Et
[
αρeat+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1]
+
∂ξ(LCEt+1,N
CE
t+1;at)
∂at
Et
[
α (1− α) eat+1 (LCEt+1)α−2]+ ∂RCEd,t+1∂LCEt+1 − ∂ξ(LCEt+1,NCEt+1;at)∂LCEt+1 L
FB
t+1
−
Et
[
αρeat+1
(
LFBt+1
)α−1]
Et
[
α (1− α) eat+1 (LFBt+1)α−2]+ ∂RFBd,t+1∂LFBt+1 L
CE
t+1
 .
This implies that the level of the excessive investment is pro-cyclical if and only if
∂ξ
(
LCEt+1, N
CE
t+1 ; at
)
∂at
< −ξ¯a,t,
where
ξ¯a,t ≡ Et
[
αρeat+1
(
LFBt+1
)α−1] Et [α (1− α) eat+1 (LCEt+1)α−2]+ ∂RCEd,t+1∂LCEt+1 − ∂ξ(LCEt+1,NCEt+1;at)∂LCEt+1
Et
[
α (1− α) eat+1 (LFBt+1)α−2]+ ∂RFBd,t+1∂LFBt+1
· L
CE
t+1
LFBt+1
−Et
[
αρeat+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1]
.
I can also show that the bailout wedge for any level of lending and equity financing is monotonically
decreasing in at. To do this, I re-write the bailout wedge as follows:
ξ (Lt+1, Nt+1; at) = Et
[∫ ω∗t+1
0
(
Rd,t+1 − αeω+at+1Lα−1t+1
)
dΦ (ω)
]
=
∫ +∞
υ∗t+1
(
Rd,t+1 − αυt+1Lα−1t+1
)
dFt (υt+1)
=
(
Rd,t+1αEt
[
υt+1| υt+1 ≤ υ∗t+1
]
Lα−1t+1
)
Φ (υ˜t+1) ,
where
Et
[
υt+1| υt+1 ≤ υ∗t+1
]
= eυ¯t+
1
2σ
2
υ
Φ (υ˜t − συ)
Φ (υ˜t)
.
Now,
∂Et
[
υt+1| υt+1 ≤ υ∗t+1
]
∂υ¯t
= eυ¯t+
1
2σ
2
υ
(
Φ (υ˜t − συ)
Φ (υ˜t)
+
− 1συ φ (υ˜t − συ) Φ (υ˜t) + 1συ Φ (υ˜t − συ)φ (υ˜t)
Φ (υ˜t)
2
)
=
1
συ
eυ¯t+
1
2σ
2
υ
Φ (υ˜t − συ)
Φ (υ˜t)
(
συ +
φ (υ˜t)
Φ (υ˜t)
− φ (υ˜t − συ)
Φ (υ˜t − συ)
)
.
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Provided that the following conditions hold:
(i)
lim
υ˜t→−∞
(
συ +
φ (υ˜t)
Φ (υ˜t)
− φ (υ˜t − συ)
Φ (υ˜t − συ)
)
=
{
συ +
{0}
{0} −
{0}
{0}
}
=
lim
υ˜t→−∞
(
συ +
−υ˜tφ (υ˜t)
φ (υ˜t)
− − (υ˜t − συ)φ (υ˜t − συ)
φ (υ˜t − συ)
)
= 0,
(ii)
lim
υ˜t→+∞
(
συ +
φ (υ˜t)
Φ (υ˜t)
− φ (υ˜t − συ)
Φ (υ˜t − συ)
)
=
{
συ +
{0}
{1} −
{0}
{1}
}
= συ,
(iii)
∂
∂υ˜t
(
συ +
φ (υ˜t)
Φ (υ˜t)
− φ (υ˜t − συ)
Φ (υ˜t − συ)
)
=
∂
∂υ˜t
(σ − λ (υ˜t)λ (υ˜t − σ)) = λ′ (υ˜t)− λ′ (υ˜t − σ) > 0,
I have that
sign
{
∂Et
[
υt+1| υt+1 ≤ υ∗t+1
]
∂υ¯t
}
= sign
{(
συ +
φ (υ˜t)
Φ (υ˜t)
− φ (υ˜t − συ)
Φ (υ˜t − συ)
)}
= ⊕.
This implies that
∂ξ (Lt+1, Nt+1; at)
∂at
= −α∂Et
[
υt+1| υt+1 ≤ υ∗t+1
]
∂υ¯t
∂υ¯t
∂at
 Lα−1t+1 Φ (υ˜t+1)
+ ξ (Lt+1, Nt+1; at)
φ (υ˜t+1)
Φ (υ˜t+1)
∂υ˜t
∂υ¯t
∂υ¯t
∂at
< 0. 
Proposition 6
In a competitive equilibrium with capital regulation in place, each bank solves:
L = max
Lt+1,Nt+1≤Lt+1
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
({
eωt+atLαt −Rd,tLt +Rd,tNt
}+ −Nt+1 + λt (Nt+1 − ζtLt+1))] ,
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capital constraint. The corresponding first-
order conditions are given by:(
∂L
∂Nt+1
)
: −1 + λt + βRCEd,t+1 − βEt
[∫ ω∗t+1
0
RCEd,t+1dΦ (ω)
]
≤ 0,
= 0 if NCEt+1 > 0,
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(
∂L
∂Lt+1
)
: −λtζt + Et
[
αeat+1
(
LCEt+1
)α−1]−RCEd,t+1 + ξ (LCEt+1, NCEt+1 ; at) ≤ 0,
= 0 if LCEt+1 > 0,
(
∂
∂λt
)
: NCEt+1 − ζtLCEt+1 ≥ 0,
= 0 if λt > 0.
Suppose first that the capital constraint is slack, i.e., NCEt+1 > ζtL
CE
t+1. This means that the Lagrange
multiplier is equal to zero, which in turn implies that the bank’s objective function is strictly de-
creasing in Nt+1, implying a corner solution for the level of equity financing N
CE
t+1 = 0. This is a
contradiction. 
Proposition 7
Substituting equation 1.17 into the bank’s first order conditions with respect to lending 1.15, I obtain
that:
Et
[
αeat+1
(
Lζ
L
t+1
)α−1]
= Rζ
L
d,t+1,
which implies that LζLt+1 = L
FB
t+1. In an equilibrium with lending capital requirement in place, the
deposit rate is equal to:
Rζ
L
d,t+1 =
1
β
− 1
β
((
1− ζLt
)
Lζ
L
t+1
)−η
,
and the bailout rate is defined by:
eω
∗
t+1+at+1
(
Lζ
L
t+1
)α
= Rζ
L
d,t+1
(
1− ζLt
)
Lζ
L
t+1.
Given that the following conditions hold:
(i)
∂
∂ζt
(
θ
(
LFBt+1, ζt
)−RFBd,t+1) = (1− ζt) ∂RζLd,t+1∂ζt +
(
1
β
−RζLd,t+1
)
= −η 1
β
(
(1− ζt)LFBt+1
)−η
+
1
β
(
(1− ζt)LFBt+1
)−η
= (1− η) 1
β
(
(1− ζt)LFBt+1
)−η
> 0,
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(ii)
∂ξ˜
(
LFBt+1, ζt; at
)
∂ζt
= Et
∫ ω∗t+1
0
−RζLd,t+1 + (1− ζt) ∂Rζ
L
d,t+1
∂ζt
 dΦ (ω)

+ Et
[
∂ω∗t+1
∂ζt
(1− ζt) (1− α)Rζ
L
d,t+1φ
(
ω∗t+1
)]
< 0,
with
∂ω∗t+1
∂ζt
= − 1
1− ζt +
1
Rζ
L
d,t+1
∂Rζ
L
d,t+1
∂ζt
< 0,
(iii)
θ
(
LFBt+1, 0
)
= RFBd,t+1 & ξ˜
(
LFBt+1, 0; at
)
> 0,
there is a unique solution to equation 1.17. 
Proposition 8
Substituting equation 1.18 into the bank’s first order condition with respect to lending 1.15,
I obtain that:
Et
[
αeat+1
(
Lζ
D
t+1
)α−1]
= Rζ
D
d,t+1,
which implies that LζDt+1 =
LFBt+1
1−ζDt
and Dζ
D
t+1 = D
FB
t+1. In an equilibrium with liquidity capital
requirement in place, the deposit rate is equal to:
Rζ
D
d,t+1 =
1
β
− 1
β
((
1− ζDt
)
Lζ
D
t+1
)−η
= RFBd,t+1,
and the bailout rate is defined by:
eω
∗
t+1+at+1
(
Lζ
D
t+1
)α
= Rζ
D
d,t+1
(
1− ζDt
)
Lζ
D
t+1,
or, equivalently:
eω
∗
t+1+at+1
(
LFBt+1
)α
= Rζ
D
d,t+1
(
1− ζDt
)α
LFBt+1.
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Given that the following conditions hold:
(i)
∂
∂ζt
(
(1− ζt)α−1 θ
(
LFBt+1
1− ζt ; ζt
)
−RFBd,t+1
)
= (1− α) (1− ζt)α−2 θ
(
LFBt+1
1− ζt ; ζt
)
+ (1− ζt)α−1
(
1
β
−RζDd,t+1
)
> 0,
(ii)
∂
∂ζt
(
(1− ζt)α−1 ξ˜
(
LFBt+1
1− ζt ; ζt
))
= −α (1− ζt)α−1Et
[∫ ω∗t+1
0
Rζ
D
d,t+1dΦ (ω)
]
+ Et
[
∂ω∗t+1
∂ζt
(1− ζt)α (1− α)Rζ
D
d,t+1φ
(
ω∗t+1
)]
,
with
∂ω∗t+1
∂ζt
= − α
1− ζt < 0,
(iii)
θ
(
LFBt+1, 0
)
= RFBd,t+1 & ξ˜
(
LFBt+1, 0; at
)
> 0,
there is a unique solution to equation 1.18. 
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APPENDIX B: Ramsey Equilibrium
A Ramsey planner maximizes the lifetime utility of households subject to the resource
constraint and implementability conditions:
max
Ct,Lt+1,Nt+1,Dt+1,Kf,t+1
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (Ct, Dt+1)
]
with u (Ct, Dt+1) =
v (Ct, Dt+1)
1−γ
1− γ − 1
s.t. Ct = Rd,tDt −Dt+1 +Rk,tKαff,t − If,t − ofKf,t + Zt + Πt − Tt, (B.1)
Et [Mt,t+1 (Rk,t+1 + (1− δ − of ))] = 1, (B.2)
Nt+1 +Dt+1 = Lt+1, (B.3)
Et [Mt,t+1 (Rl,t+1 + (1− δ − ob))] = θt − ξ˜t, (B.4)
Ct + Ib,t + If,t = Yb,t + Yf,t − obLt − ofKf,t, (B.5)
where the taxes and net proceeds from banks’ and firms’ activity are, respectively, equal to:
Tt =
∫ 1
0
max
{
Rd,tDt − eωj,t+atLαbt − (1− δ − ob)Lt, 0
}
dj, (B.6)
Zt =
∫ 1
0
zj,tdj, with zj,t = max
{
eωj,t+atLαbt + (1− δ − ob)Lt −Rd,tDt, 0
}−Nt+1,
(B.7)
Πt = Yf,t −Rk,tKf,t. (B.8)
The rate of return on deposits, the stochastic discount factor, the liquidity and risk-shifting
cost of lending, the rate of return on loans and capital are, correspondingly, defined by 1.19,
1.20, 1.21, 1.22, 1.23 and 1.24. The optimal Ramsey policy requires a capital ratio that
equals:
ζt =
Nt+1
Lt+1
. (B.9)
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The Ramsey problem can be further simplified. By substituting expressions B.6, B.7 and
B.8 in the household’s budget constraint B.1, I obtain the resource constraint B.5, therefore
implying that I can omit it.
Proposition 9 The allocation rules
{
Ct, Dt, {zj,t, lj,t+1, nj,t+1, dj,t+1}j∈Ω ,Kf,t+1
}∞
t=0
and
policies {ζt, Tt}∞t=0 in a competitive equilibrium satisfy conditions B.1-B.9. Furthermore,
given the allocation rules and policies that satisfy B.1-B.9, we can construct the price rules
{Mt,t+1, Rd,t+1, Rl,t+1, Rk,t+1}∞t=0 that together with the given allocations and policies con-
stitute a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. The first part of the proof is quite straightforward and follows from the fact that the
competitive equilibrium is symmetric. For the second part of the proof, I use the Ramsey
allocations to construct the prices as follows:
Mt,t+1 =
(
v (Ct+1, Dt+2)
v (Ct, Dt+1)
) 1
η˜
−γ (Ct+1
Ct
)− 1
η˜
,
Rd,t+1 =
1
Et [Mt,t+1]
(
1− χ
(
Dt+1
Ct
)− 1
η
)
,
Rl,t+1 = αbe
a¯b+at+1Lαb−1t+1 ,
Rk,t+1 = αfe
at+1K
αf−1
f,t+1 .
The expressions for the SDF, deposits rate and rate of return on capital along with the
budget constraint B.1 and condition B.2 ensure that the households choose their optimal
allocations for consumption and deposits. Similarly, the expression for the rate of return on
loans together with the capital constraint B.9, balance sheet constraint B.3 and condition
B.4 ensures that the banks choose their optimal lending level and capital structure. The
net distributions to the banks’ shareholders B.7 are defined by the same expressions in the
competitive and Ramsey equilibria. The government budget constraint B.6 and resource
constraint B.5 are identical. 
Alternatively, the problem of a Ramsey planner can be restated in accordance with the pri-
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mal approach, by substituting in prices, namely, Rd,t+1, Rl,t+1 and Rk,t+1. Given the policy
rules {ζ∗t , T ∗t }∞t=1 that solve the Ramsey problems, the households, banks and firms would
optimally choose the allocation rules
{
C∗t ,
{
z∗j,t
}
j∈Ω
, Z∗t , L∗t+1, N∗t+1, D∗t+1,K∗f,t+1
}∞
t=0
in a
competitive equilibrium.
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APPENDIX C: Welfare Costs of Capital Requirement
The compensating variation $, which is the permanent change in consumption that house-
holds are willing to accept to move from the economy with a fixed level of capital requirement
ζ0 to the world with a capital ratio of ζ1, is defined by:
Eζ0
 ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(1 +$) C˜t
)1−γ − 1
1− γ
 = Eζ1
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
C˜1−γt − 1
1− γ
]
. (C.1)
or, equivalently:
$ =
Eζ1
[∑+∞
t=0 β
tC˜1−γt
]
Eζ0
[∑+∞
t=0 β
tC˜1−γt
]

1
1−γ
− 1.
To obtain an estimate of expected lifetime utility, I first solve for agents’ decision rules in
a competitive equilibrium, varying the capital regulation in place. Next, I perform 1, 000
simulations of a Ramsey equilibrium. Within each simulation, at a random point on the
time path, a new regime of capital charges is introduced. Then, using agents’ decision
rules, I generate 10, 000 observations for the households’ consumption and deposits from
the period when a new regime has been introduced on. Finally, I evaluate the realized
utility under the new regime and average it over the simulations. This approach allows me
to take into account the transition dynamics between different policy regimes.
It is crucial to take into the account the transition dynamics to get the correct welfare
ranking. In a competitive equilibrium with a lower level of capital requirement, the financial
intermediaries accumulate a higher stock of capital. In the long-run, this delivers a higher
level of consumption, but it is costly for the households in the short run, since they have
to reduce consumption in order to boost capital investment. So, if I were to compare the
realized utility based on the simulations where I burn initial observations, I would find
that economies with strict capital requirements always generate lower welfare results than
economies with low capital ratios. To understand why the compensation variation is affected
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by the transition dynamics and changes in the steady state levels, define consumption as
the product of its cycle component, denoted by C˜∗t , and level component, denoted by gt:1
C˜t = gtC˜
∗
t .
By taking a second-order Taylor expansion of the momentary utility function, I obtain:
E
[(
C˜∗t
)1−γ] ≈ 1− 1
2
γ (1− γ)σ2
C˜∗t
.
Substituting the above expression in C.1 delivers:
(1 +$)1−γ
(
1− 1
2
γ (1− γ)σ2
C˜
∗ζ0
t
)( ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
gζ
0
t
)1−γ)
=
(
1− 1
2
γ (1− γ)σ2
C˜
∗ζ1
t
)( ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
gζ
1
t
)1−γ)
.
By taking logs and using that log (1 + x) ≈ x, I get:
$ ≈ −1
2
γ
(
σ2
C˜∗ζ
1
t
− σ2
C˜∗ζ
0
t
)
+
1
1− γ
(
log
( ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
gζ
1
t
)1−γ)− log( ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
gζ
0
t
)1−γ))
.
Recall that the Lucas cost of eliminating business cycle risk in this framework is equal to
−12γσ2C˜∗t .
1The level component gt captures the transition dynamics (temporary trend) between a steady state of
the economy with a fixed level of capital requirement ζ0 to a steady state of the world with a capital ratio
of ζ1.
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APPENDIX D: Barclays Index Data
Table D.1: Barclays Index Data
Index Start Quality Minimum Minimum Size
Date Issue Size Maturity ($billion)
(or Average Dec-2014
Life)
Long-Term Debt Components:
U.S. Corporate IG Jan-73 IG $250 m 1 year $ 3,892
U.S. Corporate HY Jan-83 HY $150 m 1 year $ 1,311
U.S. 144a Ex-Aggregate Feb-98 IG $250 m 1 year $ 1,287
U.S. Commercial MBS Jun-99 IG, HY $250 m 1 year $ 390
and HY
U.S. Fixed-Rate ABS Jan-92 IG $500m Deal Size 1 year $ 96
$25m Tranche Size
U.S. Tax-Exempt Municipals Jan-73 IG $250 m 1 year $ 42
U.S. Convertibles Composite Jan-03 IG, HY $250 m 1 month $ 220
and HY
Short-Term Debt Components:
U.S. Floating-Rate ABS May-05 IG $500m Deal Size 1 year $ 109
$25m Tranche Size
U.S. Floating Rate Notes Oct-03 IG $300 m 1 month $ 278
(13 months
prior Apr-07)
U.S. Floating Rate Notes HY March-06 HY $150 m 1 year $ 6
U.S. Short-Term Corporate Index June-04 IG 1 month $ 298
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APPENDIX E: Cyclical Properties of Payouts: Robustness
Figure E.1 shows the term structure of asset payout cyclicality based on value-weighted
global GDP, value-weighted global GDP excluding the United States, and equal-weighted
global GDP. To compute global GDP, we use the OECD quarterly output data for 17
major industrialized countries, such as the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
We perform a variety of checks to assess the robustness of our payout cyclicality results.
Specifically, in addition to the benchmark sample from 1975 to 2014, we consider shorter
sample which stops in 2006 before the Financial Crisis, as well as the most recent sample
from 2007 to 2014. For equity data, we also provide the results for the 1949-2014 and
1949-2006 samples. The benchmark results are based on the changes in annual payouts
sampled at annual frequency. To extend the sample size, we consider sampling the data at
quarterly frequency. First, we consider changes in annual payouts (that is, the payouts over
the past four quarters relative to the payouts over the same four quarters in the previous
year), sampled at quarterly frequency. Next, we look at changes in quarterly payouts, which
are seasonally adjusted through the band-pass filter or the X-12 ARIMA filter. Finally, we
consider year-to-year changes in quarterly payouts (that is, quarterly payouts this year
relative to the payout in the same quarter in a previous year), again sampled at quarterly
frequency. The results are consistent across all the specifications, and show that cash
payouts are generally procyclical, while changes in net issuances and total payouts seem
acyclical to mildly counter-cyclical.
133
Figure E.1: Term structure of Asset Payout Cyclicality: Global Risks
a) Value-Weighted Global GDP
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b) Value-Weighted Global GDP, excluding US
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The Figure shows multi-horizon correlations between changes in total asset payouts, scaled by the global
output level, and measures of global output growth. The left panel shows the results for the cash payouts,
the middle panel is for the net issuances, and the right panel plots the correlations for the total payouts.
Measures of global output include value-weighted GDP, value-weighted GDP excluding the U.S., and equally-
weighted GDP. The data are real quarterly observations, sampled on a quarterly frequency and from Q1.1975
to Q4.2014.
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Table E.1: Equity Payout Cyclicality
Corr (·,∆ct) ∆DtCt
∆NIt
Ct
∆ISSt
Ct
∆REPt
Ct
∆Da,t
Ct
Sample 1949-2014:
Annual change 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.16 -0.10
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.27 0.21 0.27 0.19 -0.20
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.09 -0.09
Quarterly change, year-to-year 0.25 0.10 0.16 0.15 -0.09
Sample 1949-2006:
Annual change 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.12 -0.17
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.16 0.26 0.28 0.13 -0.25
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.04 -0.12
Quarterly change, year-to-year 0.27 0.15 0.18 0.09 -0.14
Sample 1975-2014:
Annual change 0.23 -0.12 0.07 0.25 0.14
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.30 0.02 0.17 0.29 0.00
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.19 0.01 0.08 0.16 -0.01
Quarterly change, year-to-year 0.23 -0.03 0.13 0.22 0.05
Sample 1975-2006:
Annual change 0.19 -0.06 0.09 0.21 0.07
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.02 0.11 0.18 0.18 -0.11
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.08 -0.05
Quarterly change, year-to-year 0.22 0.04 0.14 0.14 -0.03
Sample 2007-2014:
Annual change 0.53 -0.34 -0.03 0.28 0.39
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.51 0.09 0.23 0.16 -0.03
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.33 -0.13 0.15 0.37 0.09
Quarterly change, raw series 0.56 -0.34 0.22 0.58 0.40
The Table reports correlations between changes in the equity payouts, scaled by the consumption level, and
consumption growth. The equity payouts include cash payouts, net issuances, issuances, repurchases, and
total payouts. Payouts are sampled at quarterly frequency, and are either annual or quarterly, seasonally
adjusted through a band-pass filter, X12-ARIMA filter, or by computing year-to-year changes.
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Table E.2: Debt Payout Cyclicality
Corr (·,∆ct) ∆DtCt
∆NIt
Ct
∆Da,t
Ct
Sample 1975-2014:
Annual change 0.21 0.13 -0.10
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.33 0.17 -0.14
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.19 0.11 -0.09
Quarterly change, year-to-year 0.30 0.11 -0.08
Sample 1975-2006:
Annual change 0.03 0.08 -0.08
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.09 -0.06 0.07
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.03 -0.03 0.03
Quarterly change, year-to-year 0.08 -0.01 0.02
Sample 2007-2014:
Annual change 0.26 0.24 -0.23
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.39 0.45 -0.44
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.34 0.22 -0.20
Quarterly change, year-to-year 0.63 0.48 -0.44
The Table reports correlations between changes in debt payouts, scaled by the consumption level, and
consumption growth. The debt payouts include cash payouts, net issuances, and total payouts. Payouts are
sampled at quarterly frequency, and are either annual or quarterly, seasonally adjusted through a band-pass
filter, X12-ARIMA filter, or by computing year-to-year changes.
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Table E.3: Asset Payout Cyclicality
Corr (·,∆ct) ∆DtCt
∆NIt
Ct
∆Da,t
Ct
Sample 1975-2014:
Annual change 0.25 0.00 0.05
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.41 0.16 -0.11
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.26 0.05 -0.02
Quarterly change, year-to-year 0.34 0.06 -0.02
Sample 1975-2006:
Annual change 0.10 -0.01 0.02
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.08 0.07 -0.06
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.12 0.03 -0.01
Quarterly change, year-to-year 0.17 0.03 -0.01
Sample 2007-2014:
Annual change 0.39 0.09 -0.00
Quarterly change, band-passed 0.59 0.38 -0.35
Quarterly change, x12 ARIMA 0.43 0.06 -0.02
Quarterly change, year-to-year 0.70 0.30 -0.20
The Table reports correlations between changes in asset payouts, scaled by the consumption level, and
consumption growth. The asset payouts include cash payouts, net issuances, and total payouts. Payouts are
sampled at quarterly frequency, and are either annual or quarterly, seasonally adjusted through a band-pass
filter, X12-ARIMA filter, or by computing year-to-year changes.
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Figure E.2: Term structure of Asset Cash Payout Cyclicality: Normalized Changes versus
Log Growth Rate
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The Figure shows multi-horizon correlations of consumption growth with changes in total asset cash payouts
scaled by the consumption level (solid line) or the log growth rates in asset cash payouts (dashed line). The
data are real quarterly observations, sampled on a quarterly frequency and from Q1.1975 to Q4.2014.
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APPENDIX F: Wavelet Analysis
The wavelet correlation between two stochastic processes x and y for scale λj = 2
j−1 equals
to
ρxy (λj) =
Cov
(
W
(x)
j,t ,W
(y)
j,t
)
{
V ar
(
W
(x)
j,t
)
V ar
(
W
(y)
j,t
)} 1
2
,
whereW
(x)
j,t andW
(y)
j,t are the scale λj maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform (MODWT)
coefficients for x and y, respectively. Since this is just a correlation coefficient between two
random variables on a scale by scale basis, −1 ≥ ρxy (λj) ≤ 1 for all j. The MODWT
coefficient for a stochastic process u is defined as
W
(u)
j,t =
Lj−1∑
l=0
h˜j,lut−l,
where
{
h˜j,0, ..., h˜j,Lj−1
}
are the wavelet filter coefficients from a Daubechies compactly
supported wavelet family, with Lj =
(
2j − 1) (L− 1) + 1.
We estimate the sample wavelet correlation by simply using the estimators of wavelet co-
variance and wavelet variance, respectively,
γˆxy (λj) =
1
Tj
T−1∑
t=Lj−1
W
(x)
j,tW
(y)
j,t & νˆ
2
x (λj) =
1
Tj
T−1∑
t=Lj−1
(
W
(x)
j,t
)2
,
with Tj = T − Lj + 1.
Whitcher et al. (2000) establish a central limit theorem for the estimator of wavelet corre-
lation,
ρˆxy (λj) =
γˆxy (λj)
νˆx (λj) νˆy (λj)
,
and construct an approximate confidence interval (CI). An approximate 100 (1− 2p) % CI
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for ρxy (λj) is given by
tanh
tanh−1 (ρˆxy (λj))± Φ−1 (1− p)√Tj − L′j − 3
 ,
with L′j = (L− 2)
(
1− 2−j).
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APPENDIX G: Model Solution
The equilibrium consumption claim loadings are given by
A0,c =
1
1− κ1,c
(
log (δ) +
(
1− 1
ψ
)
µc + κ0,c + κ1,cA2,c (1− ν)σ20 +
θ
2
(κ1,cA2,cσω)
2
)
,
A1,c =
1− 1ψ
1− κ1,cρx ,
A2,c = −
(
1− 1ψ
)
(γ − 1)
2 (1− κ1,cν)
(
1 +
(
κ1,cϕx
1− κ1,cρx
)2)
.
The market prices of risks are,
λη = γ,
λe = − (θ − 1)κ1,cA1,cϕx,
λω = − (θ − 1)κ1,cA2,c.
The log-linearization coefficients for the corporate asset satisfy,
κ0,d = log
(
1 + exp {vcd}+ exp
{
dc
}− exp{hc})− κ1,dvcd − κ2,ddc− κ3,dhc,
κ1,d =
exp {vcd}
1 + exp {vcd}+ exp
{
dc
}− exp{hc} ,
κ2,d =
exp
{
dc
}
1 + exp {vcd}+ exp
{
dc
}− exp{hc} ,
κ3,d = −
exp
{
hc
}
1 + exp {vcd}+ exp
{
dc
}− exp{hc} .
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The loadings for the corporate claim are given by,
A0,d =
1
1− κ1,d
(
m0 + µc + κ0,d + κ1,dA2,d (1− ν)σ20 + (κ1,dA3,d + κ2,d)µs (1− ρs) + ...
+ κ3,dµh + 0.5 (κ1,dA2,d − λω)2 σ2ω
)
,
A1,d =
1
1− κ1,dρx
((
1− 1
ψ
)
+
κ2,dφs
1− κ1,dρs
)
,
A2,d =
1
1− κ1,dν
(
m2 + 0.5
(
(1− λη)2 + (κ1,dA1,dϕx − λe)2 + ...
+ (κ1,dA3,d + κ2,d)
2 ϕ2s + 2α (1− λη) (κ1,dA3,d + κ2,d)ϕs + κ23,dϕ2h
))
,
A3,d =
κ2,dρs
1− κ1,dρs .
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